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Definition. A Conviction Review Unit (CRU), sometimes called a Conviction Integrity Unit, conducts extrajudicial, 
fact-based review of secured convictions to investigate plausible allegations of actual innocence. A CRU is typically 
contained within a local prosecutor’s office. 
Best Practices. A CRU dedicated to collaborative, good-faith case reviews designed to ensure the factual integrity of a 
conviction should be independent, flexible, and transparent in its work. 
INDEPENDENCE
An independent CRU should: 
1. Report directly to the District Attorney (DA) or prosecuting attorney, or head of the prosecutor’s office, and 
should not be contained within the Office’s appellate or post-conviction/habeas unit. 
2. Be led by an attorney with firsthand prosecutorial and criminal defense experience, who is widely respected by 
attorneys within the DA’s Office and throughout the jurisdiction’s criminal justice community.
3. Guard against cognitive or confirmatory biases by including the perspective of at least one external criminal 
defense attorney in the process of CRU policy definition, case screening, case investigation, and recommendations 
for action.
4. Be appropriately resourced by attorneys, investigators and staff for whom CRU cases have clear priority above 
other office matters, with sufficient personnel and budget resources to enable timely investigations and thorough 
and thoughtful recommendations.  
5. Train CRU personnel on specific topics including:
a. Errors in criminal justice known to be factors in inaccurate convictions;
b. “Human factors” and emerging issues in forensic science that may impact past convictions secured by the use 
of older scientific methods; and
c. Specific investigative techniques useful for “cold cases;”
6. Exclude personnel who participated in an underlying case under review from the CRU’s decision-making 
regarding the case, limiting participation in such cases to the provision of historical information; and
7. Establish a clear written policy on when and how to refer to appropriate authorities any credible allegations of 
official misconduct (e.g., prosecutorial or law enforcement) identified in the course of a case review.
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FLEXIBILITY
A flexible CRU should: 
8. Accept any and all cases for review that have a plausible or colorable claim of factual innocence for the conviction 
obtained;
9. Provide procedural support for fact-based case reviews, tolling any ongoing appellate litigation during active 
CRU review and minimizing barriers to the Petitioner’s collaborative participation in case review process;
10. Review all petitions on their factual merits, and not on non-substantive grounds:
a. Permit review of petitions in which the Petitioner plead guilty to the charges;
b. Permit review of petitions where the sentence has been completed;
c. Evaluate claims based on a current understanding of the totality of the circumstances now known, rather 
than what could have been presented or known by defense counsel during the pendency of the original case;
d. Review cases where due process claims (ineffective assistance of counsel, newly discovered evidence, official 
misconduct, etc.) support underlying allegations of innocence, and cases where testimonial evidence is the 
sole assertion of innocence; and 
11. Allow for resubmission of a petition whenever additional credible evidence is brought to light.
TRANSPARENCY
A Transparent CRU should:
12. Vacate each conviction where there is clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence, or where in the interests 
of justice, the CRU no longer believes that the current evidence supports the conviction beyond a reasonable 
doubt;
13. Refile charges only in cases where there is substantial evidence of guilt notwithstanding evidence gathered during 
the investigation of the petition;
14. Consider time served when deciding whether to refile charges, even in instances where evidence of guilt remains;
15. Communicate in an ongoing and timely fashion to Petitioner or Petitioner’s counsel regarding case review, 
including sharing any evidence gathered, and explaining the actions taken and conclusions drawn from the 
review;
16. Encourage an open exchange of information and ideas regarding the case review between Petitioner and 
CRU, including open file discovery and contemporaneous disclosure of information discovered in the CRU 
investigation (other than CRU work product information and information that could endanger third parties);
17. Outline any information withheld from the petitioner during the review and establish a process for third-party 
review of such withheld information;
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18. Make all physical evidence available for testing by either party, including re-testing of a previously tested object 
if the proposed method of testing can provide additional information; 
19. Provide testing of evidence that may provide conclusive evidence of innocence at no cost to Petitioner, and 
permit other testing at Petitioner’s cost;
20. Publish clear CRU policies and procedures designed to ensure flexibility of operations and encourage the 
submission of petitions for review. Suggested areas for published policies and procedures include:
i. How to submit a claim
ii. Types of cases accepted for review
iii. Standards of review for initial case acceptance (screening), case review, and vacating a conviction
iv. Role of Petitioner/Petitioner’s counsel in case review
v. Role of original prosecutor/ investigator in case review
vi. Requirements on waiver of attorney/client privilege, or use of a collaboration agreement
vii. Sharing of information learned/evidence discovered during case review
viii. Conduct and payment for requested forensic testing
ix. Procedures for handling allegations of prosecutorial or law enforcement misconduct
x. Disclosure of final decision after case review and supporting rationale
xi. Ability of Petitioner to revisit process after final decision  
19. Engage a victim’s advocate to liaise with victims or their families during the CRU investigation phase, once the 
CRU determines that there is a reasonable possibility that the underlying conviction was inaccurate; and
20. Track and report on CRU activity at least annually, including but not limited to: number of petitions received, 
number reviewed, number accepted for additional review, reasons for rejecting reviews, number acted upon, types 
of issues in cases, final conclusions, etc.
PREVENTION
In addition, a CRU should seek to implement a culture of learning from error within the prosecutor’s office, 
suggesting reforms to prevent the recurrence of errors that resulted in an inaccurate conviction. A CRU seeking to 
prevent the recurrence of errors should:
21. Conduct a root cause analysis or “Just Culture Event Review,” separate and apart from the CRU case review, on 
each case where a recommendation is made to alter a conviction, to understand and address the circumstances 
and environments that allowed one or more errors to occur in the administration of justice;
22. Identify improved policies and procedures for each stakeholder that might prevent the recurrence of the error(s) 
that permitted the flawed conviction to occur; and
23. Construct a process to implement, publicize and evaluate those modifications throughout the jurisdiction.
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As Conviction Review Units have emerged across the 
United States, community and other observers have 
sought to evaluate their impact and to identify those 
CRUs that are sincere about investigating and resolving 
credible allegations of factual innocence among closed 
convictions. A skepticism prevails that some CRUs are 
units conducting “Conviction Review In Name Only,” 
or “CRINOs.” This skepticism is fueled by CRUs that 
lack the independence, flexibility, and transparency that 
is described herein.
There is no single, conclusive measure that reveals 
whether a particular unit is a sincere CRU or a callow 
CRINO. This is true even of the metric that most casual 
observers focus on – the number of exonerated individuals 
CRU Checklist
whose convictions were vacated by the Unit.  Accordingly, 
observers should not point to any individual “best practice” 
recommended in this paper as definitive proof that any 
particular CRU is or is not engaged in the good faith 
review of cases of error that is at the core of the CRU’s 
potential to change criminal justice for the better. In fact, 
none of the CRUs we interviewed answered all of these 
questions as we suggest below, and in the opinion of the 
authors, many (in fact, most) of them are sincere CRUs. 
By asking the following questions as a group, however, 
we believe that an overall profile of sincere CRUs will 
emerge that can distinguish them from CRINOs, or that 
will prompt a conversation in offices that have not yet 
embraced the precepts of other established CRUs.
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   Sincere CRU:  Potential for 
   Indicator of  Conviction 
   Independence, Review In 
   Flexibility, Name Only 
   Transparency  
Does	the	CRU	report	to	the	DA/Head	of	Office?	 Yes	 No
Does	the	CRU	exist	within	the	appellate/habeas/post-conviction	unit	of	  
the	Office?
How	many	attorneys	are	dedicated	to	the	CRU	full-time?	 More	 Fewer
	 •	 Is	the	leader	of	the	CRU	a	senior	attorney	widely	respected	in	 Yes	 No 
	 	 the	Office?
	 •	 Does	the	leader	of	the	CRU	have	defense	experience?	 Yes	 No
Does	the	CRU	include	external	participants		
	 •	 In	policy	creation?
	 •	 In	case	selection?
	 •	 In	case	investigation/review?
	 •	 In	recommendations	for	action?	
Does	the	CRU	have	its	own	budget?	 Yes	 No
Is	the	CRU	sufficiently	funded	to	thoroughly	review	and	investigate	all		  
credible petitions within a reasonable period of time? 
Does	the	Office	provide	training	to	personnel	conducting	CRU	case	  
reviews?
Does the CRU provide training to personnel concerning learnings from  
case reviews?
Does	the	CRU	have	written	policies	and	procedures	describing	its	work?
	 •	 Are	the	CRU’s	policies	and	procedures	posted	on	its	web	site?
	 •	 Are	the	CRU’s	policies	and	procedures	available	upon	request?	
Does	the	CRU	permit	individuals	who	participated	in	the	underlying	case	  
to participate in CRU case reviews?
Does	the	CRU	provide	any	new	evidence	gathered	during	a	case	review		  
to Petitioner in a timely fashion?
Does	the	CRU	have	a	policy	on	when	and	how	to	report	exculpatory	  
information	gathered	during	a	case	review?
	 No	 Yes
	 Yes	 No
	 Yes	 No
	 Yes	 No
	 Yes	 No
	 Yes	 No
	 Yes	 No
	 No	 Yes
 Faster Slower
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Does the CRU have a policy on when and how to report credible   
allegations	of	official	misconduct,	either	related	to	the	petition	or	during	 
the	case	review,	from	law	enforcement,	the	prosecutors’	office,	or	other	 
sources?	
Does	the	CRU	reject	petitions	of	actual	innocence	on	the	basis	of	 
procedural	grounds:
	 •	 Guilty	pleas
	 •	 Exhausted	appeals
	 •	 Sentence	status
	 •	 Due	process	claims	
Does	the	CRU	make	physical	evidence	available	to	Petitioner	or		  
Petitioner’s	counsel	for	testing?	
Does	the	CRU	voluntarily	toll	appellate	proceedings	while	conducting		  
a case review? 
Does	the	CRU	permit	resubmission	of	a	petition	if	credible	factual		  
information	supporting	innocence	is	found	after	a	prior	CRU	review?	
Does	the	CRU	communicate	with	the	Petitioner	or	Petitioner’s	counsel		  
throughout	the	assessment	and	investigation	stages	of	case	review?	
Does	the	CRU	allow	Petitioner	or	Petitioner’s	counsel	to	participate		  
in case investigation? 
When	making	recommendations	about	a	specific	petition,	does	the		  
CRU	evaluate	the	totality	of	the	circumstances	as	now	understood,	rather	 
than	assessing	the	reasonableness	of	the	Office’s	actions	at	the	time	of	 
the	underlying	case?	
Does	the	CRU	communicate	the	rationale	for	its	decisions	to	Petitioner		  
or	Petitioner’s	counsel	before	that	decision	is	final?
	 •	 Is	the	rationale	provided	in	writing?	
Does	the	CRU	provide	annual	reporting	on	its	activities	and	impact?	 Yes	 No
   Sincere CRU:  Potential for 
   Indicator of  Conviction 
   Independence, Review In 
   Flexibility, Name Only 
   Transparency  
	 Yes	 No
	 Yes	 No
	 Yes	 No
	 Yes	 No
	 Yes	 No
	 Yes	 No
	 Yes	 No
	 No		 Yes
	 Yes	 No
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1.	 North	Carolina	
	 Inn.	Inq.	Comm.
2.	 Santa	Clara	County,	CA
3.	 Dallas	County,	TX
4.	 Harris	County,	TX	
5.	 Wayne	County,	MI	
6.	 Colorado	JRP
7.	 New	York	County,	NY
8.	 Kings	County,	NY
9.	 Oneida	County,	NY
Figure 1.  Conviction Review Units In The United States, December 2015
10.	 Baltimore	City,	MD
11.	 Cook	County,	IL
12.	 Lake	County,	IL
13.	 Ventura	County,	CA
14.	 Suffolk	County,	MA
15.	 Nassau	County,	NY
16.	 Philadelphia	County,	PA
17.	 Cuyahoga	County,	OH
18.	 Middlesex	County,	MA	
19.	 Yolo	County,	CA
22
19
2
2713
20
26
23
6
25
3
424
12
11
5
17
9
21
10
14
188
15
7
16
Participated	in	Survey
Special	Purpose	CRU	Participated
Did	Not	Participate	in	Survey
Announced	Late	2015
Offices in PURPLE TEXT were initiated after January 2014.
*The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office formed a “liaison” with the California Innocence Project in March, 2011 to review cases where actual 
innocence was alleged; this liaison was announced as a formal Conviction Review Unit in December, 2012.
20.	 Los	Angeles	County,	CA
21.	 Washington,	DC
22.	 Multnomah	County,	OR	
23.	 Pima	County,	AZ
24.	 Bexar	County,	TX
25.	 Tarrant	County,	TX
26.	 San	Diego	County,	CA	 
(ann.	12/15)*
27.	 Clark	County,	NV	 
(ann.	12/15)
1
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It	should	be	the	bedrock	that…	you’re	trying	to	do	the	correct	thing,	the	just	thing	and	not	necessarily	
doing	the	thing	that	 just	 favors	your	side.	This	 is	very	contraindicated	to	people	who	get	 into	trial	
work	on	both	sides,	because	people	who	get	into	trial	work	are	highly	competitive	people…	We’re	
not	doing	this	just	to	correct	past	mistakes.	We’re	doing	this	to	try	to	get	something	out	that	can	be	
a	road	map	[explaining],	here	is	where	you	did	something	wrong,	and	correct	it	so	that	there	are	not	
wrongful	convictions	in	the	future.
–Conviction	Review	Unit	Lead	Prosecutor
Introduction
Over the past two decades, Americans have grown more 
and more aware of the number of individuals across our 
country who have been convicted of crimes they did not 
commit. As of March 1, 2016, there were 1,747 such 
exonerated individuals across the United States.1 While 
it is typically defense attorneys or prisoners themselves 
who first bring these exoneration cases to light, the fate 
of each individual claiming innocence from behind bars 
rests (for the most part) with state and local prosecutors 
employed in the very offices that secured the individual’s 
conviction in the first place.  
1 National Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx. The Registry defines an “exoneration” as follows: A person has 
been exonerated if he or she was convicted of a crime and later was either: (1) declared to be factually innocent by a government official or agency with the authority 
to make that declaration; or (2) relieved of all the consequences of the criminal conviction by a government official or body with the authority to take that action. 
The official action may be: (i) a complete pardon by a governor or other competent authority, whether or not the pardon is designated as based on innocence; (ii) an 
acquittal of all charges factually related to the crime for which the person was originally convicted; or (iii) a dismissal of all charges related to the crime for which the 
person was originally convicted, by a court or by a prosecutor with the authority to enter that dismissal. The pardon, acquittal, or dismissal must have been the result, at 
least in part, of evidence of innocence that either (i) was not presented at the trial at which the person was convicted; or (ii) if the person pled guilty, was not known to 
the defendant, the defense attorney and the court at the time the plea was entered. The evidence of innocence need not be an explicit basis for the official action that 
exonerated the person.
Mindful that “[t]he prosecutor has more control over 
life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in 
America,”2 and aware of the ethical duty “to seek 
justice, not merely to convict,”3 many prosecutors have 
responded to the rise of exonerations by acknowledging 
the potential for mistakes in the criminal justice system, 
and working to establish an objective process to review 
cases where mistakes may have been made regarding guilt 
or innocence, taking any and all appropriate actions to 
ensure that justice is done, including vacating a previously 
secured conviction.
While all prosecutors’ offices have a procedure for 
handling appeals, including habeas corpus or post-
conviction appeals, the most prevalent institutional 
response by prosecutors to address fact-based post-
conviction claims of actual innocence is the Conviction 
Review Unit (CRU), sometimes called the Conviction 
Integrity Unit.4 Since the first CRU was created in 
the mid-2000s,5 more than 25 such units have been 
announced across the country. See Figure 1.
The creation of a CRU is a public commitment by the 
DA6 to ensure the accuracy, and therefore the legitimacy 
– that is, the integrity – of all criminal convictions 
secured by the Office. As Los Angeles (CA) County 
District Attorney Jackie Lacey said when announcing her 
Conviction Review Unit in June, 2015:
Just	as	we	are	expected	to	keep	pace	
with advances in forensic science, 
technology and investigative methods, 
prosecutorial	 agencies	 also	 must	
update	and	formalize	the	way	in	which	
post-conviction	 claims	 of	 innocence	
are	 handled.	 We	 must	 respond	
whenever	we	 receive	 new	 substantial	
and credible information that the 
evidence	 used	 to	 imprison	 someone	
for	 a	 serious	 or	 violent	 felony	 is	 not	
trustworthy.	 We	 must	 review	 that	
information and determine if we 
remain	confident	in	the	conviction.	As	
prosecutors,	we	have	a	legal	obligation	
and	an	ethical	mandate	to	ensure	that	
the right person is convicted for the 
crime	charged.7 
The philosophy of a CRU is straightforward, but 
implementing such a unit in a highly charged political 
and adversarial environment can be complex and 
challenging. Furthermore, each jurisdiction that has 
created a CRU has independently defined its structure, 
scope, and operations, often in reaction to a limited 
number of unique cases. Very few CRUs have written 
protocols, policies, or procedures, and what protocols 
do exist have rarely been made public. Accordingly, we 
sought to conduct a national survey of CRU practices and 
their impact.  
2 Jackson, Robert H., “The Federal Prosecutor,” Address at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys, Washington, DC, April 1, 1940, p. 1.
3 ABA Model Rule 3.8(a)
4 Although the first units called themselves “Conviction Integrity Units,” more units over time have come to favor the label “Conviction Review Units.” The word 
“Review” is often preferred as a more accurate representation of what the Unit does. In addition, some prosecutors feel that reviewing cases for “integrity” might cause 
an inference that “integrity” does not exist in all convictions. Because we use the term “conviction integrity” in this paper to refer to an evaluation of a conviction in a 
case where neither guilt nor innocence have been proven to a certainty, we use the term “Conviction Review Unit” throughout.
5 Two offices, Santa Clara (CA) and Dallas (TX) typically vie for the title of “First CRU.”  Santa Clara set up a nascent CRU in 2004, but it took a one-term hiatus 
under a new DA before being reinstated in 2008. Craig Watkins became the DA in Dallas County (TX) in 2007 and started the longest continuously operating CRU 
at that time; it is the publicity this office garnered that gets most of the credit for leading the wave of CRUs that has followed. It is San Diego, however, that may 
properly lay claim to the origination of the concept, when Deputy District Attorney Woody Clark started a “DNA Innocence Project” in his office in 2000 to review 
claims of actual innocence that could be resolved through DNA testing.
6 We use the term “District Attorney” and associated abbreviations, etc. herein as a global term for non-federal prosecutors, including jurisdictions where the local 
prosecutors are referred to as “State’s Attorney.”
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There are too few CRUs operating for too short a 
time to obtain conclusive assessments of the utility of 
different policies or procedures, or to measure the impact 
of a CRU on criminal justice outcomes or perceptions. 
Still, there is value in an empirical attempt to draw 
observational theories or lessons learned by the first wave 
of CRUs. Commentary on CRUs has been limited, and 
for the most part anecdotal, consisting mainly of media 
accounts of the creation of individual CRUs. The concept 
of conviction integrity has been discussed with a focus on 
prosecutorial “best practices” that could prevent errors,8 
while discussions of CRUs have focused on either 
their roles in the exoneration of innocent individuals 
or theoretical suggestions for their application.9 Given 
the rapid increase in the number of CRUs nationwide 
(fourteen new CRUs have been announced since the 
start of 2014)10 and the lack of standards or evaluations 
of policies, procedures, and impact of CRUs, a more 
detailed assessment of the actual policies and practices of 
operating CRUs may be helpful to a variety of audiences.
This paper seeks to help:
(a) Prosecutors in offices with established CRUs 
understand how their peers have approached 
common challenges that arise in the fact-based, 
extrajudicial review of convictions to ensure 
conviction accuracy and integrity;
(b) Prosecutors in offices without CRUs accelerate 
the creation of units with maximum positive 
impact; and 
(c) Communities that have or want CRUs evaluate 
such units and ensure that CRUs are living up to 
their aspirations for improvement of the criminal 
justice system over time.
7 “Why A Conviction Review Unit is Needed: Jackie Lacey,” Los Angeles Daily News, June 24, 2015, accessed at http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20150625/why-a-
conviction-review-unit-is-needed-jackie-lacey, last visited September 9, 2015.
8 Barkow et al., Center of the Administration of Criminal Law, New York University School of Law, “Establishing Conviction Integrity Programs in Prosecutors’ 
Offices.”
9 Gross, Samuel, et al., “The National Registry of Exonerations: Exonerations in 2014,” Published January 27, 2015, available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/about.aspx; Scheck, Barry, “Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating 
Them,” Cardozo L. Rev. 31:6 (2010), 2216-56.
10 The Orleans Parish (LA) District Attorney’s Office announced a CRU in collaboration with the Innocence Project New Orleans in late 2014; the collaboration was 
concluded in January, 2016. http://www.theneworleansadvocate.com/news/14502358-64/cannizzaro-innocence-project-call-it-quits-on-project-to-unearth-false-convictions
To date, CRUs have focused on identifying and 
correcting past errors in convictions. Some are beginning 
to perceive the additional potential of the CRU to be a 
driver of quality improvement, learning from errors to 
propose procedural or environmental reforms throughout 
a jurisdiction to prevent future errors.  But the potential 
value of a CRU extends even beyond these important 
goals. Sincere CRUs that conduct open and honest 
reviews of post-conviction claims of actual innocence 
stand as a triumph of truth and justice over procedural 
legal formality, and of collaboration over adversarialism, 
competitiveness, or bias. As such, they restore faith in our 
criminal justice system by practicing the highest ideals 
of truth and justice that are often preached, and often 
doubted.
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The very creation of a Conviction Review Unit should be 
seen as a promising development in the administration 
of justice, as it highlights the prosecutorial role in 
ensuring the legitimacy of criminal convictions, and the 
continuation of that obligation even after a conviction is 
secured.  
While such an ongoing obligation might seem contrary 
to the mission or motives of a District Attorney, the 
prosecutors who took part in our research uniformly believe 
that investigating cases where errors may have occurred 
is not only desirable, but essential. Our requirement that 
the criminal justice system function flawlessly does not 
Creation of the Conviction 
Review Unit
ensure its perfection. Errors in criminal justice, as in 
any human system, persist despite the best efforts of our 
police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and juries. 
Each allegation of wrongful conviction undermines the 
legitimacy of the prosecutorial role, and an office that 
refuses to address such allegations openly and honestly 
adds self-inflicted injury to its reputation. While perhaps 
such errors cannot be eliminated by the system, its actors 
must work to minimize their occurrence and severity.  This 
can be done most effectively by identifying, evaluating 
and learning from every error in a system in a culture of 
relentless and objective self-improvement.11 
11 See Generally, An Organisation With a Memory: Report of an Expert Group on Learning from Adverse Events in the NHS, Chaired by the Chief Medical Officer (The 
Stationery Office 2000), available at https://psnet.ahrq.gov/resources/resource/1568 (a major study undertaken by the National Health Service in the United Kingdom, 
exploring the causes of failure or adverse events, drawing on lessons from other industries, proposing a shift in organizational culture from a culture of blame to 
open reporting and balanced analysis, and arguing for a systems-centered approach to failure analysis rather than a person-centered approach of “blaming, naming 
and shaming”); M. V. Williams, Improving Patient Safety in Radiotherapy by Learning from Near Misses, Incidents and Errors, 80 Brit. J. Radiol. 297 (2007), 
available at https://psnet.ahrq.gov/resources/resource/5673/improving-patient-safety-in-radiotherapy-by-learning-from-near-misses-incidents-and-errors (arguing for the 
implementation of widespread open reporting of near misses, incidents, and errors, with web archiving of the information on publicly available databases in order 
to insure widespread learning); Qing Yan, Michelle C. Bligh & Jeffrey C. Kohles, Absence Makes the Errors Go Longer: How Leaders Inhibit Learning from Errors, 222 
Zeitschrift für Psychologie 233 (2014), available at http://econtent.hogrefe.com/doi/abs/10.1027/2151-2604/a000190 (original research study exploring the effects 
The decision to create a CRU may also arise from a more 
pragmatic place. Most District Attorneys are elected 
officials, politicians as well as prosecutors, and many 
jurisdictions that have created CRUs have received positive 
coverage in the media for placing accuracy in justice on a 
higher pedestal than conviction or case closure rates.12 As 
in other industries, errors or misconduct provide powerful 
incentives for procedural change. Wrongful convictions, 
and the calls for reform they create, are often used by 
challengers to a sitting District Attorney, and high-
profile cases of error are often held up as proof of a DA’s 
lack of competence (if not lack of morals). The creation of 
a CRU, then, can help a sitting DA respond to allegations 
of error or incompetence, or a new DA follow through 
on a campaign promise to improve the Office, each in 
furtherance of community relations:
It	 was	 one	 of	 the	 things	 I	 had	
campaigned	 on,	 and	 this	 issue	 was	 a	
hot	topic	during	our	campaign	because	
[cases	 of	 wrongful	 conviction]	 were	
getting	 a	 lot	 of	 media	 attention.	 It	
was	 a	 big	 issue	 in	 terms	 of	 wrongful	
convictions	and	what’s	the	next	[chief	
prosecutor]	going	to	do	to	address	it.	
Such factors led to the creation of the first CRUs.  In 
Santa Clara, DA George Kennedy was confronted by 
a small number of exonerations in sexual assault cases. 
Working with Assistant DAs David Angel and Karen 
Sununu, Kennedy envisioned a unit within the DA’s 
Office that would identify and implement “best practices” 
to improve the quality of the Office’s prosecutions, and 
ensure the accuracy and legitimacy of its convictions.
Not long after, in 2006, Craig Watkins became the first 
African-American District Attorney of Dallas County, 
supported by a voter base separate from, and disenchanted 
with, the existing Dallas political establishment. Watkins 
campaigned on a platform of reform, bolstered by the 
fact that Dallas had had more post-conviction DNA 
exonerations (12) in the prior five years than any county in 
the nation. When another DNA-based exoneration was 
announced shortly after his inauguration, Watkins met 
the man at the courthouse and offered a public apology to 
the man. Watkins had no role in the exoneration itself and 
has since described his act simply as common courtesy.13 
The media, however, viewed it as something more, and 
the story quickly found its way into the national press.14 
Not long after, Watkins was informed of a substantial 
number of untested rape kits in the possession of the 
Dallas DA’s Office. Taking what he has described as a 
common sense approach to the problem, he ordered the 
testing of all untested kits.15 The result was an increase 
in cases deserving of review, and the combination of 
increased cases and public support both within the 
electoral base and on a national level led Watkins to 
formally create a Conviction Review Unit in 2007 as a 
resource to address these and other such cases that might 
arise.16 Watkins hired Mike Ware, a law professor at Texas 
Wesleyan University School of Law and a board member 
of the Innocence Project of Texas, to oversee the unit and 
engaged law students to conduct the case screenings to 
determine eligibility.17 Importantly, Ware had substantial 
experience as a defense attorney, and was also respected 
by the attorneys at the DA’s Office for being fair and 
trustworthy.18 
 
of five different leadership styles, both positive and negative, on learning from errors); Michael Frese & Nina Keith, Action Errors, Error Management, and Learning 
in Organizations, 66 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 661 (2015), available at http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev- (review of research on error prevention 
and error management, explaining the difference between the two approaches, and discussing the empirical evidence for the positive effects of error management, 
emphasizing the importance for successful learning outcomes of a mindset of acceptance of human error); Suzanne M. Wright, Patient Safety in Anesthesia: Learning 
from the Culture of High-Reliability Organizations, 27 Crit. Care Nurs. Clin. N. Am. 1 (2015), available online at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25725532 
(“In this article the most current understanding of human factors, complex systems, and safety principles borrowed from high-reliability organizations (HRO) is 
provided as a foundation to examine the dynamic and vulnerable nature of anesthesia practice. HROs—industries that deliver reliable performances in the face of 
complex working environments—can serve as models of safety for our health care system until plausible explanations for patient harm are better understood.”)  
12 See, e.g., Emily, J., “Dallas County conviction integrity unit turns focus to non-DNA cases,” Dallas Morning News, March 24, 2010, accessible at http://www.
dallasnews.com/news/community-news/dallas/headlines/20100522-Dallas-County-conviction-integrity-unit-turns-6750.ece; Barber, E., “Dallas targets wrongful 
convictions, and revolution starts to spread,” Christian Science Monitor, May 25, 2014, accessible online at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2014/0525/Dallas-
targets-wrongful-convictions-and-revolution-starts-to-spread; Meminger, D., “Some DA’s Make Effort to Help People Wrongfully Convicted of Crimes,” Time Warner 
NY1 Cable News, July 13, 2015, available online at http://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/criminal-justice/2015/07/13/some-das-make-effort-to-help-people-wrongfully-
convicted-of-crimes.html; Gerber, M., “D.A. creates unit to review claims of innocence,” LA Times, June 29, 2015, available online at http://www.latimes.com/local/
california/la-me-0630-conviction-integrity-20150630-story.html.
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13 2015 Quattrone Center Spring Symposium, “A Systems Approach to Conviction Integrity,” University of Pennsylvania Law School, April 4, 2014, Presentation of 
Craig Watkins.
14 See, e.g., “New Prosecutor Revisits Justice in Dallas,” Sylvia Moreno, Washington Post, March 5, 2007.
15 Watkins, see footnote 13 above.  
16 Moore, Terri, “Prosecutors Reinvestigate Questionable Evidence: Dallas Establishes a `Conviction Integrity Unit,’” Criminal Justice, Volume 26, Number 3, Fall 2011
17 “New Prosecutor Revisits Justice in Dallas,” Sylvia Moreno, Washington Post, March 5, 2007.
18 Scheck, Barry, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models For Creating Them. Cardozo L. Rev. 31:6, 
2010, pp. 2215 – 2256, at 2251.
19 See, e.g., DC Prosecutors Create Unit to Fine Wrongful Convictions,” Washington Post, September 11, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
crime/dc-prosecutors-create-unit-to-find-wrongful-convictions/2014/09/11/91a3722c-39da-11e4-bdfb-de4104544a37_story.html. The Jesse Friedman case in the Second 
Circuit, and the exoneration of Daryl Hunt in North Carolina, provided motivation for the creation of the Nassau County Conviction Review Project and the North 
Carolina Innocence Commission, respectively; in addition, the Wayne County (MI) ballistics review was created to review a group of cases with questionable forensic 
conclusions.
Figure 2. Creation of Conviction Review Units Over Time.
Often the impetus for starting a CRU has been one or 
more specific cases in the jurisdiction, covered in the 
media and raising concern about the local administration 
of justice:19  
We	 had	 had	 an	 exoneration	 in	 this	
county…	 I	 would	 say	 it	 was	 part	 of	
the genesis of the idea of a conviction 
integrity	 program.	 I	 would	 say	 it	
inspired	 the	 idea	 that	 we	 wanted…	
procedures	to	come	up	with	a	way	of	
dealing with it that was a little bit more 
formalized.
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Figure 3.  Impetus for Conviction Review Unit Formation.
The factors that led to the creation of CRUs in Dallas and 
Santa Clara are not unique to these jurisdictions, and as 
public awareness of errors in the administration of justice 
has grown, DAs in other jurisdictions have adopted the 
CRU model in their jurisdictions, at an accelerating pace 
(see Figure 2).
Many DAs, in offices with and without established CRUs, 
have noted that reviews of cases where actual innocence 
has been alleged have always been a part of a prosecutor’s 
job. Still, DAs have seen actual and promotional value in 
the creation of a formal unit that is publicly tasked with 
conducting such case reviews:
We	 got	 a	 new	 district	 attorney	 who	
came	 in…	 and	 started	 the	 unit.	 It	
was	 very	much	done	on	 the	heels	of	
Dallas.	 Dallas	 County’s	 Conviction	
Review	 Unit	 was	 getting	 quite	 a	 lot	
of attention, they were doing a lot of 
good	work	out	there	and	there	was	a	
decision to do a separate and distinct 
unit	in	our	office.	Claims	of	innocence	
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and	 post-conviction	 DNA	 testing	
cases	 had	 been	 previously	 handled	
by	 the	 post-conviction	 writs	 division.	
So	 it’s	not	 that	we	weren’t	doing	 the	
work,	but	we	did	not	have	a	standalone	
section	that	had	100%	of	its	time	and	
resources	 dedicated	 to	 that	 type	 of	
work.
There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 these	 units	
bringing	 up	 across	 the	 country…	
They’re…	 being	 publicized.	 So	 there	
is	a	ground	swell	of	support	for	these	
kinds	 of	 things.	 But	 if	 you	 dig	 a	 little	
deeper	 I	 think	 it’s	 a	 direct	 response	
and	a	result	of	the	Innocence	Project.	
…	[Our	DA]	was	interested	in	it.	He’s	
been	asked	to	do	 it	by	people	 in	and	
out	of	 the	office…	We	needed	 to	be	
able	 to	 have	 a	 unit	 in	 our	office	 that	
would	deal	with	them	directly.
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There is a great deal of variety among CRUs in their 
structure, funding, participants, procedures, cases eligible 
for review, etc. One area of near-unanimous agreement, 
however, is the CRU’s overarching purpose. CRUs exist 
to conduct fact-based reviews of plausible claims of 
actual innocence20 without regard to the type of error or 
mindset of the participants involved.
This focus on fact-based case review pushes the CRU into 
an extrajudicial role, distanced from post-conviction or 
habeas corpus proceedings that expressly avoid assessing 
facts and focus on legal and due process concerns. 
Without reducing the need for those structures in our 
criminal justice system, CRUs seek to avoid decisions 
based on legal or procedural grounds, focusing instead on 
Models of Conviction Review
the injustice that matters most to the typical American 
– did the convicted individual actually commit the crime 
for which he or she was convicted?
   
While all CRUs exist for this stated purpose, they have 
evolved into several models:
“Standard” CRUs. While no two CRUs are identical, 
23 of the units we reviewed share a similar high-level 
structure: one or more experienced Assistant District 
Attorneys21 are given special responsibility within a 
prosecutor’s office to review cases where (a) a conviction 
has been achieved; (b) direct appeals have been rejected; 
and (c) actual innocence is claimed by the convicted 
individual. As we will see, CRUs vary in size and 
20 This paper describes the initial communication to a CRU regarding a case for potential review as a “petition,” and describes the individual claiming innocence as 
the “Petitioner.” In reality, a “petition” may be a letter from the convicted individual him/herself, or a telephone call to the CRU from the individual, his/her family 
member, etc. Our use of “petition” or “Petitioner” should therefore be distinguished from any formal, court-required petition for appellate review.
21 To date, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia is the only federal prosecutor’s office to publicly announce the formation of a CRU. This 
may be in part because of the unique caseload of the USAO in Washington, DC, which handles all manner of violent crimes and “blue collar” misdemeanors and 
felonies that are more typically handled by state or local officials in non-federal jurisdictions.
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structure, policies and procedures, structural distance 
from the post-conviction appellate or habeas processes, 
and the extent to which external personnel are engaged as 
advisors or reviewers of case-specific information, but this 
basic structure describes what we will call the “standard” 
Conviction Review Unit.
“Special Project” CRUs. In several instances, prosecutors 
have established case review teams as a targeted response 
to a specific and identifiable group of cases potentially 
subject to the same or similar repeatable errors, typically in 
forensic science. The work of these teams has been funded 
by specific (federal) grants permitting the deployment of 
resources to conduct new DNA or ballistic investigations. 
Such “Special Project CRUs” include the Wayne County 
(MI) ballistics review project, the Colorado Justice 
Review Project, and the St. Louis DNA Review Project. 
In Wayne County, for example, laboratory mistakes 
in handling gun cases were brought to the attention of 
the DA by a defense attorney and a crime lab analyst. A 
resulting audit suggested a potential error rate of 10% in 
firearms cases, causing the closure of Detroit’s crime lab 
in 2008, and the DA’s initiation of a process to review 
firearms cases that might have been affected by the errors. 
A similar story led to the creation of the state-wide 
Colorado Justice Review Project ( JRP), which began as 
a joint project of the Colorado Attorney General and the 
Denver District Attorney to review convictions of certain 
violent crimes in which post-conviction DNA testing 
might be used to exonerate an innocent inmate. The 
JRP received federal funds in 2010 for this purpose, and 
those funds were renewed and extended to other types of 
crimes. While the initiative is ongoing, its activities have 
been significantly curtailed since the expiration of that 
funding in 2013.
Innocence Commissions. An alternative to the 
standard CRU is the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry 
Commission (NCIIC). Created and funded by the North 
Carolina state legislature in 2006 “to investigate and 
evaluate post-conviction claims of factual innocence” 
throughout the state,22 the goals of the NCIIC are the 
same as the standard CRU, though it acts as a statewide 
independent clearing house for the investigation of actual 
innocence claims rather than leaving the administration 
of actual innocence claims to each local jurisdiction. 
This potentially expands the cases eligible for fact-based 
conviction review, particularly in jurisdictions that have 
fewer than 5 prosecutors. In such jurisdictions, which 
account for roughly three-fourths of all prosecutor’s offices 
nationwide,23 resource constraints are likely to limit the 
ability of the office to create and sustain a formal CRU.
On the other hand, as explored more fully below, the 
NCIIC has no structural ties to any prosecutor’s office, 
and its investigation into cases may be received less than 
enthusiastically from prosecutors in the jurisdictions 
where the cases originated. Furthermore, while the 
NCIIC has subpoena power to aid in its investigations, 
its recommendations themselves lack the power of law. 
Instead, the NCIIC presents its findings, along with the 
participation of the relevant DA’s Office, in a hearing to a 
judge. Thus, the NCIIC is a step removed from traditional 
CRUs in its ability to affect change in individual cases, 
and it has no authority to implement reforms that might 
prevent such errors from reoccurring. 
North Carolina’s use of the term “Innocence Commission” 
should be differentiated from other states, including New 
York, Pennsylvania, California, and most recently Texas, 
where legislatures have appointed Innocence Commissions 
staffed by criminal justice experts to review issues related 
to wrongful convictions and generate recommendations 
to minimize their occurrence. These organizations share 
the title of “Innocence Commission” with the NCIIC, but 
use the term differently. While they may review past cases 
of wrongful conviction, only North Carolina’s Innocence 
Commission participates in the review of active cases 
currently under appeal. The other states using the term 
assemble a broad group of stakeholders including 
22 North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission website, available at http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/statute.html, downloaded August 17, 2015; North 
Carolina G.S. §§ 15A-1460 - 1475.
23 Prosecutors in State Courts, 2007, United States Bureau of Justice Statistics, December 2011.
Conviction  
Review  
Units:  
A	National	 
Perspective
19
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, victims’ advocates, 
exonerees, and others, and review confirmed exoneration 
cases from the jurisdiction and elsewhere, with the goal 
being a set of recommendations for reform intended to 
reduce wrongful convictions throughout the state. In 
some states (e.g., California, Pennsylvania), the authoring 
of the report completes the work of the commission, 
while in others (e.g., New York State Justice Task Force), 
the group’s agenda and recommendations are ongoing. 
Such commissions are engaged in a valuable inquiry, but 
their observations are inherently limited by time and 
cases reviewed. They miss the opportunity created by the 
traditional CRU model to implement an ongoing and 
increasingly sophisticated culture of learning from error 
that matures over time.
“Course of Business” Offices – There are roughly 3,000 
counties, 50 states and 94 federal jurisdictions in the 
U.S. criminal justice system. Of these, fewer than 30 
have established CRUs. One reason for this is the belief 
held by many conscientious DAs that the cases suitable 
for CRU review already are being handled as part of the 
office’s existing caseload; if so, these DAs believe, there is 
no need to create a separate structure for them. As one 
DA who has not created a CRU in her district explained,
It’s	not	as	formal	as	what	I	think	people	
do in what they call their Conviction 
Review	Units,	but	I	think	our	office	has	
always	 done	 that.	We	 always	 have	 an	
open	mind	 and	we’ll	 look	 at	 it.	And	 I	
can’t	give	you	statistical	information	on	
anything	 like	 that,	but	 it’s	been	a	part	
of	 the	 culture	 of	 the	 office	 since	 the	
day	I	started.
A number of prosecutors in offices with newer CRUs have 
also hastened to make this point. For them, the CRU is 
an explicit effort to address community skepticism about 
prosecutorial motives and to make plain to laymen what 
the prosecutors have believed their whole careers: that 
no prosecutor wants to convict an innocent person. If a 
mistake has been made, or is being made, the prosecutor 
should be open and objective about the information 
available, and work hard to ensure that a fair and just 
result is achieved at any and all times. As Clackamas 
County (OR) DA John Foote said, “I think every lawyer 
in our office is responsible for conviction integrity… It’s 
not some specialty. To me, it goes with the job.”24
Whether the CRU is local or state-wide, the specific model 
of the CRU is less relevant than how the office chooses to 
embrace and communicate the philosophy of conviction 
integrity over time. The sincere CRU’s philosophy of 
objective and open investigation should be our aspiration 
in every criminal case.  At the same time, the CRU is re-
investigating cases that have been seen as “victories,” both 
for the prosecutors that secured them and for the Office 
as a whole. Thus, a new CRU often starts with a headwind 
of suspicion, both from within (e.g., other prosecutors in 
the Office who don’t want their cases reviewed for error) 
and without (e.g., defense attorneys who doubt the true 
motives of the CRU and view it as a publicity stunt). 
Those supporting the initiative point out that the creation 
of a CRU is entirely voluntary on the part of the District 
Attorney, and ask for the benefit of the doubt; skeptics 
reply that DAs are motivated to appease both the general 
population and the line prosecutors within the office, 
and worry that the unit conducts “Conviction Review In 
Name Only (CRINO),”25 while making no real provision 
for the sort of extrajudicial analysis described above.26 A 
CRINO is arguably worse than no CRU at all, since it 
not only retards the progress of criminal justice accuracy 
and reform, it makes the operation of sincere CRUs more 
difficult in other jurisdictions.
24 “Multnomah County DA assigns veteran prosecutor to guard against wrongful convictions,” The Oregonian, Oct. 26, 2014, available at http://www.oregonlive.com/
portland/index.ssf/2014/10/multnomah_county_da_assigns_ve.html.
25 The CRINO acronym is the creation of Professor Ron Sullivan of Harvard Law School. Others have referred to similar organizations that pay lip service to 
conviction review but act solely to affirm existing convictions as “conviction preservation units.”
26 One CRU head who participated in this research expressed a deeply felt concern that “to label [a CRU] as insincere, bad-faith, and ‘in name only’… is disrespectful 
to prosecutors who, at this early stage of the conviction integrity movement, are in good faith attempting to develop conviction review programs.”
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To address these concerns, and to signify to all stakeholders 
that the CRU is a good faith attempt to accomplish the 
wide variety of system benefits described above, sincere 
CRUs should emphasize:
(1) the independence of the CRU and actively support 
its broad-based mission that elevates truth and 
accuracy above judicial decisions and procedure;
(2) the flexibility and freedom of the CRU to 
investigate broadly and deeply across allegations 
of actual innocence in its own discretion; and 
(3) efforts by the CRU to provide transparency with 
regard to its activities and impact.
These concepts of independence, flexibility and 
transparency are part of any high-quality public agency, 
and should already be the foundation of daily operations 
throughout a DA’s Office. Applying them specifically 
to the operations of the CRU, however, will allow it to 
engage more collaboratively and effectively with others in 
the system, to the benefit of all.
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A Note for Jurisdictions with 
Fewer Attorneys
The majority of jurisdictions with CRUs are large, urban 
or suburban jurisdictions with more than 50 prosecutors, 
and most of the observations in this paper come from 
offices with greater than 30 attorneys. That does not mean 
that the philosophies and practices of a strong CRU don’t 
apply to smaller prosecutors’ offices. Errors may occur in 
jurisdictions large or small, and there is no data to suggest 
that a rural DA in a 1-2 attorney office is any more or 
less able to avoid, detect, or remedy error than prosecutors 
working in the larger offices.
It should be noted, though, that many smaller state or local 
prosecutors’ offices may lack the resources to separately 
staff a CRU. It would be impossible, for example, to 
create a formal independent CRU in a DA’s Office that 
has one prosecutor. This does not mean that smaller DA’s 
Offices are free from an obligation to conduct good faith 
independent reviews of colorable post-conviction claims 
of actual innocence, and smaller offices should ensure 
that their communities are provided with a clear path 
to submit such claims. This could be done by sharing 
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responsibility for case reviews with larger offices within 
the jurisdiction, by engaging a volunteer panel on an ad 
hoc basis and contracting out leadership of case reviews 
as needed, or through a statewide organization, as has 
been done in North Carolina.27 The important thing is 
to ensure that size and resources not impose a limitation 
on the ability of the DA’s Office to provide justice to all 
of its citizens.
27 Only one jurisdiction, Colorado, has attempted to manage a CRU through the state Attorney General, and that was done for a limited “Special Purpose CRU” 
model involving cases where guilt or innocence could be conclusively proven through DNA. This model ran into some jurisdictional challenges as not all District 
Attorneys welcomed the AG’s participation, but it could be useful as a way to ensure that plausible claims of actual innocence do not get overlooked or fall between 
the cracks in smaller jurisdictions with fewer resources for CRU-type investigations.
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While CRUs investigate and make recommendations 
about cases, virtually every office we spoke to reserved 
for the District Attorney the sole discretion to make final 
decisions about CRU petitions.28 Given the potential 
political ramifications of moving to vacate a secured 
conviction, this is not surprising. At the same time, in 
order for the CRU to be effective, the CRU must convey 
an ability to make difficult decisions that may seem to be 
in opposition to the Office or its line attorneys, without 
penalty or second-guessing. The CRU must be open 
to the possibility that mistakes have been made in the 
Office over time, and it must have the support of the DA 
and Office leadership to conduct full investigations that 
may dredge up unpleasant facts for the DA or his or her 
colleagues. In short, the CRU must be independent in its 
28 One office permitted the CRU head to make independent decisions about lower-level or nonviolent cases, but reserved the DA’s ability to decide on all violent 
felonies.
CRU Independence
decision making, focused only on the assessment of guilt 
or innocence and supported in full by the DA without 
thought to the political ramifications of its actions.
A CRU’s independence can be measured in multiple 
ways. We can look to its place within the organizational 
structure, the ability of resources to conduct its work, or 
the number of people who can influence or approve its 
recommendations or actions on specific cases, for example. 
These issues can and should be viewed in aggregation to 
evaluate the extent to which the CRU is operating free 
from the control or bias of others and is empowered to 
conduct and act upon the extrajudicial, fact-based case 
review that should be the CRU’s main objective.
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CRU Chain of Command
The ultimate question facing a CRU is whether the DA’s 
Office should act to vacate a conviction. While offices we 
interviewed had multiple different processes, all agreed 
that the role of the CRU is to advise the DA on how to 
answer this important question, and not to actually answer 
the question itself. The CRU is expected to conduct a 
thorough investigation and give a recommendation to 
the District Attorney, who retains the sole discretion on 
whether to vacate or reverse a conviction.29 
The	district	attorney	of	course	is	free	to	
do whatever he pleases on these cases 
despite what recommendation the CRU 
may have and what recommendation 
the	 [external	 committee]	 may	 have.	
It	 is	 always	 going	 to	 be	 ultimately	 his	
decision.
In part because the DA has the final word on all CRU 
activities, it is important that the DA signify strong 
support for the undertaking. This reduces efforts to 
circumvent or ignore the CRU’s requests for information 
or assistance.  
While DAs have found various ways to communicate 
their strong support for a sincere CRU, one common 
method is to have the CRU report directly to the DA. 
The DA’s personal involvement and awareness of day-
to-day activities makes clear his or her commitment 
to the unit and provides more freedom to the CRU to 
conduct investigations free of potential conflicts, while 
minimizing the impact of others who may be less 
enthusiastic about the work of the CRU. Most CRUs 
have been implemented as direct reports to the DA him/
herself; those that have not typically report to the First 
Assistant DA or to the Chief of the Appellate Unit, who 
then reports to the DA.
Figure 4. CRU Reports Directly to DA 
(n=20)
Separating the CRU from the Appellate or 
Habeas Unit
A more subtle, but very important reason to have the 
CRU report directly to the DA involves the interplay 
between the CRU and an office’s existing structure for 
handling appeals, including post-conviction appeals.  
In organizations where no CRU exists, questions of 
inaccurate convictions typically arise as part of the 
appellate process, whether the basis for the appeal is legal 
or factual. Placing a CRU in the office’s appellate or habeas 
unit therefore makes intuitive sense. Appellate attorneys 
within the DA’s Office will have considerable experience 
with the different types of arguments made by individuals 
protesting their convictions, and most, of the challenges 
will proceed through the post-conviction appeals process 
in the court. Placing the CRU within the appellate unit 
thus makes for an efficient use of resources, providing a 
pool of attorneys who can be deployed as necessary to 
25%
75%
¢		Yes									¢		No
29 Presumably, a DA who repeatedly overturns or ignores recommendations from his CRU to vacate convictions will be subject to public skepticism about, if not 
accountability for, his or her sincerity in the conviction review process.
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handle credible allegations of factual innocence and does 
not require a restructuring of the senior management 
team in the office.
On the other hand, many attorneys – both defense and 
prosecutors – view the role of an appellate attorney 
within a DA’s Office as fundamentally different from the 
underlying goal of a CRU. As one veteran prosecutor 
stated,
[The	 Office	 Appeals	 Bureau]	 has	 a	
different	 interest	 than	 what	 we	 have.	
They, beginning with the appeal through 
the post-conviction process, are trained 
and tasked to defend the conviction.
These observers worry that the core purpose of a typical 
appeals unit within a DA’s Office is the preservation, 
rather than the review of properly achieved convictions. 
Put differently, the prosecutorial mindset of an appellate 
lawyer presupposes guilt and relies on the appellate 
court to review the conviction and identify any potential 
errors. Where it exists, this mindset may undermine the 
ability of the appellate prosecutor to consider innocence 
objectively.
Well,	here’s	a	good	example:	we	had	a	
rape case that had been sitting in the 
office	for	a	year	or	two	when	I	got	it.		
Arrested	 in	 1992.	Convicted	 in	 1994.	 	
It	was	a	 gang	 rape	case	and	evidence	
not revealed to the defense at the time 
of trial showed that the complaining 
witness,	a	13-year	old	girl,	had	all	kinds	
of	 psychological	 disorders	 and	 an	 IQ	
of	71.	A	defense	expert	now	says	that	
would	 lead	 to	 confabulation,	 that	 she	
would	 perceive	 injustice	 where	 none	
existed,	 and	 try	 to	 get	 even	 for	 it.	
Which	is	exactly	what	she	said	she	had	
done	after	the	trial.		After	the	trial	back	
in	1994	she	immediately	recanted	and	
said	she	had	done	exactly	that,	that	she	
was mad at two of these defendants 
because	she	thought	they	were	friends	
of	 hers	 and	 they	 hadn’t	 helped	 her.	 	
And	 she	 made	 up	 their	 involvement.	
For	some	reason	the	trial	judge	didn’t	
believe her recantation and some years 
went	by.	And	here’s	[where	the	mindset	
comes	in.]	A	couple	of	lawyers	in	our	
appeals section said, maybe we can 
make	a	claim	on	latches	because	they	
could	have	brought	this	title,	they	could	
have	brought	this	claim	years	ago.		And	
I	said,	it’s	called	conviction	integrity.	I’m	
not	gonna	use	some	technical	defense	
to	 keep	 from	 addressing	 the	 merits	
of	this	case.	And	I’m	afraid	that’s	what	
would	 have	 happened	 if	 someone	 in	
[the	CRU	leadership]	job	had	that	sort	
of	 prosecutorial	 mindset	 of	 how	 can	
we defend this?
Prosecutors who make this observation are not criticizing 
their appellate colleagues. In the vast majority of cases, 
the DA’s Office has no reason to believe that a mistake has 
been made, and every reason to believe that an individual 
has been properly convicted of criminal conduct. 
Litigating such cases in the appellate courts with the goal 
of maintaining the conviction is exactly what prosecutors 
are supposed to do in our adversarial system. At the 
same time, a review process based on a pre-established 
and unreviewable definition of fact, except in cases based 
on allegations of “newly discovered evidence” that was 
“not available to the defendant at the time of trial” is not 
the same as the extrajudicial, outcome-neutral review of 
factual innocence that is at the core of the CRU’s mission. 
Asking Assistant District Attorneys inculcated in the 
former to suddenly start engaging in the latter may not 
always be immediately successful.  
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Structurally and philosophically, then, sincere CRUs 
define their mission as separate and apart from the 
mission of the Office’s appellate unit. In fact, as many 
have commented, a case of actual innocence may actually 
be suffocated by formalized due process or habeas corpus 
rules, which are focused more on the need for judicial 
efficiency, finality, and speculative discourse on what 
“could” have been available to a defendant at time of trial 
as opposed to a candid and open review of whether the 
individual actually committed the crime charged.30 
Figure 5. CRU Separate From Habeas/
Appellate Unit (n=21)
30 See, e.g., Seaman, Julie, “When Innocence is No Defense,” New York Times, August 12, 2015, Bookman, Marc, “Does an Innocent Man Have the Right to Be 
Exonerated?,” The Atlantic, December 6, 2014.
31 Personal Communication with Mark Gilson, Philadelphia DA’s Office, December 11, 2014.
32 Part of the rationale for placing the CRU in Washington, DC in the appellate unit was results-oriented and not indicative of a particular mindset regarding the 
underlying cases. As a political and economic matter, the creation of the CRU required new resources, and those resources could not be created without going up a 
long chain of command. Thus, institutional and/or budgetary factors may also control the location of the CRU in a particular office.
It is for this reason that several DAs have separated their 
CRU and its fact-based assessments from their appellate/
post-conviction review unit and its due process-driven 
advocacy (See Figure 5). A sample organizational 
structure is depicted in Figure 6.
The belief that a CRU and an appellate unit should not 
coexist is not a universal view. Some actively encourage 
the use of appellate attorneys for case reviews:
I	 almost	 invariably	 pull	 out	 of	 our	
[appellate]	 unit,	 since	 they’re	 used	
to	 doing	 the	 post-conviction	 type	
of	 inquiries.	And	 this	 is	 work	 that	 is	
analogous	to	a	habeas	petition.	So	 it’s	
a	pretty	[important]	skill	set.
Others believe that adding the fact-based reviews 
of a CRU is actually a benefit to the appellate unit, 
precisely because it shows the appellate attorneys a 
different mindset and approach to appellate litigation. 
Philadelphia’s Conviction Review Unit, for example, 
consciously placed its CRU within the Appellate Unit, 
in part because the DA wanted the CRU head to educate 
the appellate attorneys on how fact-based reviews might 
lead to different appellate reviews.31 Under this view, 
CRUs might have a liberating effect on appellate units 
that view their job as “conviction preservation,” rather 
than muffling the independence of the CRU’s fact-based 
investigations. Similarly, the Washington, D.C. CRU has 
been created as part of its Special Proceedings Division, 
the unit that handles post-conviction appeals.32 Further 
evaluation of these structures and the impact of the 
CRUs in offices that take each view will be useful.
¢		Yes									¢		No
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Figure 6.  Potential Organizational Chart Including a Conviction Review Unit
Selecting CRU Leadership
DAs who have established CRUs are mindful that the 
individual in charge of the CRU will have a significant 
impact not just on the Unit’s effectiveness, but on its 
perception both inside and outside the office. One DA 
put it this way:
We	all	know	the	people	 in	any	group	
that	are	not	“yes	men,”	so	to	speak.	 I	
hire	people	that	are	going	to	keep	an	
open mind, that are always saying “yeah, 
but	 what	 about	 this?”	Those	 are	 the	
type	of	people	that	I	look	for.	You	need	
people that are going to be strong 
willed, especially for a Conviction 
Review	 Unit	 model	 because	 they	
may	be	 in	a	situation	where	their	co-
worker’s	case	is	going	to	be	dismissed.	
That	[co-worker]	may	not	agree	with	
the	decision,	so	you	certainly	can’t	be	a	
pushover.	It	takes	a	certain	personality,	
I	think,	to	be	in	these	units.
The choice of leadership for a CRU sends a variety of 
important messages to all stakeholders and external 
observers. Sensitive to this, DAs have without exception 
appointed experienced, veteran prosecutors to lead the 
“traditional” CRU.33 First and foremost, this is sensible 
in terms of the highly technical work that needs to be 
done. Appointing a CRU head with a wide range of 
trial experiences should enable the CRU to identify the 
hallmarks of a questionable conviction and to review 
effectively an emotionally charged case where the facts 
may have happened decades prior.  
For internal stakeholders within the office, the 
appointment of a veteran prosecutor who has risen 
through the ranks in the DA’s Office signifies the DA’s 
commitment to the Unit and provides it with the 
credibility to advocate for overturning a conviction where 
appropriate, even when such advocacy could result in the 
criticism (perceived or real) of a valued colleague. 
District Attorney
Deputy DA, Felony
Deputy DA, Misdemeanor
Deputy DA, Appellate
Deputy DA, Chiefs
First Assistant DA
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33 See pages 67-70 for the view of the NCIIC, which uses a different model.
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Finally, the choice of a leader for the CRU conveys 
volumes to external observers about the likely approach 
that the CRU will take. Installing as the CRU leader an 
individual with broad experience in prosecuting “tough 
cases” within the office signifies a belief that conviction 
reviews are important enough to warrant the focus of a 
seasoned trial attorney, whose skills could be effectively 
used on important contemporary felony prosecutions. At 
the same time, a CRU head should not simply be a talented 
prosecutor. Appointing an individual who can listen to 
opposing viewpoints and assess claims of prosecutorial 
error calmly, openly and objectively, and who is capable of 
building relationships with defense counsel, will convey 
to the community that the CRU – and by extension, the 
DA – has intellectual independence, with the ability and 
the will to review cases on their substantive merits even if 
the ultimate result may not support the prior conviction.
Both the perception and the reality of this independence 
are important to the CRU’s effectiveness going forward.
Participation of External Stakeholders.  
An important question about CRU operations is whether 
and how to involve external voices in the CRU’s planning 
or day-to-day activities. Many observers of criminal 
justice, both within and outside DA’s offices, express 
concern about the potential for confirmation34 or other 
cognitive35 biases to arise within a prosecutor’s office (or, 
of course, in any criminal justice agency, including defense 
offices or courts) given the repetition of the cases and the 
need for constant advocacy for criminal accountability. 
These biases can lead to a “prosecutorial mindset” that 
rejects claims of actual innocence out of hand, even while 
acknowledging their potential for existence.
Believing that CRU independence means intellectual 
freedom from such biases, many DAs have designed 
various structures to ensure that an independent, defense-
oriented perspective is available to assist and inform the 
CRU’s views, either for specific cases or by influencing 
the unit’s policies and procedures.
The CRU that has most aggressively embraced third-party 
participation in the activities of its CRU is in Brooklyn, 
NY, where Kings County District Attorney DA Kenneth 
Thompson asked Ron Sullivan, a Harvard Law Professor 
and former Federal Public Defender and Director of 
the Public Defender Service for Washington, D.C., to 
coordinate the establishment of the office’s CRU with a 
veteran ADA appointed from within as its operational 
leader. Bringing in third-party participants, especially 
those with first-hand criminal defense experience, can 
impact the entire CRU’s approach to cases of actual 
innocence:
[What]	we	are	trying	to	create	[is]	an	
ethos.	It’s	an	attitude,	it’s	a	perception.	
It	should	be	the	bedrock	that…	you’re	
trying	to	do	the	correct	thing,	the	just	
thing and not necessarily doing the 
thing	 just	 that	 just	 favors	 your	 side.	 	
Now	 this	 is	 very	 contraindicated	 to	
people	 who	 get	 in	 to	 trial	 work	 on	
both	 sides,	 because	 people	 who	 get	
into	 trial	work	are	highly	competitive	
people…	 That	 is	 a	 sea	 change	 that	
we’re	trying	to	get	in	terms	of	attitude	
among	prosecutors.
External participation may be integrated in the CRU’s 
process as individuals or by committee, and at various 
points throughout the case review process. Third parties 
may assist CRUs in developing policy and procedures, 
helping to think through operational hurdles and 
generating political support for the unit within the office 
and across the jurisdiction. They may also participate in 
or review the work and recommendations of the CRU, 
to minimize the risk of unintentional or unobserved 
confirmation bias or other cognitive bias on the part of 
the case reviewers.  
A majority of offices, however, have not yet embraced 
third-party participation in their CRUs. While the 
34 Confirmation bias is a type of cognitive bias defined as “the tendency to interpret new evidence as confirmation of one’s existing beliefs or theories.” Oxford English 
Dictionary Online, accessed Nov. 27, 2015.
35 Cognitive bias is “the common tendency to acquire and process information by filtering it through one’s own likes, dislikes, and experiences.” Businessdictionary.
com, accessed Nov. 27, 2015. Subtypes of cognitive bias include confirmation bias, fundamental attribution error (FAE), belief bias, framing, or hindsight bias, among 
others. Wikipedia, “cognitive bias,” accessed Nov. 27, 2015.
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obvious reason for this is a disinterest in sharing errors 
with external individuals, there are other rationales for an 
internal case review process. Some DAs view the CRU 
case review process as identical to the review of any other 
criminal prosecution; since a typical case review is handled 
entirely within the DA’s Office, the thinking goes, so 
should the CRU case review. For others, the exclusion of 
third parties is more political in nature. he mere creation 
of a CRU can be viewed by some as revolutionary. To add 
to that the ability of external individuals to second-guess 
the office’s decisions would simply be too much change at 
once, and several prosecutors have decided to assess this 
carefully before adding external participants:
It’s	all	within	the	office.	We’ve	discussed	
some	 and	 I’m	 interested	 in	 these	
outside	panels	that	some	of	the	units	
have	 around	 the	 country.	We’re	 not	
real	sure	what	we	want	to	do	with	that	
right	now.	We’re	looking	at	potentially	
outside	 panels	 working	 more	 in	 the	
training aspect than an oversight sort 
of	outside	folks.	
Whatever the reason for not including external 
participants, it is seized upon by skeptics of the CRU as 
proof that the inherent conflict of a CRU reviewing its 
own office’s cases is not being conducted in good faith. 
This is discussed in greater depth in the “transparency” 
section of this paper.
Where third-party participation is permitted, CRUs 
deploy them in a variety of ways:
• External Advisors in Policy, Not in Case Review. 
 The CRU established by New York County (NY) 
includes a Policy Advisory Panel “comprised of 
leading criminal justice experts, including legal 
scholars and former prosecutors, who advise the 
Office on national best practices and evolving 
issues in the area of wrongful convictions.”36 These 
advisors assist the DA and CRU in structural 
and procedural issues, but participation in the 
investigation of, or recommendations about 
specific cases is limited to individuals within the 
DA’s Office. 
• Blend of External and Internal Personnel for 
Case Review.  
 In Oneida County (NY), a panel called the 
Conviction Integrity Program (CIP) Committee 
is convened to review the CRU’s recommendation 
to initiate a formal investigation into a case.37 
The panel consists of the CRU coordinator, 
three Assistant DAs, three forensic experts, and 
one community representative. A second seven-
member committee – four assistant prosecutors, 
two police officers and one civilian – receives and 
reviews the final recommendation for action from 
the CRU before it is sent to the District Attorney. 
 The US Attorney’s Office for the District of 
Columbia has announced a similar approach, 
and plans to send completed case review 
recommendations to a review panel that includes 
two attorneys, one a career prosecutor and one a 
former attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense 
Fund.38
  
 Another approach has been taken by Middlesex 
County (MA), which hired a veteran of the 
Pennsylvania Innocence Project as the screening 
attorney for its CRU, to ensure that the initial 
review of petitions for review are at once 
internal and informed by a defense-oriented and 
potentially innocence-oriented perspective. 
 
• External Case Review Committee.  
 The CRU in Lake County (IL) is staffed with 
volunteers of varied criminal justice backgrounds, 
36 http://manhattanda.org/preventing-wrongful-convictions, accessed August 18, 2015.
37 Oneida County District Attorney’s Office Conviction Integrity Program.
38 United States Department of Justice Press Release, “U.S. Attorney Machen Announces Selection of Consultants To Work With Office’s New Conviction Integrity 
Unit,” Jan. 12, 2015, available at https://www.bja.gov/Publications/ConvictionIntegrityUnit_PR.pdf.
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each of whom lives and works outside of Lake 
County. The goal is to ensure that no case reviewer 
has any particular history with, pre-existing 
opinion about, or stake in the outcome of an 
individual case, and to separate the panel’s advice 
from other political influences related to the 
potential for civil settlements, etc.  
 In Kings County (NY) the CRU meets regularly 
with an independent panel consisting of external 
participants as a way of shaping case reviews in 
process. The leadership of the office explains the 
benefits of engaging with external participants as 
follows:
We	have	this	independent	review	panel	
which	 looks	 over	 everything	 we’ve	
done,	 looks	 at	 our	 recommendation	
and	 gives	 us	 a	 direction,	 or	 asks	 for	
additional materials so that they can 
continue	 to	 investigate	 the	 cases	 and	
then	 make	 their	 recommendation	 to	
the	district	attorney.		The	independent	
review	 panel	 is	 a	 check	 on	 the	 good	
faith	 that…	 hopefully	 can	 be	 ratified	
by	these	distinguished	attorneys	in	the	
community	 who	 have	 no	 connection	
to	district	attorney’s	office,	aren’t	paid	
by the district attorney, are doing this 
completely	voluntarily	and	frankly	they	
don’t	 have	 a	 dog	 in	 the	 fight.	 I	 think	
that	 is	 a	 very	 important	 perceptual	
element	about	what	we’re	doing,	 that	
everything	that	we	do	as	prosecutors	
is being reviewed by this independent 
review	panel	and	that	they	make	their	
own recommendation independent 
of	 what	 we	 do.	 	 The	 independent	
review	 panel	 makes	 its	 own	 rules.	
They	 discuss	 it	 among	 themselves,	
[and]	 make	 various	 requests	 if	 they	
find	it	necessary	for	more	information.		
Ultimately,	 they	 come	 back	 and	 say	
thumbs	 up	 or	 thumbs	 down	 on	 the	
case.	Again,	 that	 is	a	recommendation	
that goes to the district attorney, along 
with	 our	 recommendation.	 The	 DA	
makes	the	ultimate	decision.
As with any cross-disciplinary group, these external 
advisory or review boards can run into challenges. One 
CRU chose to disband its external review board after the 
group, which consisted of a former federal prosecutor, 
an experienced former police officer, and representatives 
from the defense bar and civil rights groups, could not 
reach a consensus on the merits of a particular case. 
Whether this sort of action reflects a “CRINO” or is 
simply a failure of consensus-building will be a case by 
case determination.
 
Figure 7.  CRUs with External Participants 
(n=15)
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The impact of external participants on CRUs is 
impossible to measure at this time – and of course, no 
structure guarantees the optimal process. An objective, 
unbiased, thoughtful case review may occur in a closed, 
internal-only process just as a subjective, biased, shallow 
review may occur in a process that involves only external 
reviewers. What is more clear is that many DAs and 
CRU heads see value in enlisting the views of thoughtful 
individuals who bring open minds to the idea of what a 
CRU ought to do, how it should operate, the mechanics 
of case reviews, and the validity of its conclusions and 
recommendations. These advantages are both substantive, 
in that they minimize opportunities for bias, and 
perceptual, in that they respond to concerns of bias or 
favoritism towards the DA’s Office in the review.  
Participation of Personnel from Underlying 
Case in Case Review
Another aspect of CRU independence is ensuring that 
the CRU’s case investigations are not being led by the 
same prosecutors who participated in the underlying 
conviction that is currently being called into question. 
CRUs are unanimous that prosecutor(s) or investigator(s) 
who participated in the original case and conviction may 
not lead the CRU’s case review. Most offices also require 
the recusal of the original prosecutor from panels or 
committees reviewing CRU recommendations:
I	 personally	 don’t	 tell	 [the	 original	
prosecutors]	 much…	 First	 of	 all,	 I	
don’t	 really	 care	 what	 they	 have	 to	
say	 because	 they	 are	 going	 to	 have	
opinions	 and	 I	 don’t	 want	 opinions,	
I	want	 facts.	 I	 also	 don’t	want	 to	 get	
them	 involved	 in	 it	 because	 I	 have	 to	
keep	a	clear	mind	myself.
Part of the concern is a sensitivity to the emotions of the 
original prosecutor, who is likely to suffer from substantial 
regret or guilt if he prosecuted and convicted someone of 
a crime in error.39  
I’ll	 come	 in	and	 they’ll	be	 like,	“[o]hh,	
what	 did	 I	 do?”	 Certain	 officers	 do	
the	same	thing…	And	you	know	what?	
Sometimes	 they	 want	 to	 know.	They	
are	like,	“Did	I	make	a	mistake?”	They	
really	want	to	know,	did	I	do	something	
wrong,	because	nobody	 I’ve	talked	to,	
wants	[to	convict]	the	wrong	person.
While the sensitivity of prosecutors to having their work 
criticized is a potential barrier to gathering accurate 
information about the case, it must also be recognized 
that the original prosecutor or investigator is likely to be 
the individual in the office most familiar not only with 
the facts of the case, but with surrounding circumstances 
that add context and meaning to the investigation and 
the actions taken by the DA’s Office in the underlying 
case. Accordingly, most CRUs agree that the original 
prosecutor(s) should be interviewed about the case, but 
not involved in any substantive decision regarding the 
case review.
39 In this sense, the prosecutor or investigator in a conviction that ultimately is proven to be mistaken can be termed a “second victim,” with the first victim being the 
individual who has been exonerated. See Dekker, Sydney, Second Victim: Error, Guilt, Trauma, and Resilience, CRC Press, 2013. See also Stroud, Marty, Keynote Address, 
“Defining Quality in Criminal Justice,” Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice Spring Symposium, May, 2015, available at https://www.law.upenn.
edu/institutes/quattronecenter/conference/springsymposium2015/videos.php.
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Staffing and Resources Necessary for the 
CRU
Another key factor in the independence of the CRU is 
the amount of dedicated resources available to it. As Vice 
President Joseph Biden is fond of saying, “Don’t show 
me your values. Show me your budget, and I will tell you 
what you value.”40 A CRU without dedicated resources 
must compete for resources within the DA’s Office that 
are conducting more traditional prosecutorial work; this 
enables supervisors and managers who may not appreciate 
the goals of the CRU to exert negative pressure on the 
Unit. Even managers who support the CRU may find it 
difficult and counterproductive to volunteer prosecutor/ 
investigator resources to the CRU if that means creating 
an additional burden on the entire office.  
DAs, and in some instances the federal government41 
have provided widely varying amounts of manpower 
and money to CRUs. Occasionally, a CRU will be 
funded through an additional line item in a DA’s budget, 
supported by a Mayor or county executive with control 
over the DA’s budget. More frequently, however, DAs 
who wish to establish and maintain CRUs must do so 
without additional budget dollars, and operate within the 
existing budget for the office. 
 
Whether the office has specifically created a CRU or not, 
many prosecutors we spoke to believe that identifying and 
resolving inaccurate convictions is an important part of 
the prosecutorial role, and thus should be part of the day 
to day operations of the office. It is the DA’s responsibility 
to secure necessary funds to properly investigate cases 
with alleged errors, without compromising the ability to 
process new criminal cases. This can be a challenge:
[Erroneous	convictions	are]	a	problem	
[my	 county	 executives	 don’t]	 see	 the	
benefit	 of.	 [My]	 belief	 in	 its	 utility	 is	
strong,	but	hard	to	translate	to	those	
who	control	 the	 county	budget.	 [My]	
in-house	 attorneys	 do	 work	 on	 this	
above their caseload, since there can 
be	no	reduction	in	caseload	to	handle	
CRU	work,	and	our	external	board	is	
all	volunteer.
While it is easy to point out that CRUs must be 
appropriately staffed, budgeting in most DA’s Offices is 
a zero-sum game. Every dollar committed to a CRU to 
review potentially erroneous convictions is a dollar not 
available to promote the DA’s other initiatives, and while 
the office should receive a benefit from the transparency, 
accountability, and justice principles exemplified by the 
CRU, there is also some risk of the public perception that 
tax dollars are going to fix mistakes rather than to improve 
community safety and justice moving forward.42 The 
decision of how to staff the CRU, then, occurs within the 
context of the Office’s overall goals and obligations, and 
depends upon the availability of resources, the expected 
funnel of petitions for case review, and the number of 
actual investigations that will need to be conducted in the 
coming year – inquiries that require data collection and 
analysis for accuracy.43 Such data, which is rarely collected 
by CRUs, could also be used to secure additional funding 
for the DA’s Office, but will still be competing with other 
policy initiatives for a limited “pot” of city or county 
resources.
 
40 http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/10478-don-t-tell-me-what-you-value-show-me-your-budget
41 The “Special Project” CRUs in Colorado and Wayne County (MI) were supported by federal grants supporting  forensic testing. These groups conducted testing as 
permitted by the funding, then largely stopped working upon the expiration of the federal funds.
42 Some enterprising DAs use their civil forfeiture fund to pay for the additional costs of their CRUs, though recent public focus on the potential for conflict of 
interest when a DA’s annual budget is supplemented through forfeiture may limit this option in the future.
43 Some DAs, when defending their decision not to create a CRU, state that the number of cases ripe for review in the jurisdiction are minimal, simultaneously 
underscoring the Office’s quality and deferring the case review process. Whether such a belief is accurate or merely politically expedient can be difficult to prove in 
most jurisdictions.
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Table 1.  Dedicated Resources for Conviction Review Units.
44 U.S. Census figures, 2010.
 Attorneys Attorneys Investigators  Jurisdiction  
 Fully  Partially Dedicated CRU Population 
 Dedicated Dedicated to CRU Staff (in millions)44 
Jurisdiction CRUa to CRUa
Los	Angeles	County	(CA)		 3	 0	 1	 1	 10
N.	Carolina	Inn.		 3	 0	 	 8	 10 
Inquiry	Comm.
Cook	County	(IL)	 3b	 2	 6	on	call	 5	in	pool	 5.2
Harris	County	(TX)	 2	 	 1	 1	 4.3
San	Diego	Cty	(CA)	 2	 0	 0	 0	 3.3
Kings	Cty	(NY)	 10	 0	 3	 3	 2.6
Dallas	County	(TX)	 2	 0	 0.5	 1	 2.5
Santa	Clara	County	(CA)	 	 5	 1	 	 1.9
Bexar	County	(TX)	 3	 0	 As	needed	 0	 1.8
Wayne	County	(MI)		 3	 	 1	 2	 1.8
New	York	County	(NY)	 2	 As	needed	 	 2	 1.6
Philadelphia	County	(PA)		 	 1	 	 	 1.6
Nassau	County	(NY)	 1	 	 	 	 1.4
Cuyahoga	County	(OH)	 	 	 	 1	 1.3
Pima	County	(AZ)	 0	 1	 As	needed	 0	 1.0
Ventura	County	(CA)	 0	 4	 	 	 0.84
Middlesex	County	(MA)	 1	 2	per	case	 As	needed	 1	 0.83
Baltimore	(MD)	 3	 0	 As	needed	 2.5	 0.82
Suffolk	County	(MA)	 	 1	 >1	 >1	 0.77
Lake	County	(IL)	 	 3	 1	 	 0.70
Oneida	County	(NY)		 3	 	 3	 1	 0.23
a Case Review only; does not include review committees or policy committees
b One FTE funded by federal grant, not by office
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The resources needed to properly staff a CRU varies both 
office to office and year to year. Los Angeles County’s 
announcement of its new CRU was accompanied by 
an ongoing budget allotment of $1 million. The Dallas 
CRU was created after a public hearing with County 
Commissioners in 2007 and secured almost $400,000 
in additional funding to dedicate two assistant district 
attorneys, the chief prosecutor, an additional investigator, 
and a paralegal; presumably these individuals have 
continued to work on the County payroll in these 
capacities.45 Bexar County (TX), whose CRU was started 
in 2015, has assigned three FTEs to its CRU; while these 
are currently funded by existing operations funds, the DA 
hopes to change this to line item support in the next fiscal 
year.
The North Carolina State legislature, in creating the 
NCIIC for a state with roughly the same population 
(~10 million people) as Los Angeles County, budgeted 
$550,000 per year to the NCIIC, a sum almost completely 
expended on the six full-time staff of the Commission 
that are needed to keep up with incoming petitions and 
ongoing case investigations. The Commission’s state-
funded budget also provides $8,500 per year for DNA 
and forensic testing and $6,421 per year for consulting 
with experts. This budget leaves the Commission 
without sufficient funding to conduct all of the DNA or 
other forensic testing it deems necessary to thoroughly 
investigate the cases in its pipeline. The Commission 
spends an average of $85,000 on DNA testing and an 
additional $7,750 on scientific experts each year, which 
does not include the costs of prosecutors or judges who 
participate in hearings to adjudicate cases where the 
NCIIC believes there is sufficient evidence to overturn 
a conviction.
Grant money designed to help law enforcement deal 
with testing backlogs can ameliorate funding pressures 
somewhat, and has been helpful in Cook County (IL), 
North Carolina, and other jurisdictions, providing 
human resources and money for evidence testing. For 
example, the NCIIC has in the past secured funding 
from the National Institute of Justice, the research arm 
of the Department of Justice. The money, in the form of a 
“Bloodsworth Grant” from NIJ (three years at $250,000 
per year), provided an additional 2 FTEs and funds to be 
used for DNA testing, other forensic testing, and expert 
witnesses in cases where DNA could be used to provide 
conclusive evidence of the innocence or guilt of the 
petitioner. Even with this additional funding, however, 
the Commission has found it impossible to pay for all 
the testing it seeks, and its request to the North Carolina 
Legislature for an additional $100,000 for this purpose 
was denied.
45 Moore, Terri, “Prosecutors Reinvestigate Questionable Evidence: Dallas Establishes a `Conviction Integrity Unit,’” Criminal Justice, Volume 26, Number 3, Fall 
2011.
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CRU Flexibility
Prosecutors conducting the extrajudicial fact-based 
assessments of actual innocence at the core of the 
CRU’s mission are confronted with a limitless variety 
of circumstances, rationales, and scenarios supporting 
allegations of actual innocence. Each case presents 
prosecutors with unique challenges in deciding which 
cases to accept for review, how those reviews should be 
conducted, and what actions to take at the conclusion 
of the review to ensure justice is done. The questions 
confronting CRUs include both the aspirational and the 
practical; attorneys we spoke to struggle with finding an 
optimal balance between the need for flexibility in case 
acceptance and the need to prioritize limited resources. 
Attorneys also struggle with a consistent definition 
of “conviction integrity.” While some cases of guilt or 
innocence are clear (or can become clear with some 
investigation), many investigations conducted by CRUs 
result in the conclusion that while there are definite 
weaknesses in the state’s case, there is also evidence 
linking the petitioner to the crime. In such cases, how can 
the CRU draw an acceptable balance between ensuring 
that all of its convictions have “integrity,” as opposed to 
becoming, in the words of one CRU head, a “13th juror” 
overturning appropriate convictions?
CRUs are not uniform in their answers to these questions, 
but the Units that (1) maximize their flexibility in case 
intake, investigation, review and recommendation; (2) 
minimize their restrictions on cases eligible for review; 
and (3) take advantage of external participants are 
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accept. The fundamental question that is asked by the 
CRU from its initial receipt of petitioner’s request for 
review to the DA’s ultimate decision on the case remains 
the same: are there sufficient facts reviewable by the CRU 
in support of the actual innocence of the petitioner to 
justify continuing an investigation? The answer varies by 
the stage of the process and is conducted differently by 
each CRU.
Each CRU has unique requirements or standards of 
proof for deciding which petitions will be accepted, 
reviewed, and investigated, but the process that a petition 
must go through within the CRU is uniform. A graphic 
representation of this “case funnel” from the submission to 
the CRU of a claim of innocence through the DA’s action 
to vacate or reverse a conviction that is now believed to 
have been reached in error is shown in Figure 8, below.
 
 
Figure 8. Case Funnel for CRU Review.
more effective at realizing the core mission of accurate 
evaluations of claims of actual innocence. Ensuring the 
flexibility necessary for the CRU to achieve its mission is 
the focus of our next section.
The Conviction Review Case Funnel
Leaders of CRUs agree that their willingness to vacate a 
previously secured conviction outside the existing appeals 
process is dependent on a finding of actual innocence – 
that is, either the petitioner did not commit the crime 
charged, or no crime was committed under the facts as 
now understood. None of the CRUs we spoke to felt that 
their role was to review a case where actual innocence was 
not the core of the rationale for why a petitioner’s case 
should be reviewed. 
From this agreed upon baseline, however, there is some 
deviation among offices regarding the cases a CRU will 
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Petitions submitted to CRUs for review will proceed 
through the following stages:
• Intake. Intake policies or procedures are 
focused on the CRU’s response to the initial 
request that the CRU review a case.  
• Screening. If a case meets the baseline criteria 
for consideration by the office, it will be 
reviewed by an individual within the CRU for 
a minimum requisite level of credibility.
• Investigation. At this stage, the CRU devotes 
more substantial resources to the review, 
typically a lead prosecutor and perhaps an 
investigator at a minimum. The goal is to reach 
a definitive conclusion about the appropriate 
resolution of the case.
• Recommendation. The conclusions of the 
investigation are provided to the District 
Attorney with a recommendation for action.  
For many CRUs, the recommendation phase 
occurs in conjunction with a review board of 
one type or another.
• Action. The DA decides what action should 
be taken in the case. If the petitioner’s 
assertions of innocence have prevailed, the DA 
approaches the court with a proposal to either 
exonerate and release the defendant or drop 
the charges and lay the groundwork for a new 
trial.
 
The precise shape of the funnel will vary office by office 
based on the CRU’s criteria for case advancement and 
on the way it conducts its reviews. Offices with broad 
policies for case intake and screening, and those perceived 
to conduct good-faith investigations, are more likely to 
receive a large number of petitions and thus a wide “top” 
of the funnel, with the funnel narrowing based on the 
amount of rigor applied at each downstream phase. Other 
offices that employ strict criteria or high standards of proof 
at the recommendation phase may find fewer petitions, 
but a higher percentage of completed investigations after 
case acceptance, and very few cases that proceed to the 
DA with a recommendation to set aside the conviction.  
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Flexible Screening 
No	Structural	Limitations,	 
Good	Community	Relations
Rigorous Screening
No	Guilty	Pleas,	No	Due	Process	Claims,	etc.
While the shape of a CRU’s case funnel is not conclusive 
evidence of the sincerity of the CRU in the conviction 
review process, it is worth noting that the CRU case funnel 
is affected not just by the facts of the cases submitted to 
the CRU, but by the fact that petitions are submitted 
at all. The funnel of cases available for CRU review is 
smaller than it could be in a number of jurisdictions with 
CRUs, as defense counsel who lack faith in the CRU (in 
other words, who believe that the CRU is a CRINO) 
simply do not submit their cases to the CRU for review. 
As one defense attorney put it, “Why would I provide 
the DA’s Office with an opportunity to learn more about 
my case outside of appellate litigation if the case review 
conducted by the CRU is not sincere? I’m just giving up 
leverage and not getting anything useful for my client.”
Thus, an underfunded CRU or a CRU not engaged in good 
faith case review may find it has fewer cases to review not 
because the cases of error do not exist in the jurisdiction, 
but because the CRU’s relationship with the defense bar 
(and vice versa) convinces innocent individuals to pursue 
litigation rather than trust in a collaborative process. In 
such situations, the CRU (or perhaps CRINO) actually 
is doing more harm than good on several levels: (1) it has 
created a false sense of security in the DA’s Office; (2) it 
does not assist in necessary case reviews; and (3) it adds 
to a cynicism and lack of trust between the DA’s Office 
and the community that limits opportunities for system 
improvement.
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Figure 9. Impact of Screening Policies on Case Review Funnels.
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Standards for Acceptance of Petitions for 
Review
Decisions about the types of cases eligible for review 
(i.e., cases at the top of the funnel) reflect the CRU’s 
underlying philosophy toward its role and have significant 
downstream implications on the operations of the CRU. 
It seems reasonable to expect that the criteria for case 
acceptance for sincere CRUs will, on balance, favor the 
claims of petitioners at early stages of the process, trusting 
in case investigations to make clear the best result and 
wanting to err on the side of catching an error rather 
than excluding it. This appears to be the philosophy in 
most, but not all CRUs. The Cook County (IL) CRU, 
for example, accepts all petitions for review, gathering 
case documents and conducting a preliminary review 
and group assessment of the merits of the claim before 
deciding whether a full investigation is warranted.
Most CRUs agree on the standard for a case to get 
through the initial intake phase: the petitioner must 
assert a claim of innocence, supported by something 
testable or objectively credible in the eyes of the CRU. As 
one prosecutor put it, “We don’t just review closed cases – 
we need the petitioner to tell us why he’s innocent.”  
Other offices used words ranging from “obvious evidence” 
of innocence to “plausible” or “reasonable” evidence. “You 
have to show me something,” said one prosecutor:
At the initial review, there has to be a 
plausible	claim.	There	has	to	essentially	
be	 a	 logical	 nexus	 between	 the	 claim	
and	what	the	requested	action	is.	If	it’s	
meritless on its face then it might be 
summarily	 denied.	There	 has	 to	 be	 a	
reasonable	nexus	between	the	claim…	
of	innocence	and	the	requested	action	
that	they’re	asking	for.
The amount and types of evidence necessary to meet this 
threshold can vary from office to office. Testable physical 
evidence tends to be the most persuasive, though some 
CRUs refuse to test items that have been previously tested, 
while others will retest material that has been previously 
tested if the method of testing has gotten more advanced 
or sensitive and thus might yield more informative data. 
In any event, summarizes one prosecutor, “[i]t needs to be 
enough that I believe that at trial, with this information, 
we’d probably get a different result.”   
 
For some, the credibility of the request for review comes 
in part from the source of the initial inquiry, which may 
originate from the inmate, but may also come from the 
inmate’s family members or counsel, other prisoners, 
confidential informants, the media, and others, often 
without the inmate’s involvement and sometimes even 
against his or her wishes.
The source of the referral can be an important factors 
in assessing the underlying credibility of a request for 
a CRU review. Most CRUs believe that petitions from 
an attorney have more credibility than those that come 
from other sources, and many view referrals from the 
media with skepticism, feeling that some other agenda 
may be in play. Some prosecutors noted that claims from 
family members of an inmate are often misguided, caused 
by more gullible family members accepting baseless 
assertions of innocence made by the perpetrator of the 
crime.
A number of CRU heads specifically praised requests for 
review coming from innocence organizations across the 
country. The Innocence Network has shared principles 
of conducting fact-based investigations into cases, and 
provides a great deal of information along with their 
request for review.46 As a result, requests for review made 
by an innocence organization to a CRU are viewed as 
46 In fact, the philosophical goal and role of the Innocence Project and Innocence Network Member Organizations is very similar to the stated purpose of a 
Conviction Review Unit. To the extent there is a difference, it would seem to stem from the historical mindset of the typical attorney participant, since most lawyers 
within the Innocence Network tend to be defense-oriented while employees of CRUs are obviously more experienced in the prosecutorial role. We have not attempted 
to compare and contrast case acceptance policies and procedures used by Innocence Network Member Organizations with those of CRUs, though we note that the 
standards and techniques for a fact-based inquiry into actual innocence should not differ based on the pro-prosecutor or pro-defense advocacy label attached to the 
individual conducting the inquiry.
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more reliable and credible. In fact, one CRU stated that it 
will only review cases that have been vetted in advance by 
the Innocence Project in its jurisdiction.  
Most CRUs find the case review process used by innocence 
organizations to be informative and useful; while there 
is not always agreement with the IP’s conclusions about 
a specific case, the cases referred by members of the 
Innocence Network generally pass the “straight face” test 
and are initially reviewable:
[The	 excellence	 of	 the	 innocence	
network]	 is	 something	 I	didn’t	realize	
until	I	worked	with	some	of	ours	and	I	
appreciate	it.	I	think	more	prosecutors	
should	 know	 that	 that’s	 the	 case.	 I	
get letters all the time from angry 
defendants or from family members 
where their cases have been denied 
review	 from	 innocence	 groups.	 I	 do	
know	 that	 they	 screen	 those	 cases	
and	 it	 does	mean	 a	 lot.	 I	 don’t	 know	
that	that’s	common	knowledge	among	
prosecutors,	but	it	should	be.
CRUs differ in terms of the “degree” of innocence that 
must be alleged at the initial phase to warrant further 
review by the CRU. Some offices look not to an absolute 
standard of “actual innocence” but rather to a more 
subjective standard about whether a reasonable person 
might have a reasonable doubt that the conviction is 
accurate and legitimate. For those offices that have a 
strict “actual innocence” view, a letter from a petitioner 
that simply says that the conviction was inappropriate, 
as opposed to stating that the petitioner did not commit 
the crime, is likely insufficient to warrant further review. 
Other CRUs adopt a more restrictive standard that is 
linked to their jurisdiction’s post-conviction review rules, 
based on a two-pronged belief that (a) the DA cannot 
simply remove charges without judicial approval and 
(b) the judge will require a showing of proof that would 
satisfy the post-conviction rules. As one prosecutor 
from a jurisdiction that requires “strong indicia of actual 
innocence” to conduct a more thorough case review 
stated:
Ultimately	there’s	a	criminal	conviction	
in place that in the case of a trial the 
jury	has	put	in	place.	We	have	to	have	
a	 legal	 footing	 that	 is	 recognized	 by	
the	 state…	 in	 order	 to	 undo	 that	
conviction.	We	 can’t	 just	 undo	 that	
conviction	 because	 we	 feel	 a	 person	
may	 be	 innocent.	We	 have	 to	 [meet]	
the	appropriate	legal	standard.
Other offices concur:
We	 won’t	 take	 a	 case	 where	 the	
defense	 is	 “I’m	 innocent,”	 without	
something	more,	something	objective.	
We	 have	 to	 abide	 by	 the	 Court	 of	
Appeals standard, which is clear and 
convincing,	 because	 that’s	 what	 we’re	
going	to	go	up	against.
Still, not all offices adhere to a rigid legal standard. The 
NCIIC, for example, says:
It	 was	 specifically	 on	 purpose	 when	
they created the Commission, the 
framers…	wanted	it	not	to	be	a	legal	
standard	 because	 the	 Commission	
is	 not	 about	 technicalities	 and	 about	
much	 of	 the	 things	 that	 people	 think	
of	with	 lawyers.	 It’s	 really	 about	 facts	
and	 evidence	 and	 new	 evidence.	And	
purposefully	not	everyone	 is	a	 lawyer	
on	the	Commission.
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Many offices have declined to create an express standard 
for accepting cases, preferring instead what one called an 
“I know it when I see it” approach to colorable claims 
of actual innocence: “If there’s anything credible that 
looks like we should review it, we review it,” said one. 
“It’s a case by case decision; I’m less likely to review a case 
that appears that it has been fairly litigated. This is not 
supposed to be a second bite at the apple.”
CRUs without an articulated standard for case acceptance 
often argue that the lack of a standard is actually a 
benefit for petitioners, providing necessary freedom and 
flexibility for CRUs to work in good faith to review a 
wide variety of cases:
You	 can’t	 really	 have	 [strict	 rules]	on	
something	 like	this.	 If…	in	your	heart	
it	 meets	 it,	 in	 your	 head	 it	 doesn’t,	
sometimes	 you	 have	 to	 go	with	 that.	
I	know	 it	 sounds	 terrible	because	we	
are	 lawyers	 and	 we	 have	 rules	 and	
protocols.		[This	is]	too	dangerous	an	
area	 to	have	 too	many	rules,	because	
rules	then	define	each	one.
On the other hand, members of the defense bar have 
pointed out the opportunity for abuse of discretion (or, 
more precisely, for an anti-review philosophy) to lurk 
undetected behind the unstructured “I know it when I 
see it” standard, and CRUs operating without externally 
announced standards are subject to criticism that their 
acceptance criteria are subjective and limited to the 
(potentially arbitrary) perspective of the individual case 
screener. Some level of definition regarding which cases 
should proceed will likely be needed to convince all 
stakeholders that a clear and fair process is taking place.
Legal Standards for Case Review
Newly Discovered Evidence. Drawing a precise line 
between the desire to review cases where errors may have 
led to the misidentification of a guilty person, and the 
need to avoid simply rehearing closed criminal cases, is 
a challenging and non-scientific inquiry for most CRUs. 
Virtually all CRUs require some new evidence that has 
not been previously disclosed to accept a case for further 
review:
Some new evidence is needed so we 
aren’t	 just	 rehashing	 cases	 that	 have	
already been decided closer in time 
and	with	more	manpower.
We	want	to	be	respectful	of	the	 jury,	
their	 verdict,	 and	 generally	 we’re	 not	
going	to	 look	at	a	case	where	there’s	
nothing	new.
In a departure from appellate litigation requirements, 
however, many CRUs take a more flexible view of what 
it means for the newly discovered evidence to have been 
“available” at the original trial. This is a key difference. A 
sincere CRU focuses on actual innocence, unencumbered 
by the availability of potentially successful due process 
legal/procedural arguments that could preserve the 
conviction, but which may not address the underlying 
factual allegation of innocence. Thus, from the outset, 
sincere CRUs will review the petition in light of what 
could have been used by defense counsel, effectively 
putting themselves in the role of defense counsel as part 
of their validation of the merits of petitioner’s claim: 
We	look	[at	original	defense	counsel’s	
actions]	 and	 say,	 “Well,	 you	 have	 all	
this	 stuff	 and	 you	 did	 this	 poor	 job	
of	utilizing	 it.”	 If	you	take	all	of	 those	
circumstances…	 and	 you	 say,	 “Well,	
because	 these	were	 exploited	or	not	
revealed	 to	 the	 jury	 or	 revealed	 in	
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such	 a	 fashion	 that	was	 ineffective	 to	
the	 jury,”	 and	 you	 look	 and	 you	 say,	
“well,	 the	 jury’s	 fact-finding	 process	
was	so	corrupted	by	that	that	you	can’t	
consider	that	verdict	or	you	can’t	have	
confidence	in	that	verdict,”	therefore	it	
should	be	a	nullity.	
One way the balancing can be done is by sidestepping the 
question of whether “newly discovered evidence” is needed 
at all to justify CRU review. Rather than discussing when 
the evidence was discovered, for example, the NCIIC 
can hear cases with “[c]redible, verifiable evidence of the 
applicant’s innocence” even if that evidence was previously 
available, so long as the evidence was not previously heard 
in court.
  
Charging Errors. Another question for CRUs is whether 
they will review cases in which the petitioner acknowledges 
a role in the events in question, but argues that the wrong 
assessment of criminal accountability was reached. Most 
CRUs view the reassessment of certain charges to be a 
usurpation of the role of the original trier of fact. Those 
original participants made their own assessments of 
appropriate assessments of guilt, innocence, and charges, 
and most CRUs are hesitant to circumvent the will of a 
jury or a judge-approved plea bargain.
We	 look	 for	 cases	 where	 it’s	 the	
wrong person, where the petitioner 
wasn’t	 even	 there	 and	 has	 a	 claim	
focused	 on	 absolute	 vindication.	The	
only	other	kind	of	vindication	is	when	
there	wasn’t	a	crime	committed.
One CRU in our survey, however, consciously reviews 
cases for “count by count” innocence, meaning that the 
Unit will agree to vacate a single charge that is inaccurate 
even if other charges related to the same set of facts were 
accurately charged and should be sustained. For example, 
a woman convicted of armed robbery in a situation where 
she was unarmed and the facts of the case did not allege 
robbery would be eligible for review in such a scenario, 
even if the woman could have been convicted of a lesser 
offense for her conduct in the situation.
Procedural vs. Substantive Case Reviews 
The criteria for when a CRU will conduct a thorough 
case investigation varies across different CRUs. Not 
surprisingly, the more restrictive a CRU is in agreeing to 
investigate cases, the more the unit will be viewed as a 
CRINO by external observers. One CRU in our survey, 
for example, has unpublished criteria refusing cases where 
any of the following questions is answered in the negative:
• Is there a “qualifying conviction” (for specific 
violent felonies)? 
• Is the defendant still incarcerated?
• Is the primary defense not predicated on 
defendant’s factual involvement (e.g., not guilty 
by reason of insanity or another voluntary 
affirmative defense)?
• Did the inmate maintain his innocence 
continually throughout all proceedings?
• Is identity an issue in the case?
• Is there valid, testable biological evidence?
• Has the biological evidence not previously 
been tested in the modern era of DNA testing?
• Would a finding excluding the inmate as the 
source of DNA be material to the guilty party?
• Did the inmate decline or not want to 
participate?
Such restrictions on cases available for review seem more 
focused on excluding cases than on sincerely identifying 
and addressing cases where errors have occurred. Refusing 
to review cases where actual innocence is alleged because 
the sentence has been completed, or where an individual 
has plead guilty to the crime, for example, convey a focus 
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47 N.C. G.S. 15A-1460(1)
48 N.C. G.S. §15A-1467.
49 New York County DA’s Office, “Post-Conviction Case Review and Re-Investigation of Cases.” These requirements are similar to those of the Innocence Project at 
Cardozo Law School in New York, NY. “The Innocence Project represents clients seeking post-conviction DNA testing to prove their innocence. We also consult on 
a number of cases on appeal in which the defendant is represented by primary counsel and we provide information and background on DNA testing litigation.” http://
www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/exonerating-the-innocent, accessed August 24, 2015.
on procedural form over the substance of actual innocence. 
While seizing upon procedural grounds may be necessary 
for the CRU to prioritize limited resources, such a lack of 
resources for the review of cases with plausible claims of 
actual innocence is, of course, its own problem.   
  
Other offices, including the NCIIC, have established 
more explicit criteria for case acceptance:47  
• The conviction must be for a felony imposed in 
a North Carolina state court;
• The applicant must be a living person; 
• The applicant must be claiming complete 
factual innocence for any criminal 
responsibility for the crime;
• Credible, verifiable evidence of the applicant’s 
innocence must exist;
• The basis of petitioner’s claim must not have 
been previously heard at trial or in a post-
conviction hearing; 
• The applicant must sign an agreement in 
which he waives his procedural safeguards 
and privileges, agrees to cooperate with 
the Commission, and agrees to provide full 
disclosure regarding all inquiry requirements of 
the Commission.48  
While different jurisdictions may draw different lines, 
these requirements make clear to all that the NCIIC 
is an agency dedicated to hearing substantial claims 
of complete factual innocence not previously heard in 
a North Carolina court. While some of the NCIIC’s 
requirements, most notably the requirement for petitioner 
to waive all procedural safeguards, are not embraced by all 
CRUs, this core philosophy is shared by the majority of 
jurisdictions with CRUs.
Cases Resolved by Guilty Plea
Another instance where CRUs may prize form above 
substance is in the decision not to accept cases originally 
resolved by a guilty plea. There is a wealth of scientific 
literature, as well as common sense reasoning, indicating 
that individuals sometimes plead guilty to crimes they 
have not committed, for rational and irrational reasons. 
Some pleas are knowing and free, while others may be 
given under compulsion or trickery – but there can be 
no doubt that pleading guilty to a crime and actually 
committing the crime are not the same thing. Rejecting 
petitions for innocence in cases resolved by guilty plea 
is particularly ill-advised in cases where DNA or other 
scientific evidence is available for testing that could (a) 
conclusively exclude the petitioner and/or (b) conclusively 
identify one or more participants in the underlying crime. 
Recognizing that there is a difference between a formal 
admission of guilt to a court and an actual admission “in 
one’s heart” about committing the crime charged, most 
CRUs are willing to review cases in which the petitioner 
had entered a guilty plea. Those who use the guilty plea 
as a tool to exclude cases from the CRU typically do 
so as a way to prioritize scarce case review resources, 
rather than attempting to justify the procedural rejection 
of such cases on grounds of factual accuracy. Others, 
however, view a guilty plea as a knowing decision of the 
petitioner to “cut a deal” during the adjudication of the 
underlying case, and are loath to revisit that agreement. 
Accordingly, some CRUs require a “heightened showing” 
of innocence before agreeing to review guilty pleas. The 
Manhattan DA’s policy, for example, “will agree to DNA 
testing in cases in which the results will be informative 
as to any question strongly related to the issue of guilt or 
innocence,” while acknowledging that “claims made on 
behalf of defendants who pleaded guilty… will require a 
higher standard to garner [CRU] review.”49  
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Figure 10. CIUs that Accept Cases 
Originally Resolved by Guilty Plea.
The precise nature of this “heightened showing” varies 
from office to office. One prosecutor noted that a 
compelling factor in deciding whether to pursue a case 
resolved by a guilty plea was the acceptance of a sentence 
far lower than the crime charged would otherwise have 
been. This, to her, suggested that the guilty plea was a 
strategic move by defendant as opposed to one driven by 
prosecutorial coercion. Other prosecutors might say that 
such a plea means that the petitioner got the benefit of his 
bargain, and there is no further need to review the case, 
while defense attorneys point out that to the extent the 
question of innocence and guilt is affected at all by this 
assessment of the plea bargain, a large disparity between 
crimes charged and the crimes to which the petitioner 
plead might suggest that the prosecutor’s claims were 
weak and/or outlandish to begin with.
Other offices (e.g., the NCIIC) ignore the question of 
whether the plea deal was coercive, and simply require 
a higher standard of evidence if the petitioner’s position 
that he is innocent has ever wavered. The NCIIC requires 
credible, verifiable evidence of innocence to outweigh a 
guilty plea and initiate an investigation. In addition, cases 
No,
1
Yes,
19
decided originally by a guilty plea can only move from 
the Commission to a court hearing upon the unanimous 
agreement of the Commission members, whereas cases 
with other resolutions can advance to a hearing on a 
majority vote.
If the goal is to find cases of actual innocence and address 
them, the existence of a guilty plea should not bar the 
case from review. At the same time, a CRU looking to 
maximize efficiency and impact is entitled to understand 
why someone who at one time stood before a judge and 
admitted his or her participation in a crime is now offering 
a different, and far more self-interested statement of the 
case.
Cases Alleging Both Factual Innocence and 
Due Process Violations.  
CRUs embracing a “totality of the circumstances” standard 
in assessing factual innocence must often evaluate claims 
that are justified by, or overlap with, claims of violations of 
due process. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim, for 
example, does not necessarily incorporate a claim of actual 
innocence, though the two are often interconnected. Due 
process claims are also the vehicle for discussing a claim 
of factual innocence in convictions based on scientific 
testimony where the scientific literature has evolved 
since the underlying conviction (e.g., arson, shaken baby 
syndrome, bite mark or hair follicle comparisons). In 
cases like these, it has not been uncommon for appellate 
attorneys within DA’s Offices to point to one or more 
scientific papers published prior to the trial. Such papers, 
whether or not they were actually known to petitioner’s 
defense counsel (or, for that matter to the prosecutors) at 
the time of trial, can be used to argue against the admission 
of any new fire science knowledge on the grounds that it 
could have been used by defense counsel at trial. This is 
a perfectly legitimate legal defense of the conviction, but 
it is not an independent, fact-based assessment of actual 
innocence.50
50 Of course, the claim that science has evolved over time does not automatically mean that a fact-based assessment would find the individual innocent either; there 
may well be other fact-based indicia of guilt. The point is merely to showcase the difference between a fact-based analysis and a legitimate defense based on legal 
grounds.
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IAC,	Brady,	Junk	Science,	etc.	to	 
Support	Actual	Innocence	Claims
Substance	of	Claims
¢  Same as Habeas       ¢  Broader than Habeas       
¢		No	Due	Process	Claims
Figure 11. Overlap of Actual Innocence 
and Due Process Claims.
Consider an arson case submitted to a CRU. The petitioner 
for review may argue actual innocence (“I did not set the 
fire”), or may claim that forensic arguments supporting 
his innocence should have been presented in his defense, 
and the absence of those arguments is evidence of a viable 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Or he may not 
claim innocence, instead remaining silent on the point 
and asserting solely the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. Similar situations arise in other due process claims, 
such as illegal search/seizure, police or prosecutorial 
misconduct, etc.
CRUs vary in their reactions to these three types of 
claims. More restrictive CRUs simply refer the latter two 
categories – what we will call here due process claims – 
to the standard post-conviction appellate review process, 
feeling that the claims are fundamentally legal in nature 
and are not true claims of actual innocence. More often, 
however, sincere CRUs are willing to review cases that 
implicate due process concerns, so long as the underlying 
allegation continues to be based upon a claim of actual 
innocence. This is based in part on the recognition that 
a judicial declaration of actual innocence may actually be 
harder to secure than a judicial declaration of a procedural 
violation that achieves the higher purpose of vacating the 
conviction:
In	 a	 perfect	 world	 what	 we	 are	
searching for is some objectively, some 
objective	evidence	of	 innocence.	 	But	
if	you	can’t	reach	the	actual	innocence	
legal	 standard,	 it’s	 where	 you	 see	
those	 kind	 of	 “default”	 due	 process	
standards,	[then]	that’s	where	you	get	
the	new	trial.		Then	we	just	dismiss	it.	
You	may	not	get	that	actual	innocence	
binding	effect	because	we	can’t	 reach	
that	 standard,	 but	we	will	 find	 a	way	
to	 get	 relief	 on	 some	 other	 ground.	
[In	 our	 jurisdiction,]	 it’s	 a	 lot	 easier	
to	get	relief	on	a	due	process	ground	
than	it	is	actual	innocence	because	the	
standard	is	higher.
Figure 12. Standard for Review: Due 
Process Claims (n=20)
Actual  
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Process
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The assessment of how to address primarily legal claims 
that may bear on innocence is an important and emerging 
area for most CRUs:
There’s	 two	 classes	 of	 cases.	 One	 is	
there’s	 a	 case	 where	 there’s	 actual	
innocence,	 where	 there’s	 evidence	
that	you	have	the	wrong	person.	That’s	
obviously	the	worst	case	scenario.	The	
second	 type	 of	 case	 is	where	 there’s	
new	 evidence…	 or	 new	 information	
that has come forward that may or may 
not show that this person is innocent 
or	 we	 may	 never	 know.	 I	 think	 the	
days	of	DNA	coming	back	saying	you	
have the wrong person, those days are 
over.	From	now	on	we’re	going	to	see	
cases	where	 it’s	 not	 going	 to	 be	 that	
black	and	white.	That’s	fine,	 it	doesn’t	
mean	we	shouldn’t	look	at	these	cases.	
In	 fact,	we	should	 look	at	them	more	
because	these	are	cases	where	there’s	
a	lot	more	to	look	at.	
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims for 
Factual Innocence.
Most CRUs deploy a slightly different standard for 
handling blended actual innocence/due process claims 
based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims reviewed 
by CRUs. The real question for the CRU is whether legal 
standards of “acceptable” defense ineptitude should be 
used to justify not investigating an otherwise credible 
claim of innocence:
We’re	 looking	 at	 new	 evidence,	 and	
we’re	 trying	 to	 figure	 out,	 well	 did	
the	 defense	 attorney	 know	 about	 it	
and choose not to present it, or did 
they	not	even	know	about	 it?	And	so	
it	 helps	 us	 understand	 why	 it	 wasn’t	
presented and hence its credibility and 
reliability.
If the goal is the truth, if the defense attorney could 
have figured it out and didn’t, I’m not sure the defendant 
should have to pay for that.
At the same time, many offices are unwilling to reverse 
a conviction that was otherwise fairly attained simply 
because the defense attorney may not have been operating 
at the height of the profession:
If	I’m	looking	at	a	case	and	I’m	reading	
a	 transcript	 and	 like,	 oh	 my	 gosh.	
This	 guy	 fell	 asleep	 at	 the	wheel…	 it	
certainly	plays	in	but	I’m	not	going	to	
be	in	a	position	where	I’m	going	to	be	
conceding or rolling over on ineffective 
assistance.	Unless	the	claim	is	right,	I’m	
going	to	try	to	find	something	else.
Ultimately, CRUs viewed as sincere will be willing 
to review due process claims using a “totality of the 
circumstances” standard for case review, focusing on what 
actually happened to end in a just result.  This is true even 
if, or perhaps especially if, a rigid judicial process might 
have led to a different result.
“Conviction Integrity” and Cases That Lack 
Conclusive Evidence of Guilt.  
Perhaps the truest measure distinguishing a sincere 
CRU from a CRINO is its approach to cases that 
lack both conclusive evidence of guilt, and clear-cut 
evidence of innocence. In such cases, the CRU finds 
itself in an uncomfortable middle ground, conceding 
that the conviction lacks strength and may not add up 
to conclusive guilt, but recognizing that the facts are far 
from establishing actual innocence. In such a situation, 
should the CRU move to vacate the conviction?
Many CRUs refused to comment on such a scenario in 
the absence of case specifics, but most agreed on two 
important points: first, that it is possible to lose faith in 
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a conviction’s accuracy without being convinced of an 
individual’s innocence; and second, that in such instances, 
the appropriate action for the CRU is to seek to vacate 
the conviction and work with petitioner or petitioner’s 
counsel to renegotiate, or potentially retry the case.  
Cases	 where…	 you’re	 going	 to	 have	
new evidence that may not point to 
actual	 innocence,	but	 there’s	so	many	
problems	with	 the	conviction.	 I	 guess	
the	best	way	to	put	it	is	I	don’t	want	to	
put	the	good	name	of	my	office	on	that	
conviction.	We	may	 agree	 to	 just	 say	
look,	we’re	not	necessarily	 saying	 this	
person’s	 innocent,	 but	we’re	 going	 to	
set aside the conviction in the interest 
of	justice	because	X,	Y,	and	Z.
As	 we	 look	 in	 the	 future,	 we’re	 not	
going	 to	 necessarily	 see	 those	 black	
and	 white	 “oh	 my	 gosh	 we	 thought	
it	 was	 him,	 but	 it	 was	 actually	 him”	
[cases].	 It’s	 going	 to	 be	 a	 lot	 more	
muddy	 than	 that,	 but	 that	 doesn’t	
mean	 that	we	 shouldn’t	 act.	 If	 there’s	
a	case	where	 it’s	not	black	and	white	
and	this	person’s	actually	innocent,	but	
the	water’s	so	muddy	so	to	speak	that	
we	wouldn’t	want	to	put	our	name	on	
that	case,	we	would	still	act.
A prosecutor from another large CRU agrees:
  
Other	cases	are	not	necessarily	going	
to	get	to	that	actual	 innocence	finally,	
but	 you’ve	 now	 learned	 enough	 that	
it	 just	undermines	your	confidence	 in	
the	outcome.	What	 happens	 in	 those	
cases,	most	of	 the	 time,	 you	may	not	
get	 an	 actual	 innocence	 finding,	 but	
relief is going to be granted and so the 
case	is	going	to	come	back	for	retrial	
and	it’s	going	to	get	dismissed	because	
nobody	wants	 to	 touch	 it	with	 a	 10-
foot	pole.
Jackie Lacey, District Attorney for Los Angeles County, 
espoused a similar view during her announcement of the 
Los Angeles CRU, suggesting the potential emergence of 
this view as a majority view: “[i]f the committee decides 
the office has lost faith in the conviction, my office will 
seek to have the conviction vacated.”
The decision of when to dismiss all charges and when 
to retry the petitioner is challenging, and is made on a 
potentially confusing, case-by-case basis:
Sometimes,	we	are	sorry,	we	just	don’t	
have	 the	 answers.	We	 are	 going	 to	
have	old	cases,	old	memories,	old	files,	
different	 times,	 different	 everything.	
It’s	not	as	easy	as	you	think	to	say,	this	
person	is	innocent.	It’s	so	difficult.	
Let’s	 say	 we’ve	 got	 some	 pretty	
strong evidence that this person is 
entitled	 to	 a	 new	 trial,	 just	 based	 on	
retesting; we retested the evidence 
and…	 it’s	 enough	 reasonable	 doubt	
that…	 this	 [conviction]	 should	 have	
been	prevented.	 It’s	 newly	 discovered	
and	 should	 have	 been	 presented	 at	
trial,	 because	 it	 could	 be	 outcome-
determinative.	 That’s	 when	 we	 send	
back	 for	a	new	trial.	We	can’t	 tell.	 It’s	
not	 clear	 enough	 for	 us	 to	 say	 total	
vindication,	but	it’s	clear	enough	for	us	
to	say,	it’s	entitled	to	a	trial…	[But]	in	
some	 cases,	we	 looked	 at	 it	 and	 said	
it	was	 just	so	screwed	up	that	 justice	
demands	we	release	them.		
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It is reasonable to expect that prosecutors and defense 
attorneys may not agree on the appropriate resolution 
to be reached in cases where neither guilt nor innocence 
has been proven conclusively. It is precisely for this 
reason that these cases are the true marks of “conviction 
integrity.” CRU heads and DAs should know that the 
way in which they assess and act upon these cases will be 
a deciding factor in how their CRU, and their approach 
to conviction integrity is ultimately judged by thoughtful 
observers. A CRINO will be seen in offices that reflexively 
uphold convictions in all but the most extreme cases of 
innocence, while a sincere CRU will examine the case 
with fresh eyes, considering (a) the likelihood of guilt and 
(b) the likely sentence for the case if tried today along 
with (c) the sentence already served by the convicted 
individual, before deciding upon the best course of 
action, and communicating his or her decision to defense 
counsel along with its rationale. Such decision-making 
need not result in a decision to vacate the conviction but 
must treat the defendant as part of the very community 
the prosecutor is trying to protect.
Collaborative Case Review
CRUs have reached widely varying conclusions about 
whether to include petitioner or petitioner’s counsel in 
the conduct of a case review. On one extreme are the 
jurisdictions that simply take a petition and conduct an 
internal investigation, reach a conclusion, and inform 
petitioner of the result. On the other, a few CRUs will 
conduct joint witness interviews with petitioner’s counsel 
under certain circumstances. Most CRUs fall somewhere 
between these two extremes.
Criminal prosecutions are inherently adversarial, and the 
collaborative navigation of a post-conviction review is 
tricky, particularly while the petitioner to the CRU has 
ongoing appeals. Given this, it is no surprise that a CRU 
might give the petitioner no role other than initiating a 
request for the CRU’s review. As one CRU head put it:
We	would	absolutely	 follow	the	rules	
of	 discovery.	 [Petitioners]	want	more	
of	 a	 collaborative	 effort.	 I’m	 not	 so	
sure	we’re	ready	for	that.	And	I’m	not	
so	sure	that	that’s	necessarily	the	best	
way	to	go.
Offices that have not embraced petitioner’s participation 
in the CRU’s review of the case point out that the role 
of investigating a case to determine actual innocence 
is no different than what prosecutors typically do at 
the start of criminal cases, and the CRU can conduct 
its investigation in the same way. If so, it is no more 
necessary to engage external participation or petitioner’s 
input than it would be to engage external participation 
during the investigational phase of any other case, and 
there can be objectivity without the specific addition of 
a defense-oriented voice. These CRUs often also point 
out that engaging outsiders in the process might waive 
privileges, etc. that could affect pending appeals:
[Our]	 process	 of	 review	 was	 a	
confidential	 one,	 in	which	 [the	CRU]	
did not share information with 
anyone	 but	 initiated	 the	 gathering	 of	
information.	 In	 particular,	 [the	 CRU]	
did	not	 reach	out	 to	prosecutors	 [of	
the	underlying	cases],	because	they	did	
not	want	 to	 risk	 tainting	 any	pending	
appeals.	 Few	 defense	 attorneys	 were	
interested or involved; most had 
moved	 on	 to	 other	 cases	 and	 didn’t	
even	 share	 information	 about	 their	
former	clients’	cases.
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More flexible CRUs will permit petitioner’s counsel to 
act as a participant in the case investigation, since counsel 
can help locate, interview, and/or discuss issues around 
evidence presented by potential witnesses or items of 
evidence:
[W]hen	 we	 do	 open	 a	 full	
investigation…	 what	 we’re	 trying	 to	
do is establish a proper investigation 
where	 they	 tell	us	what	 they	have	or	
we	 tell	 them	 what	 we	 have.	 If	 they	
are part of it, everything that we 
have, we will do interviews jointly 
with	 them.	 We	 will	 give	 them	 the	
substance	 of	whatever	 interview	 that	
we’ve	done.	We	will	disclose	to	them	
all	 of	 the	 paper	 that	 we’re	 able	 to	
garner	 to	 make	 comparisons	 to	 see	
whether	trial	counsel	got	all	the	same	
paperwork	 that	 we	 now	 have	 in	 our	
possession.	We	are	obligated	if	we	find	
anything	that	 is	exculpatory	 in	nature	
during	 our	 investigations	 to	 report	 it	
immediately	 to	the	court	and	we	will	
give	it	to	them	simultaneously.
Other CRUs are willing to hear from the petitioner, but 
do not allow an external voice in the CRU’s deliberations 
or assessments of the case. For example, in both New York 
County and Middlesex County (MA), petitioner’s counsel 
is invited to present to the CRU’s investigation team, 
and petitioner’s communication with the investigators is 
encouraged throughout the process. The petitioner may 
assist the investigation team in responding to follow-up 
questions from that committee and may present multiple 
times to the review committee. Their review committees, 
however, are made up entirely of internal members of 
the DA’s Office and make the final recommendation for 
action by the DA.
The willingness to include external participants in the 
case review is not limited to petitioner or petitioner’s 
counsel. It extends also to other agencies that may have 
information relevant to the CRU’s investigation. CRUs 
all agree that they would consult external agencies or 
individuals as necessary to get information, though most 
described the typical response as standoffish at best from 
the other agencies, who “hate” the process and see little 
potential upside in the time investment necessary to help 
investigate a possible error.  
Many CRUs will conduct their own independent 
investigation but will confer with petitioner or counsel 
before making a formal recommendation to the DA or an 
external panel. This helps inform the CRU with regard to 
the identification, location, and interpretation of pieces 
of evidence into the creation of an accurate and nuanced 
narrative of the case.
Another benefit seen by CRUs that involve petitioner’s 
counsel in investigations is a reduction of defense counsel 
impulses to tell petitioner’s story to the media. And any 
concern that an adversarial “mini-trial” might result 
if petitioner’s counsel is involved seems to be largely 
unfulfilled in practice:
That’s	 something	 that	 I	 changed	 my	
mind	 on	 that.	 I	 went	 180	 [degrees].	
Initially	I	had	determined	that	I	wasn’t	
going	to	do	that	just	because	I	thought	
I’d	 be	 opening	 up	 the	 flood	 gates.	All	
these	attorneys	coming	in	and	putting	
on	mini-trials,	but	that	hasn’t	happened.	
We’ve	done	it	a	couple	of	times	where	
I	 think	 it’s	 actually	 been	 healthy.	 I’m	
certainly	open	to	that.	 If	 it	got	to	the	
point	 where	 it	 was	 becoming…	The	
people	were	coming	in	putting	on	mini	
trials,	then	we’d	have	to	revisit	it.	Right	
now,	it	seems	to	work	well	so	I’m	open	
to	doing	that.
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CRU Requirements for Waiver of Petitioner’s 
Rights Under Appeal
Tolling Agreements. Whether one views the CRU’s 
investigative role as collaborative or independent, it would 
be counterintuitive and counterproductive for a CRU 
review to penalize the legitimate claims of a petitioner 
in any way. Accordingly, the CRU’s case review should 
be separate and apart from any ongoing habeas petition 
activities, and CRUs should be willing to appear before 
the appropriate courts of record and request a tolling 
order from the judge that will ensure that the petitioner’s 
participation in the CRU process will not jeopardize 
any other rights he or she might have in a habeas/post-
conviction review process.
Attorney-Client Privilege. One of the more contentious 
policies adopted by a small group of CRUs (see Figure 
13) is the requirement that petitioner waive his or her 
attorney/client privilege as a prerequisite to CRU review.
Figure 13:  Does CRU Require Defense 
Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege? 
(n=19)
Offices requiring a waiver see a fundamental fairness 
directed to ascertaining the truth that corresponds well to 
the stated goal of the CRU, since the waiver is requested 
in the service of allowing the CRU investigators to speak 
to anyone, including petitioner’s attorneys, who can help 
in the search for the truth – which may be different than 
a search to prove the petitioner’s innocence. One CRU 
head whose jurisdiction requires a waiver of attorney/
client privilege explained their position this way:
We	[ask	for]	a	waiver	to	make	it	easier	
for	us	to	look	into	it,	because	it	would	
be	unlikely	that	a	trial	defense	attorney	
would	 talk	 to	us	unless	 the	attorney-
client	privilege	 is	waived.	 	The	waiver	
is	not	for	the	purpose	of	investigating	
more	 crimes.	The	 purpose	 is	 to	 help	
us	 look	 into	 the	 claim	 presented	 by	
that	 person.	 So	 it’s	 a	 combination.	
I	 think	 it	 works	 well…	 [to	 get]	 a	
notarized	document	from	[petitioner]	
consenting	to	the	waiver	of	privilege.”
Other offices frame the question as one of equality and 
objectivity.  If prosecutors are going to dedicate resources 
to a fact-based investigation of a closed conviction, and if 
they are required to share all exculpatory information, the 
logic goes, it is reasonable to ensure that the petitioner is 
operating in good faith too, and is not hiding inculpatory 
information behind attorney/client privilege:
I	think	if	we’re	truly	undertaking	a	fact	
finding	 effort	 to	 find	 out	 the	 truth	
about	something,	it	should	be	open	on	
both	sides.	And	I	know	the	law	doesn’t	
mandate	that,	but	I	would	expect	that	
sort	 of	 fairness	 on	 the	 other	 side.	 I	
would	 hope	 that	 somebody	 would	
not	be	bringing	me	a	particular	piece	
of	 evidence	 to	 try	 to	 suggest	 that	
somebody	is	innocent	but	then	hiding	
other	evidence.
¢		Yes									¢		No
89%
11%
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Not surprisingly, requiring a petitioner claiming actual 
innocence to waive a constitutional protection as an entry 
fee for a factual review of his case does not please defense 
counsel, who are hesitant to waive privilege beyond the 
CRU review and who worry that the petitioners’ waiver 
might lead to the disclosure of incriminatory information 
regarding other, unrelated criminal acts.
These concerns are valid, and some CRUs have shown a 
willingness to meet defense counsel halfway on the issue. 
The protocols of Oneida County (NY), for example, state:
Where	 the	 need	 arises,	 a	 defendant	
may	 be	 required	 by	 the	 Committee	
to waive attorney/client privilege 
in writing in order that the defense 
attorney(s)	who	originally	represented	
the defendant may be interviewed as 
to	any	admissions	or	other	disclosures	
made	 by	 the	 defendant	 during	 the	
pendency	 of	 the	 original	 case.	 Failure	
of	 a	 defendant	 to	 consent	 to	 such	 a	
waiver	may	result	in	a	discontinuation	
of	 the	 re-investigation	 where	 such	
information is reasonably necessary to 
resolve	the	claim.
With this language, Oneida effectively limits the extent 
of the waiver to specific instances where it may be useful 
to the petitioner’s case review.  
Other offices take a more aggressive approach. 
The NCIIC, for example, requires “[t]he waiver of 
procedural safeguards and privileges… for all matters 
relating to the claimant’s innocence claim,” though the 
Commission notes that petitioner’s waiver “does not 
create an affirmative duty on the part of the attorney to 
disclose.”  The situation is more pronounced when the full 
Commission meets to review a recommendation from the 
investigators:
The Commission may compel the 
testimony	of	 any	witness.	 If	 a	witness	
asserts	his	or	her	privilege	against	self-
incrimination	 in	 a	 proceeding	 under	
this	Article,	 the	 Commission	 chair…	
may order the witness to testify or 
produce	other	information	if	the	chair	
first	 determines	 that	 the	 witness’s	
testimony	 will	 likely	 be	 material	 to	
reach	 a	 correct	 factual	 determination	
in	the	case	at	hand.	
This language may be helpful in getting information 
from witnesses to the underlying case, though it can 
easily run afoul of petitioner’s 5th Amendment rights. 
On the other hand, the NCIIC’s scope is limited only 
to the case at hand and is not intended to punish the 
petitioner in other (or previous) settings. It includes a 
limited grant of immunity for the individual taking part 
in the Commission’s proceedings:
The	order	shall	prevent	a	prosecutor	
from	 using	 the	 compelled	 testimony,	
or evidence derived therefrom, to 
prosecute	 the	 witness	 for	 previous	
false	 statements	 made	 under	 oath	
by	 the	 witness	 in	 prior	 proceedings.	
Once	granted,	the	immunity	shall	apply	
throughout	all	proceedings	conducted	
pursuant	to	this	Article.
A third approach, embraced by multiple CRUs, is to 
request but not require a waiver of attorney/client 
privilege, while noting that the petitioner’s refusal to 
waive the privilege may be viewed by the CRU as a 
negative factor when reviewing petitioner’s case for actual 
innocence.  
Whatever the rationale, requiring a waiver of attorney/
client privilege is likely to have a chilling effect on the 
willingness of some petitioners to engage with the CRU. 
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Defense attorneys in jurisdictions requiring the waivers 
will often actively counsel potential petitioners not to 
apply to their CRUs, preferring post-conviction appeals 
to the waiver. Thus, the practical effect of requiring 
petitioners to waive attorney/client privilege as a 
condition of conducting a case review is to return to the 
adversarial system, undercutting the value of the CRU as 
a driver towards a collaborative search for truth.
Petitioner/CRU Collaboration Agreements
Given the new challenges created – for all parties – by the 
extrajudicial CRU investigatory process, some CRUs have 
begun experimenting with collaborative confidentiality 
agreements that outline the roles and limitations of various 
stakeholders in the CRU process. Such agreements could 
address areas of potential conflict (such as the waiver 
of privilege described above) and provide other mutual 
assurances of good faith that can enhance the CRU 
process. For example, some offices use written agreements 
with defense counsel to restrict the ability of either party 
to discuss the case with CRU investigators or the media 
or other external participants. Such agreements have 
been considered by only a few offices to date, but they are 
promising:
I	 have	 had	 cases	 where	 the	 defense	
attorney	 would	 call	 and	 ask	 me	 to	
look	 at	 a	 case.	 I’d	 agree	 to	 look	 at	 it	
and	at	the	same	time	he	would	call	the	
newspaper	who	would	 then	write	 an	
article	about	our	review	and	put	it	on	
the	front	page	of	the	paper.	They	have	
a	 victim	 calling	 me	 screaming	 what’s	
going	on,	before	I’ve	even	had	a	chance	
to	look	at	the	case.	That’s	a	problem.	I	
think	the	[confidentiality	agreement]	is	
a	better	way	to	handle	it.
Confidentiality agreements are not necessarily without 
their concerns in a CRU context. Some DAs worry that 
a written contract between the parties on the conduct 
of a CRU investigation simply creates a new obligation 
between the DA’s Office and the petitioner that could 
conceivably lead to a new course of action, this time 
in civil court, between the parties. On the other side, 
defense counsel may react poorly when their request for 
moral justice and an honest case review is greeted by a 
legal document seeking to put further limitations on 
their ability to advocate for their client. Done properly, 
however, collaboration agreements may act to provide the 
parties with a framework for building a mutual trust that 
allows the case review to flourish, to the benefit of all.
The CRU that has given the most thought to the use of 
confidentiality agreements with petitioner’s counsel is the 
Kings County (NY) District Attorney’s Office, which 
covers Brooklyn.  Like other offices, the Brooklyn CRU 
is cognizant of the potential imbalance that can result in 
an investigation when petitioner refuses to allow the CRU 
to speak with his original defense counsel. At the same 
time, the CRU does not believe that it is appropriate to 
ask a petitioner who is claiming actual innocence to waive 
constitutional protections as an “entry fee” to search for 
the truth.  
Their solution is a thoughtful example of the benefit of 
flexibility that the CRU enables.  Rather than adopt a strict 
rule requiring waiver of privilege, or allowing a withholding 
of privilege to interfere with a full investigation where 
warranted, Brooklyn presents a “cooperation agreement” 
to the petitioner as a choice:
When	we	do	open	a	full	investigation…	
we	seek	a	cooperative	agreement	with	
defense	counsel.	That	includes	a	limited	
waiver	 as	 to	 the	defendant’s	 privilege	
with their former attorneys, which they 
have	no	reason	not	to	sign	–	particularly	
if	they’re	accusing	their	former	defense	
attorney	of	misconduct…	What	we’re	
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trying to do is establish a proper 
investigation	where	 they	 tell	 us	what	
they have or we tell them what we 
have.	Now,	they don’t have to enter 
into that.	If	they	don’t	enter	into	that,	
it	 doesn’t	mean	 that	 we’re	 not	 going	
to	do	a	 full	 investigation	on	 the	case.	
It	 just	means	 that	 they	won’t	be	part	
of	it…	If	they	are	part	of	it,	everything	
that we have, we will do interviews 
jointly	 with	 them.	We	 will	 give	 them	
the	 substance	 of	 whatever	 interview	
that	 we’ve	 done.	We	 will	 disclose	 to	
them	all	 of	 the	paper	 that	we’re	 able	
to	garner	to	make	comparisons	to	see	
whether	trial	counsel	got	all	the	same	
paperwork	 that	 we	 now	 have	 in	 our	
possession.		We	are	obligated	if	we	find	
anything	that	 is	exculpatory	 in	nature	
during	 our	 investigations	 to	 report	 it	
immediately	 to	the	court	and	we	will	
give	it	to	them	simultaneously.	There’s	
all	kinds	of	advantages	for	them	to	do	
that.	We	 hope	 that	 everybody	 plays	
by	the	rules.	We	tell	them	that	if	they	
withhold	 things	 or	 if	 they	 go…	 to	
the	 press	 about	 the	 progress	 of	 our	
investigation, that all bets are off and 
then	they’re	out,	but	we	want	it	to	be	
as open as we can with them and let 
them	 know	 every	 stage	 of	 the	 game.	
One	caveat	 to	 that	 is,	 and	 it	 happens	
on	 occasion,	 that	 we	 won’t	 share	
with them things that will endanger 
a	 particular	 individual’s	 life.	 That	
situation	 does	 arise	 on	 occasion,	 but	
for	all	other	purposes,	we	want	them	
to be a partner in the investigation as 
opposed	to	an	adversary.
The conditional cooperative agreement model used 
in Brooklyn underscores the advantages to both sides 
of articulating a relationship structure that might feel 
unfamiliar to two historically adversarial parties. The 
CRU gets additional information to aid in its totality 
of the circumstances review, as well as freedom from 
headline-driven advocacy and media involvement. On 
the other side, the petitioner benefits from improved 
and active participation in the investigation, which may 
provide a material benefit to the search, and receives any 
investigational information generated for use in a later 
appeals process, if necessary.
 
Training for CRU Personnel
Most CRUs handle the re-investigation of cases in the 
same way that they handle the investigation of cases pre-
indictment. The CRU appoints a lead prosecutor to direct 
the investigation and provides access to one or more 
investigators to assist with the process. A CRU case review 
can be meaningfully different from a pre-indictment or 
pre-trial case investigation, however. First, cases under 
CRU review are inherently cases where errors are being 
alleged. Thus, it is useful for the individuals participating 
in the case review to be familiar with the types of errors 
that have been known to occur in criminal cases, and to 
receive training on the situations in which those errors 
have occurred, to help them identify potential “weak 
spots” in the underlying case that might have contributed 
to a mistaken finding of guilt.
A second difference between a case review conducted 
by a CRU and an open case investigation is one of 
contemporaneousness. The CRU review can be thought 
of as the inverse of a “cold case,” often occurring years, 
and perhaps even decades after conviction. Thus, an 
essential preliminary hurdle of CRU investigations is the 
identification and location of all case-related information, 
including documents, potential witnesses, biological 
Conviction 
Review 
Units: 
A	National	 
Perspective
54
materials or information, etc. Interestingly, it is the non-
prosecutorial NCIIC that sees this most clearly:
We	have	a	whole	process	by	which	we	
ask	an	agency	to	search	now.	That	has	
developed	 over	 time.	We	 begin	 with	
asking	them	to	search	themselves,	and	
having	 them	 report	 back	 the	 details	
of	the	search.	And	along	with	that,	we	
need their evidence storage policies 
and	we	need	to	know	it	they	have	any	
unaccounted-for	 evidence,	 and	 that’s	
what	we’re	really	looking	for.		So	if	an	
agency,	 for	 example,	 searches	 and	we	
can see how their evidence is stored 
and	how	their	evidence	logs	are,	(and	
we	might	tour	the	facility	to	find	that	
out),	 and	 they	 have	 no	 unaccounted-
for	 evidence,	 then	 we	 have	 to	 trust	
that	search.	But	if	they	search	and	then	
we	 find	 out	 that	 they	 have	 evidence	
that’s	 just	unaccounted	for,	you	know,	
unlabeled	 boxes,	 or	 things	 that	 they	
don’t	know	where	they	are,	or	missing	
evidence,	 then	 we’re	 going	 to	 have	
to	 search	 ourselves.	 So	 we’re	 asking	
them	to	do	affidavits	 throughout	 that	
process…	If	they	can’t	give	us	complete	
confirmation	of	all	of	those	things,	we’ll	
ask	 them	 to	 go	 back.	We	 start	 with	
them,	 but	 if	 they	 ultimately	 can’t	 do	
that,	we’re	going	to	do	our	request	to	
search	ourselves.	But	we’re	going	to	do	
it	very	nicely,	and	we’re	going	to	send	
them	proposed	procedures	to	search,	
work	 with	 them	 on	 how	 that	 want	
that to be changed or how they want 
that	to	be	done.		Whoever	they	want	
to	be	there	with	us.	If	they	don’t	want	
us	 touching	 evidence…	All	 of	 those	
things,	we’ll	 iron	 out	 those	 proposed	
procedures	with	them.	
Gathering such information can be quite challenging, 
and training its members on techniques to locate the 
information has had a substantial impact on many 
investigations:
The	 [NCIIC]	 has	 successfully	 located	
physical	 evidence	 and/or	 files	 in	 18	
cases	when	previous	efforts	by	other	
agencies	 had	 resulted	 in	 conclusions	
that	 the	 evidence	 or	 files	 had	 been	
destroyed	 or	 lost.	 In	 some	 of	 those	
cases, the prior searches had been 
court	 ordered	 with	 findings	 of	 fact	
made	 regarding	 the	missing	 evidence.	
In	 2014,	 the	Commission	 successfully	
located	 missing	 evidence	 in	 four	
cases.	 Of	 those	 cases,	 two	 resulted	
in	 exonerations,	 one	 is	 pending	 as	 a	
federal	 habeas	 corpus	 motion,	 and	
another	case	continues	 to	be	actively	
investigated.
While several of the employees of the NCIIC have 
graduated from law school, none has prosecutorial or 
investigational experience, suggesting that the skills 
necessary to fully investigate CRU cases are (a) trainable 
and (b) not typically taught by DA’s Offices to the 
attorneys participating in CRU reviews. Providing the 
training necessary to ensure that a person knowledgeable 
about the precise type of investigation that is necessary 
in a CRU setting is something that each CRU should 
consider for every investigation.
None of the CRUs we spoke to have a formal 
training program to assist prosecutors or investigators 
participating in the CRU with the conduct of case 
reviews. This information would likely be helpful for all 
attorneys within an office, but it should be mandatory for 
individuals involved in CRU case reviews.
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Revisiting “Completed” CRU Reviews
Another area of flexibility in CRUs is the ability to “reopen” 
a CRU case that the Unit has previously reviewed. Those 
CRUs that have considered the question are uniform that 
a decision not to proceed with a specific petition is not a 
one-time, permanent refusal “with prejudice” that bars a 
future review. Rather, rejection places the petition into a 
“parking lot” of sorts. No additional work is anticipated 
by the CRU, but if at any later date the petitioner were to 
gather additional evidence sufficient to meet the CRU’s 
investigational standard, the petition could be reopened.  
Some CRUs mentioned a slight caveat to this policy, 
designed to minimize repeated requests for unproductive 
additional reviews: while the Unit’s standard for its first 
acceptance of the case for review is very broad, permitting 
the review of facts known but not used by petitioner’s 
counsel at the time of trial, subsequent reviews would 
require a more traditional definition of “newly discovered” 
that requires evidence not previously known to the 
petitioner as of the time of the most recent CRU review. 
So long as the totality of the circumstances standard is 
employed by the CRU, such a rule should not materially 
damage a good faith petitioner.
CRUs and Forensic Science
For the most part, questions regarding the scientific 
testing of biological or other evidence in a CRU context 
are handled in the same manner as cases outside the 
CRU. Prosecutors will test evidence that they feel will 
conclusively resolve questions of guilt or innocence, 
while defense attorneys and petitioners often seek to 
test much more broadly. In addition, the parties often 
disagree about the probative value of the evidence yielded 
by one test or another. Budget and utilization constraints 
are as real in the CRU setting as in day-to-day practice, 
making policies for the use of forensic science in CRU 
investigations a very subjective one for the CRU as well 
as for the petitioner.
Sincere CRUs are typically willing to test evidence if (a) 
the evidence has been newly discovered; (b) the evidence 
has not previously been tested; and/or (c) the testing 
technique proposed is a material advance in specificity 
or sensitivity to prior testing methods used. Beyond that, 
whether and how to test specific pieces of evidence is a 
more subjective inquiry. Some CRUs are very willing to 
conduct tests requested by the petitioner:
I	know	there’s	financial	concerns	there	
and	 the	 people	 out	 at	 the	 crime	 lab	
probably	don’t	like	me,	but	my	position	
is if somebody wants to have something 
tested	or	re-tested,	we’re	going	to	do	
it.	We	have	done	[the	testing]	on	every	
single	occasion	because	it’s	either	going	
to	tell	you	nothing,	or	it’ll	confirm	the	
conviction,	 or	God	 forbid	 it	 tells	 you	
you	have	the	wrong	person.	Either	way,	
you	want	to	know.	
Another CRU leader also explained why the office might 
not test forensic evidence:
The	only	time	we	don’t	test	is	(a)	there	
is	nothing	to	test.	If	the	evidence	that	
is	 destroyed,	 sorry	 we	 can’t	 test	 it.	
We’d	 love	 to,	we	can’t.	Or	 (b)	where	
it’s	 really	 not	 giving	 you	 this	 positive,	
like	in	a	rape	allegation	where	he	didn’t	
actually	 physically	 penetrate	 her,	 he	
just	 held	her	wrist.	He’s	 still	 guilty	of	
rape.	He	doesn’t	 like	 that	because	he	
didn’t	do	 it,	 if	 you	will.	Well,	okay,	 I’m	
not	 going	 to	 do	 DNA	 testing.	There	
is	 nothing	 to	 test	 that’s	 going	 to	 be	
probative.	We	are	going	to	object	only	
in	 situations	 like	 that.	 Otherwise,	 we	
are	testing.
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51 U.S. v. Olsen, 737 F. 3d 625 (9th Cir. 2013).
52 In some sense, this is the reverse of the inquiry conducted by many CRUs in looking at ineffective assistance of counsel claims – the question is not whether the 
information was available to law enforcement or the prosecutor, but whether the individual was actually aware of and influenced by the information in the adjudication 
of the case.
53 The NCIIC enabling statute does provide that the underlying case may be removed from its original jurisdiction as a court reviews how best to address the error 
identified in the case. North Carolina General Statutes §15A-1469(a1).
In another example of the potential benefit from involving 
external participants, at least one CRU has a process in 
place that allows its investigators to discuss the benefits 
of various tests with an independent (i.e., external) 
forensic expert. If the expert suggests that testing would 
be valuable, then the CRU approves the test.  
Several offices take an economically pragmatic view: the 
DA’s Office will pay for testing that meets the prosecutor’s 
bar of bearing on innocence, and it permits additional 
testing at the request of the petitioner, at petitioner’s 
expense. As one prosecutor succinctly stated, “I’ll let the 
defendant test anything he/she wants, if he pays for it.”
Allegations of Prosecutorial or Law 
Enforcement Misconduct
One concern often raised in the context of a CRU 
investigation is whether allegations of official misconduct 
will be reviewed fairly and in good faith by the DA’s 
Office. It is difficult to know whether the “epidemic of 
Brady violations” seen by some observers of the criminal 
justice system51 is caused by an increase in prosecutorial 
misconduct, an increase in allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct, or an improvement in our ability to detect 
such violations. It is also difficult to tell in many contexts 
whether the failure of the prosecution to turn over 
exculpatory evidence is a failure of record-keeping, a 
failure of interpretation of the subjective “materiality” 
standard, or a deliberate attempt to gain advantage in a 
criminal case, though all of these situations are currently 
lumped together as “prosecutorial misconduct.” 
Cases progressing through the post-conviction appeals 
process often involve newly discovered evidence, and 
the defense by necessity focuses on what was “known” by 
police or prosecutors during the underlying investigation 
and prosecution.52 Thus, it is predictable that a CRU will 
be confronted with questions and allegations regarding the 
actions of the original investigator(s) and prosecutor(s). 
DAs and CRU leaders can be sure that petitioners and 
the defense bar, as well as the media, will watch carefully 
to see how such situations are handled, and will use these 
situations as a benchmark for the independence and 
transparency of the CRU and the Office as a whole.
While very few CRUs admitted to identifying an 
intentional case of prosecutorial misconduct in any of 
their investigations to date, all were uniform in how 
they proposed to handle such an issue. The CRU would 
refer information about the potential misconduct to an 
appropriate official as set forth by the DA’s policies on 
misconduct, and would continue its fact-based review of 
the case in question. None, however, have a written policy 
supporting this process, or any process for handling cases 
involving official misconduct.53   
Despite broad public skepticism, prosecutors were 
uniformly confident that their objectivity in case review 
would be unaffected in a case where, for example, a 
prosecutorial violation of the requirement of Brady by 
one of their current co-workers was alleged. Interestingly, 
given that all Brady violations occur despite an ethical 
obligation, several prosecutors referenced their ethical 
obligation to disclose any Brady information as proof that 
such disclosures would be made:
If	there	was	a	claim	that	Brady material 
had	been	withheld,	we	would	certainly	
investigate	 that	 to	 know	 whether	 or	
not	that	was	in	fact	that	case.	If	it	were	
in	fact	the	case,	we	would	divulge	the	
Brady	material.	We	would	 involve	 the	
judiciary	and	determine	what	the	next	
appropriate	step	was.
While the CRU may identify instances of prosecutorial 
or police misconduct, the ability to administer discipline 
for such actions does not rest within the CRU. Rather, 
the CRU is limited to communicating the evidence 
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54 See footnote 11 above.
55 National Commission on Forensic Science, Directive Recommendation: Root Cause Analysis (RCA) In Forensic Science, referred to United States Attorney 
General on August 11, 2015. Available at https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/work-products-adopted-commission, and attached as Appendix C.
56 See generally id. and articles cited in footnote 11.
of misconduct to the DA, the appropriate executive 
committee or the office’s General Counsel for review 
and further action. This is true even within the NCIIC, 
which is required to disclose information about potential 
prosecutorial misconduct to “the appropriate authority” 
for such matters.
For offices that only review cases for factual accuracy (as 
opposed to cases where actual innocence is predicated 
on the due process argument of withholding evidence 
known at the time of trial), Brady presents an interesting 
conundrum. While the conviction may have been secured 
in part because of the office’s own error or misconduct, the 
later CRU review may still conclude that the conviction 
is factually accurate. A few offices go a step farther, 
suggesting that evidence of Brady violations might 
increase their willingness to vacate convictions with 
prejudice given the Office’s more direct role in depriving 
the defendant of rights. 
While some view the inability to enforce disciplinary 
action for official misconduct as evidence that the CRU 
is in fact a CRINO, it should be pointed out that the 
separation of discipline for reckless or intentional 
misconduct from the fact-based event review is actually 
a best practice in many industries, including healthcare 
and aviation,54 and is expressly recommended in the “Just 
Culture Event Review” procedures recommended to the 
U.S. Attorney General by the National Commission on 
Forensic Science.55 Separating issues of discipline and 
blame from the investigation of what actually happened 
during the commission of a crime encourages the 
participation of knowledgeable participants in the events. 
Conversely, prosecutors, police officers and witnesses 
with knowledge of the case might be more reticent if 
their participation would cause another to be punished. 
In this way, ensuring that the CRU is not a disciplinary 
body actually furthers the goals of the case review,56  
without limiting the ability of appropriate entities (e.g., 
the DA or State Bar for prosecutors, or an internal affairs 
or disciplinary board, for police) to ensure accountability 
for intentional misconduct. At the same time, DAs and 
CRU heads who take the process seriously would be 
well advised to have clearly stated policies not just for 
the handling of Brady material discovered during a case 
review, but for the separate investigative process to assess 
the culpability of the prosecutors or investigators in the 
underlying case. 
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CRU Transparency
The evaluation of a CRU has both a direct and an indirect 
component. The direct evaluation looks at the freedom 
that a CRU is given by the DA to review cases previously 
adjudicated by the DA’s Office where errors are alleged, 
and the policies and procedures that it has developed to 
conduct and act upon those case reviews.The indirect 
evaluation takes a wider lens and considers the inherent 
skepticism of the CRU enterprise from the defense bar, 
the political currency of the CRU to the current DA and 
his/her potential challengers, and the utility of the CRU 
to the community as a whole.
Independence and flexibility are important factors in 
each of these assessments, providing insight into how 
the CRU conducts its activities and how those activities 
are perceived by external stakeholders. The third category 
on which governmental actors reviewing their own past 
actions for error can and will be judged is transparency. 
The ability of those outside the DA’s Office to see what 
actions a CRU is taking and to understand the rationales 
behind those actions is what enables communities to 
verify the good faith of their CRUs – or validate their 
worst suspicions. The CRU’s decisions on what to 
publicize and what to shield from the public eye impact 
the willingness of petitioners to use the CRU, and inform 
the public’s judgment of whether the CRU is engaging 
in good faith reviews of allegations of error, or is simply 
an effort to curry public favor that lacks legitimacy and 
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integrity.  Finally, and assuming that the CRU is sincere, 
transparency should allow DAs to make more powerful 
arguments to their County Commissioners about the 
need to prioritize funds to the CRU over time.   
For all of these reasons, while due deference should be 
given to the need for confidentiality of case records, 
safety for potential witnesses, and the emotional needs of 
victims of crime and their families and friends, it is also 
important for DAs and CRU leaders to maximize the 
reasonable transparency of CRU activity and to publicize 
the CRU’s impact within the Office and within the larger 
community.
Publishing CRU Policies and Procedures
Jurisdictions with CRUs have wrestled with a two-tier 
threshold question regarding transparency: should the 
policies and practices of the CRU be in writing, and 
should they be publicly available? Several of the most 
active and established CRUs (e.g., Brooklyn, Dallas, 
Santa Clara) have very few, if any written policies 
and procedures, while other offices (e.g., Cuyahoga, 
Manhattan, Oneida) have detailed and public protocols 
and procedures available for all to review.
Having policies and procedures makes it easy for everyone 
to know what to expect from the CRU process, and 
provides concrete information for CRU assessment and 
accountability. On the other hand, written policies and 
procedures create two potential downsides for a CRU.  
First, several prosecutors expressed concern that written 
policies and procedures might paradoxically limit their 
flexibility in handling case reviews. Each case reviewed 
presents a unique fact pattern and underlying scenario 
that led to the erroneous conviction. It is reasonable to 
assume that written policies, no matter how well written, 
will not account for every situation that arises, and poorly 
written protocols or protocols may actually constrain 
the prosecutor’s ability to use his or her full discretion 
to advocate for the best result based on a totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the review:
The	 post-conviction	 courts	 and	 the	
appeals	courts	have	to	set	standards	in	
an	adversarial	[setting].		You	cross	this	
line	 or	 you’re	 below	 this	 line	 and	 it’s	
either	 good	or	 it’s	 not	 good.	That,	 to	
us,	 limits	 tremendously	 our	 flexibility,	
because	 what	 we	 talk	 about	 is	 not	
really	 the	 legalities	 of	 things,	 we’re	
talking	about	the	use	of	prosecutorial	
discretion.	That	 takes	 us	 outside	 the	
realm	 of	 what…	 the	 judicial	 process	
does,	 why	 in	 an	 extrajudicial	 fashion	
we	can	form	our	own	standards,	which	
again	 are	 not	 bright	 line	 standards.	 It	
has	to	be	to	the	extent	where	this	 is	
all	going	to	be	subjective.
[We	 are]	 in	 the	 process	 of	 making	
written	 goals,	 directives	 and	 policies.	
Necessarily,	 those	 have	 to	 be	
somewhat	 amorphous	 because	 the	
second	you	put	in	bright	line	stuff	then	
you	 create	 another	 layer	 of	 litigation	
which	is	something	that	we	just	don’t	
want	to	get	into	because	it	doesn’t	help	
us.		Sure,	it’s	great	for	defense	litigants	
but	we	don’t	want	[petitioners]	to	be	
defense litigants, we want them to be 
investigatory	partners.
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Figure 14.  CRUs with Written Protocols 
(n=20)
The concern for maximum flexibility can be taken as 
sincere coming from such established CRUs as Brooklyn 
and Dallas. At the same time, for experienced prosecutors 
and legal writers to claim that written protocols constrain 
their activities seems disingenuous to some. Drafting 
protocols with non-absolute language and exception 
clauses for special circumstances that protect the flexibility 
of the CRU is easily done, and would provide myriad 
benefits to the CRU. One example of this drafting can be 
seen in the written policies of Oneida County (NY) with 
regard to the scope of the CRU’s review. The protocol 
is clear without limiting the flexibility of the DA or the 
Unit:
While	the	scope	of	the	review	of	the	
CIP57 is ordinarily limited to claims of 
actual	innocence,	the	CIP	reserves	the	
right	 in	 extraordinary	 circumstances,	
to	conduct	its	review	in	cases	where	it	
is claimed that the level of offense for 
which the defendant stands convicted 
is overwhelmingly disproportionate 
¢		Yes									¢		No
70%
30%
to	 the	 criminal	 conduct	 that	 actually	
occurred.	 The	 Committee	 serving	
under	the	District	Attorney,	shall	have	
complete discretion as to whether, 
and	 in	what	 instances,	 any	 such	 non-
innocence	 claims	 of	 over-conviction	
shall	be	reviewed.
The transparency and accountability inherent in 
publishing written policies and procedures for conviction 
reviews should help a DA convince petitioners, defense 
counsel, judges, and the community that the CRU is 
an honest, good faith endeavor. Written policies and 
procedures also provide an opportunity for feedback from 
external stakeholders and the community, which will both 
improve the policies and increase the goodwill generated 
by the CRU while bringing some who were skeptical over 
to support the CRU.  
The benefit of transparency may be most beneficial to 
newer CRUs, which are likely to be more vulnerable 
in the court of public opinion. One of the CRUs that 
participated in this review lacks a direct reporting line to 
the DA, lacks dedicated personnel (including the head of 
the CRU, whose responsibilities exist on top of an active 
and high-profile caseload), and has not yet recommended 
any exonerations, including for individuals who have 
subsequently been exonerated in habeas proceedings. This 
office may be articulating a sincerely held view supporting 
conviction review for cases of actual innocence, but 
without more, the growing claims that have begun 
throughout the jurisdiction and elsewhere that the unit is 
actually a CRINO will continue unabated, reducing the 
unit’s utility for the DA’s Office in question.
What Protocols Should be Committed to Writing? In 
general, offices should commit protocols to writing that 
will assist participants in case submission and review, 
and what to expect in terms of the activities of the CRU. 
While different offices have handled this in different 
57 Oneida County calls its unit a Conviction Integrity Program, or CIP.
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ways, examples of areas that could benefit from written 
policies and procedures include:
• Process for claim submission
• Types of cases CRU will/will not accept for 
review
• Standard of review for initial case acceptance 
(screening)
• Standard of review for case review
• Standard of review for vacating a conviction
• Who will/will not conduct a case review
• Role of petitioner and petitioner’s counsel in 
case review
• Role of original prosecutor and/or investigator 
in case review
• Requirements on waiver of attorney/client 
privilege, or use of a collaboration agreement
• Sharing of documents, including potential 
reciprocity, with petitioner/petitioner’s attorney
• Sharing of information learned/ evidence 
discovered during case review
• Conduct, payment for forensic testing
• Procedures for allegations of government 
misconduct
• Disclosure of final decision after case review 
and supporting rationale
• Ability of petitioner to revisit process after 
final decision
• Ability of CRU/DA’s Office to use information 
obtained during investigation in future 
litigation
The NCIIC has developed a more extensive set of policies 
and procedures, going beyond case-related issues into 
structural and operational concerns:
The	 human	 resources	 policies,	 all	 of	
those	 that	 you	 think	of	 you	need	 for	
an	 office,	 we	 have	 all	 of	 those.	We	
have	office	policies	on	interviews,	and	
that	includes	safety	on	an	interview…	
How	do	we	check	in?	We’re	going	out	
in	 the	field	 to	 lots	of	 different	places	
and	we	have	rules	that	I	need	staff	to	
follow	when	 they’re	 doing	 that.	What	
are	 the	 things	 you	 can	 and	 can’t	 say	
when	you’re	doing	an	interview?	How	
are	 you	 going	 to	 record	 it?	Who	 are	
you	going	to	bring	with	you?	We	have	
a policy on evidence collection that 
everyone has to follow, all the forms 
that	they	have	to	fill	out,	the	things	that	
they	have	to	do.	We	have	policies	we’ve	
adopted	like	the	hazardous	workplace	
policies for when we are collecting 
evidence	and	things	like	that.	We	have	
what are then, what we call sort of 
more	“go-bys,”	 less	 formal,	 these	 are	
the	 best	 practices	 that	 we’ve	 seen	
[in	 certain	 situations].	Those	 types	of	
things,	 and	 that’s	 a	 lot	 that,	 again,	 has	
been	 just	 developed	 over	 time	 and	
those	 are	 things	 that	 we’re	 eager	 to	
share.
The NCIIC’s policies, procedures and protocols – many of 
which are not published – make clear that while drafting 
protocols can be a tedious and time-consuming task, 
carefully written protocols can give clarity, transparency, 
and legitimacy to the CRU effort, while protecting 
flexibility and prosecutorial discretion at all times.
Transparency to Victims of Crime
One of the most challenging and difficult parts of a 
prosecutor’s job is managing each criminal case in a way 
that considers the complex emotional needs of victims of 
crime and their families.  In the CRU context, the victims’ 
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emotions are even more sympathetic. The CRU case 
review re-examines a tragedy – often a violent trauma 
– that befell the victims and their families. Opening the 
case for re-investigation due to a potential error of guilt 
or innocence forces victims to relive this trauma while 
reducing the victim’s trust in the system. In some cases it 
may even add to the anguish of a victim or witnesses, who 
may have unwittingly aided in a mistaken identification 
or bolstered a shaky (and ultimately inaccurate) case. 
 
At the same time, victims’ sense of ownership over the 
crime – that it is their crime, it happened to them – and 
the need to provide justice to them can generate an 
emotional need to participate in decisions regarding the 
outcome, especially in a situation where it now appears 
that the DA’s Office may have mishandled it from the 
start.
In an effort to be mindful of and sensitive to these 
emotional complexities, many CRUs wait to inform 
victims of their work until there is something substantial 
to discuss:
We	try	 to	keep	 [victims]	 informed…	
The	 problem	 is	 that	 when	 you	
engage	 them	at	 an	early	point	of	our	
investigation, they invariably become 
advocates to not release the person, 
and	 sometimes	 engage	 counsel	 to	
press	 that.	 If	 they	 have	 information	
that	is	germane	in	terms	of	the	guilt	or	
innocence of the defendant, as opposed 
to	their	belief	or	what	they’ve	been	told	
or	what	the	jury	had,	we	generally	will	
not	 contact	 them	until	we	are	 at	 the	
end	 part	 of	 our	 investigation,	 where	
pretty	much	we	know	which	direction	
we’re	going.	There	again,	we	don’t	want	
them	 tampering	 with	 the	 process…	
[T]his	isn’t	about	victim	impact.	This	is	
about	whether	the	person	has	done	it	
or	not.	
Other CRUs find their obligations with regard to victims 
controlled by statute. In California, for example, the issue 
is governed by the California Victims’ Bill of Rights 
Act of 2008, also known as Marsy’s Law. Marsy’s Law 
requires prosecutors’ offices to give victims reasonable 
notice of any court proceeding involving the case(s) in 
which they were victims, and the opportunity for the 
victim to reasonably confer with the prosecuting attorney 
and to be heard at any proceedings related to the case.
The NCIIC has a policy of informing victims upon entry 
into the “formal inquiry” phase, and permitting the victim 
(or his/her next of kin if the victim is deceased) the ability 
to share his/her views throughout the formal inquiry 
process. In addition, the Commission will notify victims 
30 days prior to the official hearing on the case. Victims 
are invited to attend with 10 days’ notice, and they are 
immediately informed of the result of the hearing in any 
event.
The Middlesex County DA has constructed a middle 
ground between the emotional response of the victim 
of the underlying crime and the reality that victims and 
their emotions matter in addressing errors in the system. 
Middlesex CRU protocols state that the prosecutor 
leading the investigation should confer with a Victim 
Witness Advocate prior to presenting the case to the 
Committee to determine if, and when, any victim(s) 
should be notified of review.  It is then the responsibility 
of the Victim Witness Advocate to discuss the case to the 
specific victims involved in the underlying crime, and give 
the victims their opportunity to present their views and 
concerns to the Committee. In this way, the risk that the 
victims of the underlying crime will have undue influence 
on the CRU process is minimized, and the presentation 
of a very difficult emotional issue for the victims is done 
compassionately by an expert in such conversations.
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Transparency of Case Review Process, 
Decision and Rationale 
Even a well-resourced CRU must balance realities 
of limited resources and the likelihood of success 
with the unquenchable thirst of a petitioner, almost 
always incarcerated, to keep pushing for additional 
testing, investigation, etc. to prove his/her innocence 
and secure his freedom. Add to that the challenges of 
finding evidence and witnesses from a case that may be 
years or decades old, individuals who may not want to 
acknowledge that the case could have been decided in 
error, and general skepticism surrounding the fact that 
the DA is investigating a closed conviction, and the 
challenge of how, and when, to end an investigation 
where the conclusion is not to reverse or vacate the 
conviction becomes clear. The decision to stop reviewing 
a petition for actual innocence presents a somewhat 
paradoxical, but important question:  in a situation where 
a petitioner steadfastly maintains his innocence despite 
some evidence to the contrary, how does a good faith 
CRU dedicated to ensuring accurate convictions decide 
when to stop an investigation?
CRUs differ in their answers to this question, from the 
linear “[w]hen facts deviate from allegations, you stop” 
to the circular “[w]hen you’re done, you’re done.” Others 
compared it to the decision of whether to charge or to go 
to trial, saying that the decision to stop an investigation 
was based on a multitude of factors that were difficult to 
define in total:
It’s	 hard	 to	 tell.	 If	 we	 get	 something	
definitive,	 certainly	 in	 the	 meantime,	
then	we	 can	 act.	 If	 they	 give	 us	 their	
theory	 of	 the	 case	 and	 we	 look	 at	
some	of	the	leads	and	we	look	at	some	
of	 the	 theories	 that	 they’re	 putting	
forward	 and	 it’s	 not	 going	 anywhere,	
then we may get to the point at some 
point	where	we’re	just	going	to	decide	
that	 there’s	 nothing	 new	 here	 and	
we’re	 not	 going	 to	 do	 anything	 with	
regard	to	the	conviction.
The best practice for sincere CRUs here may borrow from 
concepts of procedural justice, which seek to improve 
judicial listening, respect and empathy for the individuals 
on their dockets. Similarly, CRUs that truly engage in 
a collaborative process are likely to get better (i.e., less 
contentious) outcomes among petitioners or counsel 
who (a) feel that the CRU has honestly and openly 
discussed the allegations of error, (b) have been involved 
in the CRU’s process and know what resources have been 
expended and what steps have been taken in the service 
of the investigation, and (c) have received substantive 
rather than bureaucratic or administrative reasons for not 
conducting certain testing, etc.  
Once a decision not to proceed is made, some CRUs 
have a practice of providing notification to petitioners 
in writing, while others communicate more informally, 
particularly if petitioner is represented by counsel. As in 
other settings, some CRUs are comfortable sharing the 
rationale for the cessation of the review: “we’re happy to 
communicate our findings to defense counsel and listen 
to their reactions, but more often than not, you’ve made 
your mind up,” while others choose to be more vague, 
feeling that a reason is not required for the rejection 
of a claim, and providing one simply leaves an opening 
for a persistent petitioner to continue to keep an actual 
innocence conversation alive longer than is minimally 
necessary.
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Collection and Publication of Metrics and 
Accomplishments  
As stewards of taxpayer funds, it is the responsibility 
of the DA and CRU head to understand the impact of 
the CRU they manage, and such information should 
generally be made available to the public for evaluation 
and comment.58 Such disclosures should benefit the 
Office, the Unit and the community, as they will dispel 
concerns that the CRU is merely a PR stunt and 
allow for thoughtful discussion regarding appropriate 
modifications and agreement among stakeholders 
over time. The word “should” in the previous sentence, 
however, looms large. DAs who provide such information 
are subject to different interpretations of the information 
from political opponents, the media, and others, and thus 
it is incumbent upon the defense bar, judges, and the 
media to understand and support such voluntary steps 
towards fact-based case review, giving more transparent 
jurisdictions the benefit of the doubt when evaluating the 
results.  
Tracking the CRU’s activity and determining metrics 
for its utility can and should go beyond the number of 
exonerations that the CRU recommends. While some 
CRUs have exonerated dozens of individuals and created 
impressive goodwill in their jurisdictions, a lack of 
exonerations should not necessarily be viewed as evidence 
of CRINO. Generating large numbers of exonerations 
may be more challenging than it seems.  CRUs to date 
have grown in large urban centers, by and large, and 
smaller, less populated jurisdictions can be expected to 
have fewer allegations and instances of error to review. 
A more reliable approach to reassure external observers 
in the jurisdiction of the true intentions of the CRU, 
while making a case to legislators and others about its 
utility, would be the dissemination of data about the 
CRU’s activities. Examples of what activities might be 
useful to measure the CRU’s impact are suggested by the 
58 As with other disclosures involving criminal cases, individually identifiable information should be disclosed with care, if at all, to protect victims and witnesses.
annual report of the NCIIC. The data presented in the 
NCIIC’s Annual report provides an excellent template 
that to date has not been followed by any other CRU, 
though the data could easily be gathered and provided by 
each CRU without any danger or injury to specific case 
investigations, witnesses, victims or next of kin, or other 
issues around confidentiality.
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A Case Study of 
Independence and 
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The staff of the Commission is similarly devoid of 
prosecutors, consisting of:
• Executive Director 
• Associate Director 
• Associate Counsel 
• Paralegal 
• Legal Investigator 
• Grant Staff Attorney (paid for by federal grant 
money for DNA case review)
• Grant Investigator (paid for by federal grant 
money for DNA case review)
While some members of the NCIIC have law degrees, 
all view their roles as primarily investigational; they 
will present their findings to a Judge, and ultimately are 
requesting a judicial hearing at which the DA’s Office 
may speak and/or present.  
Prior to moving for a judicial hearing, however, the 
NCIIC consults with its Advisory Board, which is 
required by law to consist of the following:
• Superior Court Judge
• Sheriff
• Criminal Defense Attorney
• Prosecuting Attorney
• Victim’s Advocate
• Public Member (non-attorney, non-judge)
• Three (3) Discretionary Appointments by the 
Chief Justice.
59 http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/gar.html, accessed August 31, 2015.
The CRU with the most independent and transparent 
structure (though not the most flexible one) is not a 
“traditional” CRU at all, but rather the state-funded North 
Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC), 
which effectively serves as a clearinghouse for all post-
conviction claims of actual innocence throughout the state, 
conducting investigations independent of the prosecutors’ 
offices involved, and making recommendations regarding 
the claims to a review board and ultimately to a judicial 
tribunal at which the prosecutors and victims may 
participate.
The NCIIC has no prosecutors involved in its case reviews, 
which simultaneously underscores its independence from 
allegations of prosecutorial bias and makes a strong 
argument that there is nothing inherently prosecutorial 
about the skills needed to thoroughly investigate past 
cases where inaccurate convictions are alleged. Rather, the 
membership of the NCIIC consists entirely of outside 
perspectives, including:
• One victims’ advocate; 
• One criminal defense attorney;
• One member of the public (currently a 
Commissioner on Urban Planning and 
Community Economic Development);
• One Sheriff; and 
• Two discretionary members appointed by the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
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The statewide Innocence Commission model should, in 
theory, allow for centralized (and therefore more plentiful 
and experienced) case reviews, and those reviews should be 
at least as objective as reviews conducted by “traditional” 
CRUs, who are investigating activities within their own 
offices. But the strategy is not without its potential 
downsides. First, where traditional CRUs are voluntary 
activities sponsored by DAs, the NCIIC is a legislative 
mandate that is being imposed on all prosecutors in 
North Carolina. It would be surprising if some of those 
prosecutors did not feel that the NCIIC is an undesired 
intrusion on their work, a Monday morning quarterback 
intent on exposing the office’s mistakes. Without any 
ownership of the review, these prosecutors are more likely 
to bristle at the NCIIC’s requests, and as elected officials 
outside of a reporting chain linked to the NCIIC, they 
are more able to oppose a recommendation of dismissal 
or vacation of charges than other CRUs.
Another potential weakness of the NCIIC is its inability 
to implement any of its recommendations, including 
its findings of actual innocence. Rather, the NCIIC 
makes a recommendation regarding each specific case 
to the Commission as a whole. “If five or more of the 
eight voting members of the Commission conclude 
there is sufficient evidence of factual innocence to merit 
judicial review, the case shall be referred to the senior 
resident superior court judge in the district of original 
jurisdiction by filing with the clerk of court the opinion 
of the Commission with supporting findings of fact, as 
well as the record in support of such opinion…” From 
here, the court appoints a panel of three judges, none of 
whom have been previously involved in the case, and a 
hearing is held for the NCIIC, the DA in question and 
petitioner’s counsel (who may be court-appointed if the 
petition to the CRU was filed pro se). Only if the three-
judge panel unanimously feels that the convicted person 
is innocent by clear and convincing evidence can the 
petitioner released with the dismissal of all or any charge. 
There are multiple opportunities among the many steps 
between the NCIIC’s initial recommendation and an 
actual finding of exoneration for a savvy DA to delay or 
disrupt the case review process.
The transparency of the NCIIC, however, provides a 
way to judge whether the cynical view in the preceding 
paragraph is occurring. The NCIIC posts on its web 
site an annual report prescribed by the North Carolina 
legislature.59 The report, which includes the Commission’s 
case filter, allows the general public to review the size 
and scope of the actual innocence problem in North 
Carolina. The top of the filter may be seen as a reasonable 
proxy for the number of people incarcerated in the state 
who believe they should be exonerated; the middle 
can be a proxy for the percentage of the believers who 
have articulated colorable claims of innocence; and the 
bottom, the exonerations, shows the actual impact of the 
NCIIC and provides a group of cases ripe for careful root 
cause analysis and dissemination of recommendations for 
improvements throughout the criminal justice system in 
the jurisdiction.
Conviction 
Review 
Units: 
A	National	 
Perspective
70
The Annual Report also provides the following key 
information about the Commission:
• Commission members and staff; 
• A description of activities, including four 
cases that led to judicial hearings exonerating 
individuals based on actual innocence. In these 
cases, which are matters of public record, all 
documents used in the Commission’s exoneration 
hearing are posted on the NCIIC website;
• Annual case statistics:
o New claims of actual innocence: 180
o Average number of new claims of actual 
Innocence per year: 205
o Number of claims of actual innocence since 
inception of NCIIC: 1,642
o Number of claims reviewed and closed: 
1,482
o Number of exonerations: 8 
• Specific case statistics:
o Types of crime at issue
o Basis of the innocence claims submitted
o Reasons for rejection. 
• Results of investigations (a useful metric for 
the NCIIC specifically, which has been granted 
subpoena power and thus wants to show its 
ability to conduct thorough investigations)
o Number of cases where the NCIIC found 
physical evidence or files reported missing by 
other agencies: 18
• Presentations made to other agencies
This information suggests an active case filter statewide; 
with a little more research, it could easily be broken 
down by case and by jurisdiction to evaluate how various 
counties within the state are participating in terms of 
number of cases, average duration of reviews, etc. The 
average time for a case from petition to resolution across 
the various parts of the funnel, for example, could inform 
policy makers can identify appropriate levels of staffing 
to handle a reasonable flow of additional claims in the 
future, which may be useful as cases do not always appear 
in regular time intervals.
The NCIIC is an admirable experiment, creating a top-
down model for cultural change and a thoughtful safety 
net for the criminal justice system to identify and review 
potential errors in the administration of justice. It remains 
to be seen whether the model operates more effectively 
and efficiently than the “traditional” CRU model, and 
its inability to implement “best practices” that might be 
identified in the course of conducting case reviews may 
limit its ability to help prevent the recurrence of errors in 
the future. Still, the NCIIC’s emphasis on independence 
and transparency and its willingness to investigate cases 
openly and objectively bode well for its future, and 
provide a useful counterpoint for CRUs operating within 
DA’s Offices.
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As CRUs proliferate across the country, it is important 
to realize that the lack of a CRU is not proof of an 
unwillingness to review plausible claims of actual 
innocence, just as the existence of a CRU is not in itself 
proof of the willingness to conduct them.
The sort of data collection contemplated here does not 
seek to publicize case-specific information that is not 
already part of the public record, or to reveal information 
that could jeopardize witnesses, victims, or next of 
kin. Rather, the assessment of aggregated information 
about the activities undertaken by the CRU can 
convey quantitative and qualitative information about 
inaccuracies in the criminal justice system and thoughts 
about how to reduce them over time. This could easily be 
reflected in a case funnel that show the process from the 
CRU’s receipt of a request for assistance through to the 
decision to vacate a conviction. Such a funnel might have 
the stages set forth in Table 2 on page 73.
A unified case funnel of all CRUs that submitted data 
in response to our requests is below. Fields in gray were 
not reported by the CRUs. We supplemented the data 
provided with information posted on the National 
Registry of Exonerations.60 Of the nineteen (19) CRUs 
that participated in our survey and interviews, only eleven 
(11) published or provided their case funnel information.61 
The information was not provided for a variety of reasons, 
with the most popular being that the statistics were not 
kept, the individual was too busy, or the office decided not 
to release the data publicly.
It is important to recognize that case funnels are not 
static. As previously noted, CRU policies will impact the 
number of requests for assistance received by the CRU, 
and these policies may change over time.  In addition, the 
number of petitions received by an office is likely to be at 
its largest within the first 6-24 months after announcing 
the CRU, and then can be expected to increase shortly 
after any published exoneration, as other inmates hear of 
a successful petition to the CRU. It is probably safe to 
assume, however, that these numbers will diminish over 
time.
The information we have suggested here should not be 
burdensome to collect or to publish. Most of it, if not 
all, is likely to be retrievable from even a basic case 
management system, or can be kept “on the fly” by the 
person handling the intake of petitions for assistance to 
the CRU. Understanding the flow of cases through the 
CRU funnel and gathering deidentified information 
about the underlying issues in these cases will go a long 
way towards establishing the value of the CRU within 
a jurisdiction and will support requests for additional 
funding, as well as chart a course towards creating a 
culture of sustained self-evaluation and self-improvement 
that is crucial to the reduction of inaccurate convictions 
over time.
60 The National Registry of Exonerations, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx, last accessed October 8, 2015. Individual exonerees whose 
profiles included the “CIU” tag were counted and distributed by county.
61 http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/stats.html, last accessed October 8, 2015.
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  Requests       
 Year for  Substantial Reviews     NRE 
Office Established Review Investigations Pending Exonerations Rejections Investigations Exonerations**
Bexar	County,	TX	 2015	 200	 50	 15	 1	 175	 15	 1
Pima	County,	AZ	 2014	 35	 17	 15	 0	 0	 17	 -
Middlesex	County,	MA	 2014	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Cuyahoga	County,	OH	 2014	 70	 15	 -	 0	 -	 -	 -
Philadelphia	County,	PA	 2014	 101	 6	 89	 0	 -	 -	 -
Nassau	County,	NY	 2013	 3	 2	 0	 0	 0	 2	 -
Ventura	County,	CA	 2012	 17	 15	 2	 1	 11	 5	 1
Cook	County,	IL	 2012	 435	 435	 -	 12	 238	 222	 14	
Lake	County,	IL	 2012	 16	 5	 1	 2	 1	 2	 2
Oneida	County,	NY	 2012	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Kings	County,	NY	 2011	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 21
San	Diego,	CA	 2011	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1
Baltimore,	MD	 2011	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 3
New	York,	NY	 2010	 175	 17	 0	 5	 -	 1	 4
Colorado	Justice	 2010-13	 4,976	 -	 -	 1	 -	 -	 - 
Review Program
Wayne	County,	MI	 2010-13	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Harris	County,	TX	 2009	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 77
Dallas	County,	TX	 2007	 -	 -	 35	 28	 -	 -	 25
North	Carolina	 2006	 1,768	 1,549	 -	 8*	 -	 9	 - 
Inn.	Inq.	Comm.
Santa	Clara	 2004-08,		 1,447	 6	 0	 5	 1	 0	 4 
County,	CA	 2010
TOTALS  9,243 2,117 157 55 426 273 153
* NCIIC reports 8 exonerations at hearing and one additional exoneration due to its investigations.
** Includes data reported by National Registry of Exonerations
Table 2.  Case Funnels for Conviction Review Units.
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Can CRUs Prevent  
Future Errors?
As currently practiced, the CRU model is a model of 
error remediation, as opposed to one of error prevention. 
CRUs work to identify cases where errors may have been 
committed, and they take steps to correct those errors. 
Done conscientiously, it is a valuable and important 
service, adding tremendous legitimacy to our criminal 
justice system. To the extent that the process deployed 
by the CRU is a collaborative process with reduced 
adversarial posturing driven solely to find the truth, CRUs 
have the ability to transcend both the administrative 
limitations of post-conviction appellate litigation and our 
cynicism about the adversarial process, and truly improve 
the functioning of the criminal justice system.
At the same time, a CRU that merely contents itself with 
resolving or redressing errors in the adjudication of guilt 
or innocence is missing a far larger and more important 
opportunity to improve the system. As the focal point 
for analysis of cases where errors are alleged, CRUs are 
well positioned to be the leading advocate of training 
and implementation of “best practices” that will assist 
not just prosecutors or investigators in DA’s Offices, but 
law enforcement, defense attorneys, judges, and juries to 
prevent such errors in the future.
Recent conferences or symposia discussing CRUs62 
suggest that DAs are starting to understand this potential, 
62 Northern California Innocence Project Symposium on Conviction Integrity Units, Oct. 28, 2015; Kings County (NY) District Attorney’s Office Summit on 
Wrongful Convictions, Nov. 5, 2015.
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but that their CRUs have not translated this potential 
into reality.  The gap between observing this opportunity 
and implementing effective reform can be vast, and most 
individuals running CRUs tell a story very different than 
their District Attorneys regarding their ability to conduct 
effective analyses of why a mistake was made in the 
adjudication of a case, much less have the time or the 
resources to actually advocate for, design, or implement 
preventative reforms to such errors. While some CRUs 
have conducted training on, for example, optimized 
procedures for conducting photographic lineups to 
minimize eyewitness identification mistakes or rewritten 
policies for the handling of Brady material in criminal 
cases, such actions are more likely a response to news 
articles or conversations with other prosecutors than 
they are an actual feedback loop generated by a specific 
case review within the office. What’s more, such activity 
regularly occurs in offices without CRUs as well, making 
it difficult to suggest that CRUs have somehow “raised 
the bar” on best practices and training.
Part of the challenge is administrative.  Almost no CRUs 
gather data about the cases reviewed, and what data has been 
gathered is predominantly administrative, rather than the 
disciplined “Just Culture Event Review” recommended in 
other industries and in, for example, a crime lab setting.63 
It is important to realize that reviews to improve the 
safety of a system, or to prevent future errors within that 
system, are inherently different than the investigation 
of factual innocence that the CRU undertakes. Just 
Culture Event Reviews are non-disciplinary reviews 
of unintended outcomes – which might include errors, 
mistakes, adverse events, or misconduct – to understand 
the environmental, procedural, supervisory, or other 
circumstances that enabled, incented, or failed to prevent 
the unintended outcome. The case review conducted by 
a CRU, by contrast, is a fact-based evaluation of guilt or 
innocence in a criminal case. Thus, in cases where the 
CRU decides that the criminal justice system has made 
an error, it should ensure that the jurisdiction is actively 
engaging in a Just Culture Event Review to learn from 
the error, and prevent its recurrence.
None of the offices we spoke to have implemented 
such review, nor have they looked at their case filters 
as potential databases for aggregated analysis, useful to 
catalog the types of errors in the cases they review for 
potential use in trend-spotting or contextual learning.64   
In fairness to CRUs, there is an undeniable structural 
limitation on the ability of a CRU to implement 
procedural improvements to reduce errors. As a creation 
within the DA’s Office, the authority of the CRU to 
mandate changes to law enforcement activity to prevent 
future errors extends only as far as the DA’s Office. 
Certainly, many of the errors that can lead to inaccurate 
convictions are committed by prosecutors, but many are 
committed in other parts of the criminal justice system 
as well. Inaccurate eyewitness identifications and false 
confessions, for example, are typically committed during 
the investigation phase when a police department is in 
charge of the case. Ineffective assistance of counsel is 
based on the activity of defense counsel. A CRU might 
rightfully identify a need for modified practices to 
address these problems, but it lacks the ability to force 
the implementation of the solutions.
63 National Commission on Forensic Science, Directive Recommendation: Root Cause Analysis (RCA) In Forensic Science, referred to United States Attorney 
General on August 11, 2015. Available at https://www.justice.gov/ncfs/work-products-adopted-commission, and attached as Appendix C.
64 One challenge that individual prosecutors’ offices face here is that the number of cases reviewed in a single jurisdiction, particularly in smaller offices, is unlikely 
to be sufficiently large to draw accurate systemic conclusions from the cases. A state-wide or nationwide data gathering model may be needed for such aggregated 
analysis.
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Figure 15. Feedback Loop.
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procedural	 hurdles	 that	 exist	 under	
[post-conviction	 review	 statutes].	 If	
along the way as we go on in time we 
see	 things	 that	 are	 procedurally	 not	
correct or need improvement then 
we’ll	 certainly	react	 to	 that,	and	 train	
on	that.
Another question unresolved by CRUs to date is how 
to address situations in which there could be multiple 
instances of the same error. No CRUs were eager to 
embrace the conduct of an “audit” that would expand 
a case review to review a large group of related cases 
to ensure that all potential incidences of the error 
were identified and addressed. In such situations, most 
people interviewed suggested that they would conduct 
broader reviews “when they feel it necessary” but were 
not able to describe what those conditions might be. 
For whatever reason, such audits appear to be more 
easily embraced when pertaining to a crime lab, and less 
clear when pertaining to a colleague in a DA’s Office or 
a police officer. Brooklyn and Harris County, however, 
have conducted or are in the process of conducting such 
reviews, and their work may serve as tutorials for such 
reviews moving forward.
Several CRUs indicated a history of, or a philosophy 
supportive of conducting audits in instances where 
prosecutorial or police misconduct have been alleged. 
The publicity surrounding Detective Louis Scarcella 
in Brooklyn is one example of this; the CRU is in the 
process of reviewing 150 cases involving the Detective 
to determine whether any of those cases should be 
reinvestigated. In another jurisdiction, the DA conducted 
an audit based on an intentional act of bad faith taken by 
a prosecutor. The theory in that office was that a discovery 
of intentional misconduct was something likely to have 
been repeated, and so delving into additional cases for 
that prosecutor was necessary to rule out other potential 
affected cases.  
Still, CRUs persist in the attempt to learn from the cases 
they review and to implement improvements to the 
adjudication process that are designed to reduce errors 
in the future. “We do spend time talking about not just 
specific cases, but are there policies, are there procedures, 
are there things we can put into place to prevent some of 
these cases from happening in the first place.” All agree 
in theory that some sense of learning from these errors 
is useful, but too few offices are conducting such work in 
practice:
Is	 it	 the	 role	 of	 the	CRU	 to	 identify,	
communicate,	 or	 implement	 changes	
as	 a	 result	 of	 lessons	 learned	 in	
the	 cases	 that	 you’re	 reviewing?	 	
I’m	 hoping	 that	 it	 will	 be.	 It	 hasn’t	
historically	 been	 that.	 The	 unit	 was	
created	with	the	notion	of	making	sure	
that the claims of people, innocence 
claims are properly addressed, and 
they’re	addressed	without	some	of	the	
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In truth, the creation of a broad-based “cycle of 
improvement” that will analyze errors found by CRUs and 
implement reforms to prevent future errors throughout 
the criminal justice system is not something that a CRU 
can reasonably be expected to do alone. It requires the 
participation of all criminal justice stakeholders within a 
jurisdiction. As such, this may be an area where an outside 
organization, along the lines of an Innocence Commission, 
could add value to CRUs across a broader jurisdiction 
(for example, a state). The Texas Innocence Commission, 
or the Pennsylvania or California commissions that 
reviewed wrongful convictions, could be used to receive 
data from prosecutors’ offices on a variety of activities, 
including data on cases that are reversed. This data could 
be analyzed and discussed with a cross-disciplinary group 
and discussions had on how tom implement best practices 
throughout the state. The Commission could also have 
authority to order a broader review of cases in situations 
where the possibility of multiple instances of the same or 
similar errors existed.
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The variety of philosophies, policies, and practices across 
the 19 CRUs that participated in this project is no surprise. 
High-quality Conviction Review Units are balancing 
acts, seeking to satisfy a diverse set of stakeholders across 
multiple dimensions. CRUs seek to identify and rectify 
cases of injustice that have fallen through the cracks of 
our judicial system notwithstanding all of its intricate 
checks and balances. Given the complexities inherent in 
all of these goals, it is probably more surprising to note 
how many areas the DAs and leaders of CRUs did agree 
on than to observe the differences.
Conclusion
The best CRUs manage to evaluate and resolve a large 
number of claims of actual innocence by leveraging 
independence, flexibility, and transparency so that all 
involved – CRU attorneys, the defense bar, victims of 
crime, victims of procedural injustice, and communities – 
have confidence that the District Attorney and her office 
are focused on the legitimacy of all convictions secured by 
the office, and are using a thoughtful and reliable process 
of review, evaluation, and communication to ensure that 
the CRU’s balancing act is emphasizing the right metrics 
for the community (see Figure 16 below).
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Figure 16. The Competing Concerns of Conviction Review Units.
One could point to the small (but growing) number of 
CRU exonerations secured to date as evidence that the 
approach has its limitations. On the other hand, with so 
many brand-new CRUs, and so little data gathered by 
more established CRUs, a complete evaluation of the 
utility of the different approaches employed by the CRUs 
is clearly premature.  
Whether CRUs will live up to their promise is far from 
clear. CRUs have the potential to showcase the criminal 
justice system working at its best.  Done well, a CRU can 
be a force of good in the criminal justice community, a 
model that operates with objectivity and focuses on real-
world truth to integrate adversarial viewpoints, analyze 
conflicting and complex information and address claims 
for individuals suffering from a State-imposed injustice. 
Whether the model extends and realizes its potential as 
a force for education and improvement of techniques to 
investigate and adjudicate criminal charges or not, good 
faith CRUs that operate with independence, flexibility, 
and transparency can build bridges across what is too 
often a bitter ideological divide between prosecutors and 
defense counsel, and between law enforcement and the 
communities they serve, and restore the community’s 
faith that each part of the system is operating to ensure 
that perpetrators of crime – and only perpetrators of 
crime – are held accountable for their acts in ways that 
preserve the constitutional freedoms of all.
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This paper consists of quotes and synthesized observations 
gathered from semi-structured interviews with the 
leaders of 19 CRUs throughout the country, as well as 
with prosecutors in offices who did not have formal 
Conviction Review Units, but who believed that their 
offices conducted the analogous work if and when cases 
of actual innocence were alleged in their jurisdictions. (A 
copy of our questionnaire is included in the appendix to 
this paper.) We also spoke to a group of defense attorneys 
in the same jurisdictions as the CRUs to understand 
how people might perceive the activities of CRUs with 
different stated philosophies, policies, or practices.
APPENDIX A.  
METHODOLOGY
Conviction Review Units throughout the United States 
were identified through internet and other media research. 
The Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration 
of Justice, with the assistance of Barry Scheck of the 
Innocence Project, created an interview questionnaire 
(attached below as Appendix B) to be administered to 
at least one individual in each office in a leadership or 
supervisory role with the CRU in question.
Twenty-four offices were contacted by phone or email 
with interview requests, including twenty-three offices 
with active CRUs and one office that does not have a 
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CRU but was known through personal communication 
with the authors to have actively considered starting a 
CRU. Of the twenty-three offices with a CRU that were 
contacted, seventeen agreed to participate, with other 
opting not to participate or not responding to repeated 
requests. Of offices that affirmatively elected not to 
participate, the reason given for not participating was 
a belief on the part of the CRU representative that the 
CRU had not been in existence long enough to provide 
useful information to the project.
Participation in interviews was voluntary. Interviews 
were conducted in person where possible and by phone 
where necessary. All interviews were recorded using the 
Voice Base recording and human transcription system 
unless recording was declined by the interviewee. If 
the interviewee declined to be recorded, notes of the 
interview were taken contemporaneously. Transcripts or 
notes of interviews were logged, coded and organized 
in NVivo 10 for Windows. No review of comments 
or quotes was permitted unless quotes were sought for 
attribution, in which case the quotes have been reviewed 
and approved by the individual given attribution. Where 
statements were made by an interviewee about the 
perspective of external participants, an individual outside 
the CRU who was familiar with the CRU’s operations 
(e.g., a defense attorney who had communicated with 
the CRU in question) was contacted and his/her opinion 
requested. Such communications were memorialized 
through contemporaneous notes, but were not recorded.
A working draft of this paper was circulated to all 
originally contacted CRUs in December, 2015, and 
selected data and responses gathered from respondents 
were included in this version.
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APPENDIX B.  
Interview Guide for Conviction 
Review Unit Interviews
A.   Office/Unit Demographics
1. Office
i. Size of office
ii. Number of prosecutors
1. Is there an appeals unit?
2. Is there a post-conviction unit?
3. Does state attorney general handle state habeas? If yes, what is relationship with state AG?
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iii. Is there a police or investigator department that is part of the office?
1. If so, how many investigators?
iv. Nature of caseload (homicides, robberies, burglaries, narcotics, etc.)
v. Demographics of jurisdiction
2. How many different police departments are there within your jurisdiction?
3. CRU characteristics
i. When was the CRU first formed?
ii. Why – what was the occurrence or factor that prompted its creation?
iii. Size of CRU
1. Number/type of prosecutors?
a. Do they have other duties in the office? If so, please describe.
2. Other members who are non-prosecutors, such as investigators or clerical support?
a. Who do those investigators work for?  
i. Police or prosecutor, and are they 
ii. ex-police detailed or are they independent?
iv. How is CRU funded?
v. Is there training for CRU staff?
1. What does the training consist of ?
2. Who does it?
B.   Protocols and Procedures
1. Does the CRU have written protocols and procedures?
2. If so, what do they cover?
3. Can we have a copy?
C.   Case Acceptance Criteria
1. What are the sources of your cases/from where will you accept cases?
i. Public Defender
ii. Police
iii. Court
iv. Family member
v. Innocence Project/non-profit
vi. Other 
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2. What standard do you use before deciding to investigate or review a claim?
i. Is factual innocence required? What does factual innocence mean?
ii. A “colorable” claim of factual innocence?
iii. A “plausible” claim of factual innocence?
iv. A “reasonable possibility” of factual innocence?
v. If none of these adequately describes the standard, how would you define it?
3. Do you restrict your review to matters involving only “newly discovered evidence,” i.e., evidence that could 
not have been discovered with exercise of due diligence by counsel?
4. Do you consider “due process” claims while conducting a CRU review such as 
i. Undisclosed Brady/Impeachment material 
ii. Ineffective assistance of counsel
iii. Other “fair trial” claims
iv. If you do not, is there another unit in the DA’s Office that would consider such a case?
5. Would you accept a case where the motion for a new trial is outside the statute of limitations?
6. Do you cumulate or combine in any way evidence pointing toward factual innocence and evidence 
supporting a due process claim 
i. In your decision to investigate or review a claim? 
ii. In your decision to grant relief ? 
iii. If so, please describe in your own words that process works?
7. If the CRU discovers at any point in its review of a case that there is a “substantial claim” of misconduct 
against a prosecutor, how would that be handled?
i. By the CRU?
ii. Referred elsewhere in the office?
iii. Referred to an independent entity or party? 
iv. Is “substantial claim” the standard you would use, or is it another standard?
v. How severe would the misconduct need to be?
1. Legal error but honest mistake
2. Ethical
3. Criminal
vi. Is there a statutory procedure for such a referral in your jurisdiction? If so, how does it work?
vii. Are you free to follow a different procedure – appoint your own independent entity or party? Do you 
think it’s a good or bad practice? 
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8. Same question as 6, except for police misconduct? What triggers an independent person to come in and run 
the process or make decisions?
9. What is your ability to discipline or fire an underperforming prosecutor/investigator, or one who commits 
intentional misconduct?
10. Does the CRU consider guilty plea cases?
i. If so, is there a higher standard that must be met before deciding to review or investigate? What is that 
standard? 
11. Are there cases where the CRU is more likely to conduct an investigation or review than others?
i. An application for DNA testing?
ii. An application for a review of fingerprints?
iii. An application for other scientific testing?
iv. An application involving allegations of prior unreliable forensic science?
v. An application involving allegations against a police officer or prosecutor with a prior history of 
misconduct?
vi. An application involving allegations against a jailhouse informant?
vii. An application involving allegations of eyewitness identification?
viii. An application involving allegations of a false confession?
ix. Other?
D.   Conduct of Review
1. How many applications received?
2. How many accepted for investigation or review?
3. In how many cases did you consent to relief ?
4. In how many cases did courts grant relief where no agreement could be reached?
5. What is the breakdown on grounds for relief:
i. Innocence;
1. Based on DNA
2. Based on other scientific evidence
3. Recantation 
ii. Due process violation
1. Brady
2. Ineffective assistance
3. Other grounds
iii. Both Innocence and due process violations
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6. What is your practice on post-conviction disclosure of your file and/or police files?
7. What documents do you make available to petitioner’s counsel in a review?
i. Open file
ii. Open file but for safety concerns
iii. Non-privileged
iv. Originally discoverable
v. Other standard
8. Do you reach out to other agencies that might have documents about the case that are not in your physical 
possession?
i. Would you make these documents available to the defense?
9. What is your practice on requests for disclosure from the petitioner seeking relief ?
i. Request petitioner’s file except for attorney-client communications?
ii. Request only documents relating to petitioner’s proffer?
10. Would you consent to greater disclosure of your file or police files if there were an agreement with 
petitioner’s counsel not to disclose the information until the Conviction Integrity review process is complete?
11. Will you share documents with opposing counsel and allow them to use those documents in a subsequent 
appeal if you find no need to grant relief ?
i. Would that make you more or less likely to share information?
12. What is the role of the prosecutors who tried the underlying case in the review process
i. Witness?
ii. Any role in the decision making process
13. Does petitioner’s counsel get an opportunity to:
i. Make a presentation?
ii. Participate in the investigation?
iii. Respond to evidence discovered in the course of the investigation?
iv. Any other role? 
14. Under what circumstances would you do a PCRA test of forensic data/DNA?
i. Under what circumstances would you:
1. Conduct that review voluntarily
2. Agree if asked
3. Fight the request?
ii. What if inmate turned down a testing request at trial?
iii. What lab would conduct that testing?
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15. Do you reach out to other agencies that might have documents about the case that are not in your physical 
possession?
i. E.g., medical examiner in Philadelphia
ii. Would you make these documents available to the defense?
16. What discovery, if anything, do you require the defendant or the source of the allegations for review to turn 
over to the CRU?
i. PAIP suggestion: New, credible, and ideally corroborative evidence
ii. Example: we will turn over all information except ___________; important to fill in all the blanks there.
iii. Do you have agreements for data sharing to control or limit disclosure to the review, and/or to ensure 
no media leaking, etc.?
iv. Would an information sharing agreement be useful?  
v. If so, what would it need to include?
17. What information would cause you to feel that you had investigated enough?
18. Is the person who brought the case to your attention given a chance to refute your conclusions before they 
are announced?
i. Example: Brooklyn has independent 3 atty interim review panel – they are supposed to come in and 
critique the CRU’s review.
ii. Example: Lake County (IL) has a special paralegal/investigator position, and a 10-person review team 
made up of people outside Lake County
19. How are your conclusions announced? Do you explain why you have made a decision and if so, to whom?
E.   Criteria for Granting Relief
1. What is the standard for consenting to relief on innocence grounds?
i. Clear or convincing evidence of innocence?
ii. A reasonable probability of a different outcome?
iii. Application involving claim of self-defense or claim of mens rea?
iv. Interests of justice?
2. How is that standard different from what PCRA requires in your jurisdiction?
3. In consenting to relief on a due process claim, do you consider new factual evidence of innocence unrelated 
to the due process claim and not part of the original trial record?
4. What other factors might you consider in terms of accepting or rejecting factors?
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F.   Audits
1. When a case is reversed for failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, have you ever conducted an audit of 
prior cases of the prosecutor involved?
2. The police officers? 
3. The prosecutor’s supervisors? 
4. Do you think such an audit is a good idea? If not, why not?
5. Learning from error – what they have learned, what is important, what they would advise people to do or 
worry about or whatever… political/real limitations in various places.
G.   Learning from Error
1. Does the CRU catalog errors that might have occurred in cases it reviews?
2. Does it communicate those errors to anyone inside or outside the Office?
3. It is a role of the CRU to identify, communicate or implement changes as a result of lessons learned in cases 
reviewed?
i. If so, how does the CRU do this?
1. For internal changes
2. For external changes (e.g., new eyewitness ID procedures that would need to be implemented by police) 
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APPENDIX C.  
National Commission on 
Forensic Science Directive 
Recommendation on Root 
Cause Analysis (RCA)
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Subcommittee 
Interim Solutions 
Commission Action 
On August 11, 2015, the Commission voted to adopt this 
recommendation with a more than two-thirds majority 
(93% affirmative) vote. 
Type of Work Product 
Policy Recommendation. 
Recommendation 
The U.S. Attorney General should direct the adoption 
of appropriate root cause analysis protocols for all 
forensic science service providers (FSSPs) or forensic 
science medical providers (FSMPs) who are part of the 
federal government or are receiving federal funds, and to 
establish policy for restoration procedures that comply 
with the recommended root cause analysis process. 
RECOMMENDATION: The US Attorney General 
should direct the adoption of appropriate root cause 
analysis protocols for all forensic science service providers 
(FSSPs) or forensic science medical providers (FSMPs) 
that are part of the federal government or are receiving 
federal funds, and to establish policy for restoration 
procedures that comply with the recommended root 
cause analysis process.
Background
Forensic laboratories accredited under programs that 
adhere to the ISO/IEC 17025, General requirements 
for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories, 
are required to “establish a policy and a procedure and 
shall designate appropriate authorities for implementing 
corrective action when nonconforming work or departures 
from the policies and procedures in the management 
system or technical operations have been identified.” A 
problem or nonconformity may be identified through 
a number of different techniques, including internal 
and external audits, reviews of the management system, 
customer feedback, or staff observations.
Corrective Actions are potential solutions that address 
a nonconformity and eliminate or minimize the risk 
of repeating the nonconforming work or departure 
from policies and procedures. A Corrective Action is a 
requirement when any error or nonconformity is identified. 
ISO 17025 (4.9.1) states that “The laboratory shall 
have a policy and procedures that shall be implemented 
when any aspect of its testing and/or calibration work, 
or the results of this work, do not conform to its own 
procedures or the agreed requirements of the customer.” 
(Emphasis added.) ISO 17025 (4.9.2) states that “Where 
the evaluation indicates that the nonconforming work 
could recur or that there is doubt about the compliance 
of the laboratory’s operations with its own policies and 
procedures, the corrective action procedures given in 4.11 
shall be promptly followed”. In addition, “The laboratory 
shall establish a policy and a procedure and shall designate 
appropriate authorities for implementing corrective 
action when nonconforming work or departures from 
the policies and procedures in the management system 
or technical operations have been identified.” ISO 17025 
(4.11.1). To establish the best corrective actions, and 
as required by ISO 17025 (4.11.2), an investigation is 
initiated to determine the root cause(s) of the situation or 
condition: “The procedure for corrective action shall start 
with an investigation to determine the root cause(s) of the 
problem.” Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a critical step of 
determining corrective actions for substantive errors, and 
may be the most important part of establishing proper 
corrective actions.
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Implementation Recommendations
Understanding that all human systems are fallible, and 
that risks in a system can be minimized, the Department 
of Justice should encourage federal Forensic Science 
Service Providers (FSSPs) and Forensic Science Medical 
Providers (FSMPs) to consistently strive to be “high 
reliability organizations” and ensure a culture of constant 
self-monitoring and self-improvement by incorporating 
established practices of “just culture”1 and learning from 
error. To this end, the Department of Justice shall require 
its FSSPs and FSMPs to create and maintain protocols 
around the conduct of Root Cause Analysis (RCA) to 
address nonconforming work or departures from policies 
or procedures.2 The Department or its designee will 
periodically review those RCA policies to ensure they 
include the following:
• Objective guidance as to when a RCA should 
be conducted;
• The regular provision of appropriate training 
to key personnel on how a RCA should be 
conducted;
• Training to all employees within the FSSP 
and FSMP on RCA principles and processes, 
to enhance the quality of the RCA and its 
acceptance within the laboratory environment;
• Proper construction of the investigative team 
conducting a RCA;
• Definition of and procedures for an 
investigation that identifies the extent of 
nonconforming work and its causal factor(s) 
in a blame-free environment, prioritizing 
continuous improvement of laboratory 
quality, safety and reliability by learning from 
nonconformities;
• Recommendations that identify corrective 
actions to minimize the chance of future 
recurrence of nonconformities identified in the 
RCA;
• Guidelines that define when and how to 
identify other cases that may have also 
been affected by an identical or similar 
nonconformity, and the obligation to conduct 
a retrospective re-analysis of and address such 
cases;
• Communication of the existence of the 
nonconformity to internal and external 
individuals impacted by the nonconformity;
• Provision of Safe Harbor to employees 
who report nonconformities or near misses, 
including use immunity for participation in 
an RCA and limitations on the disclosure of 
materials generated in the course of an RCA;
• Implementation of actions designed to 
minimize the chance of future similar 
nonconformities and to appropriately redress 
injury caused by the nonconformity; and
• Documentation of each nonconformity as well 
as the proposed corrective action in a manner 
that does not publicly identify confidential 
information regarding specific individuals or 
cases, but that makes the learnings from the 
RCA publicly available for the review and 
benefit of other FSSPs and FSMPs.
Implementation Strategy
The US Attorney General should collaborate with FSSPs 
and FSMPs as well as experts in the field of RCA to 
establish guidelines in compliance with the above for the 
design, implementation, and review of RCAs, and for the 
periodic review of protocols and procedures regarding 
RCAs that may be updated over time. In addition, the 
Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) 
should be tasked with further exploration and periodic 
definition of best practices in RCA as applied to FSSPs 
and FSMPs.
1 A “just culture” can be defined as “a culture that recognizes that competent professionals make mistakes and acknowledges that even competent professionals will 
develop unhealthy norms (shortcuts, “routine rule violations”), but has zero tolerance for reckless behavior.” Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality Glossary, 
available at http://psnet.ahrq.gov/popup_glossary.aspx?name=justculture.
2 Different terms may be used for unplanned and/or unintended occurrences in human systems, including adverse events, errors/omissions, mistakes, nonconformities, 
etc. We have selected the terms “nonconforming work” or “nonconformity” to include each of these various unplanned and/or unintended occurrences as well as 
departures from policies or procedures, and note that any of the above may include good faith or malfeasant behavior. Furthermore, “nonconformity” is broadly defined 
herein to include “near misses,” or unplanned occurrences or events that had the potential to result in a nonconformity but did not do so due to a fortunate turn of 
events, as opposed to a deliberate system design. Near misses should be addressed with the same diligence and vigor as actual nonconformities.
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APPENDIX A: 
Supporting Information and Examples of 
Root Cause Analysis
Despite the best intentions and best efforts of forensic 
science professionals, supervisors, and managers, 
nonconformities will occur in forensic laboratories, 
as in any complex organization. It is the position of 
the National Commission on Forensic Science that all 
responsible forensic science providers should embrace 
and implement a just culture1 of “learning from error” and 
continuous improvement to minimize the occurrence of 
nonconformities and/or misconduct in the performance 
of forensic science services over time. This is true 
regardless of an organization’s history of error, since 
“[a]dverse events, like the number of adverse events, 
are poor indicators of the general safety of a system… 
Safe organizations can still have bad adverse events, 
whereas unsafe systems can escape them for long periods. 
Furthermore, progress creates new risk that is difficult 
to anticipate but is a feature of new procedures and 
technologies.”2 
Forensic laboratories accredited under programs that 
adhere to the ISO/IEC 17025 General requirements for 
the competence of testing and calibration laboratories 
are required to “establish a policy and a procedure and 
shall designate appropriate authorities for implementing 
corrective action when nonconforming work or departures 
from the policies and procedures in the management 
system or technical operations have been identified.” A 
problem may be identified through a number of different 
techniques, including internal and external audits, reviews 
of the management system, customer feedback, or staff 
observations.
“Corrective actions” are potential solutions that eliminate 
or minimize the risk of repeating the nonconforming work 
or departure from policies and procedures. Corrective 
action is a requirement when any error or nonconformity 
is identified. To identify the best corrective actions, and 
as required by ISO 17025,3 an investigation is initiated to 
determine the root cause(s) of the situation or condition. 
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a critical step and may be 
the most important part of identifying and implementing 
appropriate corrective actions.
 
ISO/IEC 17025 also requires laboratories to establish 
procedures to identify needed improvements and potential 
sources of nonconformities. This proactive process is 
termed “preventative action” and follows a similar process 
of Root Cause Analysis to identify the best solutions to 
prevent or minimize the chance of nonconformity from 
occurring.
RCA has been used productively not only throughout the 
healthcare industry but also in aviation, manufacturing and 
other quality-minded industries to conduct event reviews 
that lead to actionable change of policies and procedures 
to reduce the occurrence of nonconformities.4 The goal of 
RCA is to learn from nonconformities and to implement 
corrective actions in order to reduce further similar events 
that might compromise lab report or opinion integrity. 
An important feature of the RCA is that it is a blame-
free analysis: “[b]laming and punishing for adverse events 
that are made by well-intentioned people… drives the 
problem of iatrogenic harm underground and alienates 
people who are best placed to prevent such problems 
from recurring.”5 
1 A “just culture” can be defined as “a culture that recognizes that competent professionals make mistakes and acknowledges that even competent professionals will 
develop unhealthy norms (shortcuts, “routine rule violations”), but has zero tolerance for reckless behavior.” Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality Glossary, 
available at http://psnet.ahrq.gov/popup_glossary.aspx?name=justculture.
2 Barach P, Berwick DM. Patient Safety and the reliability of health care systems. Ann Intern Med 2003, 138(12):997-8. Barach uses the health care term “adverse 
event” to define an unintended outcome; in the forensic science context we use the ISO 9000-defined term “nonconformity,” which encompasses any deviation from a 
policy or procedure regardless of its impact.
3 ISO/IEC 17025:2005(E) (hereafter, ISO 17025), General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories, Section 4.11.2 Cause Analysis. 
“The procedure for corrective action shall start with an investigation to determine the root cause(s) of the problem.”
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A subset of nonconformity is the “near miss,” a 
nonconformity or unplanned event that had the potential 
to affect the accuracy or reliability of the laboratory results 
or work product, but did not do so through a fortuitous 
intervention. Only a fortunate break in the chain of 
events prevented a potentially systemic nonconformity. 
Near misses are nonconformities and must be evaluated 
as such. Further, they should be evaluated in the same way 
they would be if the nonconformity had actually occurred. 
To do otherwise would suggest that because this near 
miss did not result in a nonconformity, the contributing 
factors that caused the near miss have been resolved.
This document sets forth recommendations for the 
standardized use of RCA to identify why an error has 
occurred in a forensic laboratory setting and make 
recommendations for the prevention of the future 
occurrence of similar nonconformities.
Types of Nonconformities Suitable for Root Cause 
Analysis and A Structure for Analyzing Causes.
It is common for a RCA to identify multiple factors that 
combined to cause the nonconformity. Indeed, the purpose 
of the RCA is to identify any and all contributing factors. 
While no framework can specifically identify and catalog 
all factors that could contribute to a nonconformity, one 
framework for evaluating nonconformities has been 
provided by British researcher Dr. James Reasons. Dr. 
Reasons describes three different types of error:
1. Decision error: One made because information, 
knowledge, or experience is lacking
2. Skill-based error: One made while engaged in a 
familiar task
3. Perceptual error: One  made  because  input  
to  one  of  the  five  senses  is  degraded  or 
incomplete.
These errors typically fall into one of four categories:
1. Unsafe Acts: those performed by the operator
2. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts: environmental 
factors contributing to the error
3. Supervision: management actions affecting the 
operator
4. Organizational Influences: culture, policies, or 
procedures of the organization that affect the 
operator.
Dr. Reasons describes some nonconformities as “errors” 
and others as “violations,” distinct from errors in that they 
are “intentional departure[s] from accepted practice.” 
Violations may be:
1. Routine violation: habitual, repeat departures, 
enabled by “bending of the rules.”
2. Exceptional violation: a willful departure outside 
norms, not condoned by management.
A structure for categorizing different causes of many 
common unintentional or intentional nonconformities 
follows.
4 ISO 17025, Section 4.12.” 4.12.1 Needed improvements and potential sources of nonconformities, either technical or concerning the management system, shall be 
identified. When improvement opportunities are identified or if preventive action is required, action plans shall be developed, implemented and monitored to reduce 
the likelihood of the occurrence of such nonconformities and to take advantage of the opportunities for improvement.
5 Rinciman WB, Merry AF, Error, blame, and the law in health care – an antipodean perspective. Ann Intern Med. 2003 Jun 17; 138(12):974-9.
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Figure 1.  Types of Unsafe Acts.
Preconditions for 
Unsafe Acts
Environmental 
Factors
Personnel 
Factors
Conditions of 
the	Operator
Physical 
Environment
Technical 
Environment
Communication/	
Coordination 
Planning
Fitness for 
Duty
Adverse  
Mental State
Adverse 
Physiological 
State
Chronic 
Performance 
Limitation
Figure 2. Causes of Preconditions for 
Unsafe Acts.
Figure 3.  Causes for Nonconformities of Supervision.
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Figure 4.  Causes of Undue Organizations 
Influences.
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How should an RCA be conducted?
It cannot be emphasized enough that RCAs are not 
performance evaluations, and their purpose is learning, 
not punishment. Accordingly, personnel and discipline 
issues should be handled through a separate process 
from RCA. In many contexts, including transportation 
and healthcare, the activities and output of an RCA are 
inadmissible as evidence and excluded from discovery 
in litigation to ensure this purity of purpose. The “just 
culture” focus of the RCA creates shared accountability: 
the system is responsible for providing an environment 
that is optimally designed for safe care and staff is 
responsible for their choices of behavior and for reporting 
system vulnerabilities.6 
While specific recommendations for the conduct of 
RCAs may differ, a few themes emerge from review of 
RCAs across industries:
• Construction. RCAs should be performed by 
a team. There is a benefit to engaging multiple 
perspectives and multidisciplinary personnel 
whose backgrounds encompass the various 
parts of the technical analysis and management 
systems, and reporting process to ensure a 
holistic review of factors that contributed to 
the nonconformity that might otherwise be 
overlooked.
o The number of participants conducting 
the RCA can vary depending on the 
nature of the nonconformity. For more 
substantial nonconformities, RCAs 
often work best when performed by 
multidisciplinary teams, from all levels of 
staff, with fundamental knowledge of the 
specific area involved.
o The team should have people who were 
not involved with the specific incident to 
ensure objectivity in the review.
o A facilitator should be appointed who was 
not directly implicated in the incident.
• Investigation. The nonconformity should be 
analyzed for its causal factors.
o Detailed review of the event by the team
o Identify problems – what went wrong. Is 
this a one-time event or a recurring error?
o Identify Root Causes/Contributing 
Factors – why it went wrong. Focus on 
objective causes and minimize causation 
conclusions that focus solely on blaming 
an individual or individuals, rather than 
evaluating environmental, organizational, 
supervisory, and other factors where 
possible
o Prioritize the factors that contributed to 
the nonconformity, evaluating both their 
severity and the probability that these 
factors will cause harm in the future
o Develop interventions that conform 
with the prioritization and likelihood of 
repetition of the various factors
• Recommendation. The team should make 
specific, prioritized recommendations for 
corrective actions that are intended to 
6 Agrawal, A, Patient Safety: A Case-based Comprehensive Guide, 2014.
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prevent occurrences of similar events. The 
recommendations may incorporate input 
from primary operators who will be affected 
by the recommendations to enhance their 
ability to be implemented efficiently. These 
recommendations should be made in writing 
and stored for future review as needed.
• Implementation. Implement those corrective 
actions, considering the quality of analysis, 
the cost of the suggested interventions, and 
their likely real-world impact on safety and 
reliability.
• Evaluation. Evaluate the corrective actions and 
take subsequent additional action as needed.
• Professional Standards and a “Just Culture.” A 
“Just Culture” is one that balances blame-free 
event reviews with the need for professionals, 
including FSSP/FSMPs, to be personally 
accountable for adherence to reasonable 
standards of professional conduct. Typically, 
this involves the creation of a separate 
disciplinary process, managed outside the 
RCA process, in the event that the RCA 
uncovers evidence of intentional wrongdoing 
by any individual. A sample tool to assess the 
necessity of such a parallel disciplinary process 
used in a hospital setting is attached.
To preserve the integrity of the RCA as a blame-free 
event review, it is important that any disciplinary process 
be additional to, and separate from, the RCA, and that 
the individual in charge of making determinations about 
disciplinary action be informed by, but not reporting to or 
involved in, the RCA itself.
Documentation/Implementation of Improvement.
ISO/IEC 17025 4.11.3 and 4.11.4 requires all selected 
changes resulting from corrective action investigations be 
documented and implemented. In addition, laboratories 
are required to monitor the results of the corrective 
actions to ensure the effectiveness of the solutions; this 
monitoring should similarly be documented.
In the criminal justice context, documentation and 
implementation of corrective action should include 
the obligation on the part of the panel conducting the 
RCA to communicate the nonconformity to individuals 
or agencies involved in casework that may have been 
affected by the nonconformity.7 This duty extends to 
other individuals who may be similarly situated to those 
directly affected by the nonconformity that has been 
discovered. For example, an RCA could be performed 
on a nonconformity regarding the miscalibration of an 
instrument used to assess blood tests in a single DUI case. 
If an error is discovered, it would lead to an obligation 
to identify all others who might be affected by the 
miscalibration and inform them about the re-evaluation 
of their cases. Not all nonconformities affect casework, 
but when they do, it is important to note that the life and 
liberty of a human being may be (or may not be) affected.
For this reason, forensic science service providers have a 
duty to inform others of the nonconformity, which should 
include a new, amended, or supplemental report with 
the correct results and an explanation of the initiating 
nonconformity distributed to the various parties in a 
case. The FSSP/FSMP must work with the proper legal 
authority to identify and notify all individuals whose 
cases were affected by the nonconformity/error, and 
should participate in the suitable remedy as appropriate.
7 Note that corrective action may correct errors from which inferences of guilt or innocence may be drawn.
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Training of Personnel to Conduct RCAs.
Root cause analysis may be the most difficult part 
of establishing proper corrective actions following a 
nonconformity. By becoming proficient at investigating 
and solving problems of nonconformity in their work, 
a laboratory will ultimately need to conduct fewer 
investigations. But if done inappropriately, a root cause 
analysis investigation may lead to the inadvertent blame 
of individuals instead of identifying where a work process 
has broken down. Such blame will be detrimental to 
encouraging participation in the root cause analysis 
process.
A study that evaluated an aggregated group of RCAs 
in the healthcare setting identified lack of time (55%), 
unwilling colleagues (34%) and inter-professional 
differences (31%) as the top three barriers to RCAs.8 
Each of these barriers can be addressed, at least in part, 
by experienced facilitation and support from senior 
management within the organization.
Accordingly, a recommendation is made to establish 
key individuals within a forensic laboratory to serve 
as facilitators of root cause panels. Characteristics of 
successful RCA facilitators will likely include, but may 
not be limited to:
• Interested in facilitating and documenting 
problems
• Excellent listening skills
• Naturally inquisitive
• Comfortable speaking in front of a group
• Detail-oriented
• Relatively calm disposition
• Good rapport with front-line personnel and 
management
Once selected, these individuals should be required to 
receive annual specialized training on the topic of root 
cause analysis to include practice in running group 
facilitations.
When Should an RCA Be Conducted?
ISO 17025 (4.9.2) states, “Where the evaluation indicates 
that the nonconforming work could recur or that there is 
doubt about the compliance of the laboratory’s operations 
with its own policies and procedures, the corrective action 
procedures given in 4.11 shall be promptly followed.”  ISO 
17025 (4.11.2) continues, “The procedure for corrective 
action shall start with an investigation to determine 
the root cause(s) of the problem.” Properly done, RCAs 
include:  investigation of facts and circumstances that 
caused or contributed to the nonconformity; development 
of interventions that should minimize the chance of 
future similar nonconformities, implementation of 
those interventions, and evaluation of the impact of the 
interventions. As such, they should be deployed with an 
eye towards the severity and risk of the problem.
Some laboratories, including the FBI Laboratory, 
categorize nonconformities in their work product as 
Level 1 or Level 2. Level 1 nonconformities are situations 
or conditions that directly affect and have a fundamental 
impact on the quality of the work product or the integrity 
of evidence. Level 2 nonconformities are situations or 
conditions that may affect the quality of the work, but 
does not, to any significant degree, affect the fundamental 
reliability of the work product or the integrity of the 
evidence.
Another approach, modeled after that of the Veterans’ 
Health Administration (VHA), evaluates whether a full 
RCA is needed based on the severity of the nonconformity 
and the likelihood of its reoccurrence:9 
8 Bowie, Paul, Skinner, J. and de Wet, C. Training health care professionals in root cause analysis: a cross-sectional study of post-training experiences, benefits, and attitudes. 
BMC Health Services Research 2013, 13:50.
9 A “near miss” should be included for RCA review if its score qualifies when viewed as if the event had actually occurred.
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Probability Severity
 Catastrophic Major Moderate Minor 
 Systemic	errors	in		 Casework	or	proficiency	 Clerical	nonconformity	 Clerical 
	 procedure	that	affect	 test	error	that	affects	 affecting	result	but	 nonconformity 
	 several	outcomes	or		 outcome	or	reported	result.	 corrected	during	the	 that	does	not 
	 reported	results;		 Potential	problems	that	may	 review	process	prior	to		 affect	outcome 
	 intentional	misconduct	 affect	the	reliability,	accuracy	 reporting;	nonconformity	 or	reported 
	 or	recklessness	in	 or	performance	of	a	test		 that	does	not	affect	outcome		 result 
	 execution	of	role	 procedure	or	policy;	serious		 or	reported	result 
	 	 negligence	in	execution	of	role.
Frequent	 3	 3	 2	 1	  
Likely	to	occur 
multiple	times	in	 
1	year
Occasional 3	 3	 2	 1 
May	occur	several 
times	in	1-2	years
Uncommon 3	 2	 1	 1 
May happen once in 
2-5	years
Remote 3	 2	 1	 1 
May happen once  
in	5+	years
RCA Required for 3, Recommended for 2, Optional for 1
Table 1. Potential RCA Initiation Matrix.
When an RCA is required or recommended, it should 
be conducted both on actual nonconformities and 
on nonconformities that could have occurred but for 
a fortuitous intervention or timely discovery. Such 
interventions are called “near misses,” and they should 
be scored in the SAC Matrix as if they were an event 
that actually occurred. Such reviews of near misses or 
“close calls” are valuable “because they occur much more 
frequently than adverse or reviewable sentinel events 
and do not require harm to a patient before learning 
can occur.”10 Indeed, “the absence of safety, like poor 
health, is clearly signaled by near misses, injuries, and 
fatalities, which lend themselves to close analysis and 
quantification.”11 
It is also important that the RCA process include steps 
designed to understand whether or not the error has been 
repeated, and if so, the extent of the nonconformities. An 
example would be the use of an improper reagent in a 
chemical test – appropriate auditing should be conducted 
to ensure what other tests, if any, might have been similarly 
compromised by the improper reagent. Another example 
might be the calibration of lab equipment, which would 
likely require a review of all tests conducted between the 
dates of the last calibration and the discovery of the error.
10 Bagian, James et al., The Veterans Affairs Root Cause Analysis System in Action. Journal on Quality Improvement, 2002, Vol. 28 No. 10, 531 – 545, at 531.
11 Making Sense of Root Cause Analysis Investigations of Surgery-Related Adverse Events, Cassin, Bryce R., Barach, Paul R., Surg Clin N Am. 92 (2012) 101-115.
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12 To the extent an error justifying a RCA occurs in a criminal case, the defendant may have enhanced rights to learn about the results of the RCA as part of his/her 
criminal defense. Such an issue can be managed by the court of relevant jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis, with the information that the Attorney General views the 
protection of RCA work product to be an important public interest that does not preclude any discovery sought by the defendant on the underlying facts at issue.
Creating a “Safe Harbor” to Encourage Transparency 
and Reporting of Error
It has been shown in numerous settings that providing 
a “safe” environment – that is, an environment that 
encourages and prevents negative use of important quality 
and/or reliability information – enhances participation in 
RCAs, and thus improves both their frequency and their 
substance.
The key characteristics of such a Safe Harbor include:
1.  Qualified Immunity for Participants.
a. An individual should not be disciplined in any 
way for participating in a RCA, or offering a 
candid and good faith assessment of the role of 
others in an incident under review.
b. In addition, an individual who reports an error 
should receive positive consideration from any 
disciplinary body if the individual self-reports 
an error within a reasonable time after the 
incident (e.g., 10 days). Note that this does not 
protect the individual from any liability that 
may accrue for the individual’s role in the error, 
though the FSSP/FSMPs should consider 
the positive impact of the self- reported 
information in its assessment of any necessary 
punishment.
2.  Protection from discovery for Notes, Minutes, 
Correspondence, and/or Reports generated as part of 
an RCA. In order to ensure that the RCA is an event 
review only, designed to learn from error and improve 
upstream processes, materials generated as part of an 
RCA should not, generally speaking, be discoverable in 
civil or criminal litigation related to the incident. This is 
in keeping with Peer Review Protection Acts that hold 
healthcare event reviews as undiscoverable in 46 states 
throughout the United States.12 
3.  Nothing in this safe harbor should be viewed 
as limiting the discovery rights of individuals to 
information about the underlying facts related to a 
nonconformity (i.e., facts or documents pertaining to 
the actual nonconformity, as opposed to documents 
generated by the RCA process). The purpose of the 
safe harbor is merely to ensure that no one is penalized 
as a result of his or her participation in a valuable 
event review designed to improve the technical 
and management system process, the quality of the 
laboratory work product, and the fair administration of 
justice.
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APPENDIX D.   
Additional Writings on 
Conviction Review Units
Scheck, Barry. Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need Them, Why They Will Work, and 
Models For Creating Them. Cardozo L. Rev. 31:6, 2010, pp. 2215 – 2256.
“Conviction Integrity Units: Vanguard of Criminal Justice Reform,” Center for Prosecutorial Integrity White Paper, 
released Dec. 4, 2014
Barkow et al., Center of the Administration of Criminal Law, New York University School of Law, “Establishing 
Conviction Integrity Programs in Prosecutors’ Offices” 
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Moore, Terri, “Prosecutors Reinvestigate Questionable Evidence: Dallas Establishes a `Conviction Integrity Unit,’” 
Criminal Justice, Volume 26, Number 3, Fall 2011
Gross, Samuel, et al., “The National Registry of Exonerations: Exonerations in 2014,” Published January 27, 2015, 
available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx.
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